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ABSTRACT 
 
 
At a time when digital technologies have become ubiquitous in music making, and 
where the majority of research into music technology happens at the 
computational ‘cutting edge’, this practice-based PhD explores analogue 
technologies deemed, in the main, obsolete, anachronistic, or as quaint nostalgic 
throwbacks, and asks how a combination of technological, historical and practice-
based research, focused through commitment to artistic outputs in the domain of 
music technology, might shed new light on the terms analogue and digital, and on 
the nature of the analogue-digital relationship.  
 
Underlying much contemporary enthusiasm for ‘the digital’ are progress 
narratives that rely on both a succession logic (old analogue technology gets 
replaced by new digital technology) and an assumption of isomorphism (the 
digital technology does all the same things as the replaced technology, though 
often with ‘enhanced’ affordances). This thesis questions such assumptions along 
historical, philosophical and practice-based trajectories. 
 
Key to these research trajectories is the trans-discipline cybernetics, in particular 
the second-order cybernetics of Gordon Pask, whose self-designation 
‘philosophical mechanic’ indicates the importance he placed on a cyclical, mutually 
accommodating thinking-designing-making. Pask presented a powerful practical 
methodology for the examination and creation of dynamical systems in flux, 
systems that evolve as a result of participant interaction, systems that can be seen 
to manifest self-organisation. Second-order cybernetics puts the emphasis on 
processes in interaction rather than positing pre-existing objects (including 
concepts) in a world ‘out there’. Cybernetics helps us to explore systems whose 
complexity and interdependence precludes the separation out into constituent 
parts, systems where control is shared across multiple mutually interacting 
dimensions, and where the observer is a committed participant whose actions, 
interests and biases cannot be divorced from the interactions therein. 
 
  
Two other key concepts are: (1) transduction, which relates energy, information, 
patterns of growth, or other dynamical processes across media or between 
domains; (2) performativity, an interventional act that brings forth a world. 
Transduction is essential to an understanding of recording studio processes and 
practices: the microphone, signal processing and recording itself all rely on 
transduction. When viewed from a performative perspective, actions such as 
recording are found to be carried out very differently when the final stage of 
transduction is discrete (the case with the now ubiquitous digital audio 
workstation) or continuous (such as recording to tape). This difference is 
primarily due to the hyper-plasticity of digital audio, a taking of sound ‘out of 
time’. Rather than seeing this as an evolution of ‘precursor’ analogue technologies, 
as most accounts have it, this thesis takes the perspective that this is a difference in 
kind, rather than one of degree, and explores that difference with a particular 
focus on emergent and intertwined cultural, embodied and technological systems, 
rather than on end products.  
 
The second half of the thesis presents the compositional practice, ranging from 
experimental work on tape music composition and installation, through a series of 
modular synthesis live performances, to tape-based recording of pop music. The 
physical, gestural engagement with the resistant materiality of these technologies 
emphasises a very different cognitive engagement with processes of composition 
and production to that which happens with supposed ‘successor’ digital 
technologies; assumptions of isomorphism, buttressed by skeuomorphic emulation, 
tend to occlude this cognitive distinction.  
 
This thesis is offered as an act of cybernetic musicking – resolutely practical in 
orientation, with a wide-ranging, trans-disciplinary theoretical framework, and 
with the emphasis not on things but on ongoing processes in complex interaction 
with a world in constant becoming. 
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 1 
THESIS MOTTO 
 
 
“It’s growing an ear”, Gordon Pask (quoted in Beer, 2001, 555).  
 
 
 
  
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The analogue-digital distinction matters. It is a “difference which makes a 
difference” (Bateson, 2000, 315).1 Distinction does not mean opposition: analogue 
does not equal ‘not digital’. Rather, the analogue-digital distinction denotes a 
systemic demarcation that has, in some 80 or so years of conjoined significance, 
allowed scientists, engineers, philosophers, musicians and others to gain some 
purchase on various processes, primarily technological, but also biological and 
cognitive. Like an analogy, in that it “always involves both a similarity and a 
distinction” (Pask, 1979a, 221), but generatively the inverse, the analogue-digital 
relationship is one of cleaving apart across an axis of similarity: analogue or digital 
computation, recording, signal, watch, or what have you.2  
 
It is certainly not the only way to make a cut in the domain of technological 
musicking3 – this thesis also offers transduction and performativity as fruitful 
alternatives – but, given the contemporary privileging of the term ‘digital’, 
academic attention given to ‘the digital’, and the well-known ubiquity of digital 
devices in music technology (as in a bewildering profusion of other areas), the 
analogue-digital distinction is examined here in some considerable detail. This 
exploration, both practical and theoretical, is offered: (1) in reaction against the 
strange state of affairs where analogue has come to mean ‘not digital’, or 
‘everything outside of the computer’ (see Sterne (2016), and cf. chapter 2); (2) in 
support of some much needed contextual and technological specificity such that 
the two terms can continue to do useful work in a variety of areas; and (3) as 
antidote to what seem to be prevalent tendencies in contemporary culture: a 
fixation on the computational, with underlying assumptions that digitisation is 
                                               
1 Bateson is discussing “units of information”, rather than the analogue-digital distinction. 
I employ this quote because of its productive resonances, and because the demarcation of 
meaningful distinction, which Bateson is referring to, is central to what follows. 
2 Generation of analogy is, inversely, creation of a similarity across an axis of distinction. 
3 See Small (1998) and cf. p.7. 
 3 
inexorable, that a digital ‘switchover’ is inevitable, and that ‘analogue’ is by nature 
obsolete, or at best, anachronistic. 4 
 
The analogue and digital ‘what have you’, of the thesis title originates in a 
footnoted comment by John Haugeland, discussed in more detail in chapter 2 (cf. 
p.34). It baulks a persistent contemporary tendency to pronounce on ‘the digital’ 
(and to a lesser extent ‘the analogue’), by insisting on the need for contextual 
specificity when using these terms. This thesis proposes that any useful definition 
of either term is impossible unless the term prefixes a referent, a noun, a process, 
or what have you. Thus one can define analogue or digital computation, but the 
definition will not port over to analogue or digital recording. The analogue and 
digital what have you thus operates as a placeholder for all the things analogue 
and digital may prefix, while insisting that they cannot exist in isolation and must 
prefix something. 
 
In both scholarly and commercial accounts of music technology history, one of the 
most common stories told about how we got to where we are is of replacement along 
lines of continuity. In this narrative an analogue technology is replaced by a digital 
version that does all the same things, in a similar way. For example, multitrack 
tape is supplanted by the digital audio workstation (DAW). The digital version is 
frequently presented as offering enhanced affordances, such as the ‘greatly 
improved editing facility’ of the DAW, or the way a digital synthesis environment 
can offer everything a (physical) modular synth does, plus the possibility of 
hundreds of oscillators (impracticable in a physical system where each oscillator 
has a significant cost). In this narrative of replacement there is an underlying and 
frequently hidden assumption of isomorphism. Once the principles of (for example) 
analogue synthesis have been ‘understood’ (formalised, represented in 
mathematical form) then they can be instantiated in a digital system, and then 
presented as providing exactly the same functionality as the ‘equivalent’ analogue 
system. There are at least two problems with this commonly held assumption: (1) 
A formal representation of a real-world physical process is not the same as the 
                                               
4 A note on use of quotation marks in this thesis: double quotation marks are used for 
direct quotations from a listed author. Single quotation marks are used to ‘scare-quote’ 
and to indicate ‘what people say’. 
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physical process – it is a simulation, emulation, mathematic model, or some other 
quantifiable abstraction (Pattee, 1995). (2) This perspective tends to elide the user 
of the technology; it concentrates on ‘end results’ (multitrack audio, the behaviour 
of a synthesis system, parity of sounding behaviour between a piece of signal 
processing hardware and a software emulation) and does not pay attention to how 
differences of modality, gesture and ergonomics affect not just how that 
technology is actually used in practice, but also the essential underlying cognitive 
processes involved in engagement with that technology. In other words, it ignores 
the body. Theories of embodiment, such as Varela et al.’s “enactive cognition” 
(Varela et al., 1993), as well as ideas of tacit knowledge (embodied know-how) in 
Gordon Pask’s cybernetics (Pask, 1975a) and elsewhere, are important to what 
follows. 
 
In order to investigate the significance of physical, embodied engagement with 
technologies, this thesis takes a practice-based stance (which we could also call a 
Paskian cybernetic stance, cf. p.16) to the underpinning research, and takes very 
seriously the differences that make differences that arise when considering how 
the physical body engages with technologies of music making. Interrogation of the 
assumption of isomorphism that underpins various progress narratives proceeds by 
directly engaging with technologies that are deemed, in the main, to be obsolete, 
supplanted and improved upon by digital ‘successors’. This engagement operates 
across three areas of music technology: (1) Musique concrète and a practice of tape-
music composition are generally assumed to have been replaced by sampling 
technology and by the affordances of digital audio. In order to investigate this I set 
up a tape music studio and explored classic musique concrète techniques.5 I also 
created two sound installations that allowed audiences to explore the materiality 
of tape.6 (2) Modular synthesis presents a slightly different case, as this area is 
generally not considered obsolete, and there is a healthy worldwide modular 
synthesis community. Computer synthesis systems do not necessarily succeed 
analogue forebears, since developments occurred in parallel, but the same 
principles of isomorphism are still often assumed: a filter is a filter, regardless of 
                                               
5 Documentation at http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/musique-concrete/  
6 Documentation at http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/sound-installations/  
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analogue or digital instantiation. My modular synthesis work is documented at 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/modular-synthesis/ and discussed 
in chapter 5, which focuses primarily on a modular synthesis performance piece 
called The Thing Breathed, which was performed several times between 2015 and 
2018. (3) The obsolescence of the multitrack tape studio has been loudly trumpeted 
(cf. p.116), and contemporary pop music production is absolutely dominated by the 
DAW; although tape-based alternatives are not difficult to find, the ubiquity of 
the DAW and assumptions of technological progression still abound here. To 
explore this I employed the very tight constraints of 8-track multitrack tape as a 
basis for the recording of four pop songs: the Euterprise EP (documented at 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/ and discussed in 
chapters 3 and 6). 
 
In all cases, my own history of technological musicking meant that I came to these 
‘predecessor’ technologies from a position of ‘digital literacy’: I had spent many 
years working with samplers and sequencers; I had practical knowledge of digital 
synthesis systems such as Max/MSP, used in the making of sound installations 
and other outputs; I had spent years as a professional sound engineer working 
with various DAWs in all kinds of studio setup and environment. In all cases, and 
as a result of practice-based exploration, I find the assumption of isomorphism to 
be misplaced. This insight can only come from a practical engagement with the 
actual technology: simulations or surveys of available literature do not engender 
the same conclusions. This is discussed throughout the thesis. 
 
But practical experiments and investigations may mean little in and of themselves. 
The PhD is, after all, an attempt to generate new insights, or ‘original 
contributions to knowledge’, within a certain domain or discipline. Thus, this 
thesis builds a theoretical framework that puts this questioning of commonplace 
assumptions and ubiquitous technologies into a wider scholarly framework. The 
most important part of this framework is that elucidated by second-order 
cybernetics, in particular the thinking and practical investigations of Gordon 
Pask. This cybernetic perspective is introduced in chapter 1 and then explored in 
detail in chapter 3, which attempts to build a Paskian ‘cybernetics of the recording 
studio’. Chapter 1 also delineates a methodology and introduces the key 
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theoretical concepts transduction and performativity. Chapter 2 explores the 
analogue-digital distinction at some length, both from a historical and technical 
perspective, and arrives at the somewhat provocative conclusion that analogue and 
digital always and only coexist. In addition to highlighting the need for a conjoined 
specification, I argue that there is no single overriding definition of either term, or 
their relationship, that will hold true in every case: to call something analogue or 
digital is always to take a perspective, to make an interpretation, to demarcate a 
distinction: activities about which cybernetics has important things to say. That 
there is no single reliably absolute way to define analogue and digital has far 
reaching ramifications given the contemporary prevalence of not just digital 
technologies, but also the term ‘the digital’.  
 
After these three contextual, theoretical chapters, come three chapters examining 
and evaluating the practical research. These chapters are supported by the 
documentation at http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/. Chapter 4 
looks at experiments in tape music composition and installation. This is where I 
started to seriously question assumptions of isomorphism, as my sampler-literate 
thinking assumed all kinds of things to be possible which, in practice, turned out 
to be otherwise. Chapter 5 examines modular synthesis in live performance, 
primarily investigating a single piece The Thing Breathed, which uses multiple 
nested feedback networks instantiated in analogue electronics. Performative 
engagement with the system reveals a complexity that resists rational penetration, 
reliable pre-programming and the like, and yet remains a compelling 
conversational partner. The continuous analogue electronics underlying both 
system and interface manifest concurrency, a property not generally available in 
digital systems. Chapter 6 looks at tape-studio based production of pop music, and 
finds performance, gesture and commitment to be fundamental to all activities 
therein; by comparison, the DAW is found to be somewhat lacking in these 
regards. Appendix 1, a technical glossary, is offered as support to those readers 
without extensive knowledge of the jargon of music technology. Appendix 2 gives 
further detail on the documentation. Appendix 3 discusses the Euterprise EP vinyl 
record, included with the PhD submission.  
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Although the focus of the practice described here addresses specifically musical 
concerns, this research may also be of interest to practitioners and theorists 
concerned with: (1) the ubiquity of the digital what have you in our current 
cultural moment; (2) the dominance of the computationalist framework in AI, 
cognitive science, and increasing swathes of contemporary culture; (3) 
embodiment, gesture, performativity, interaction in a variety of technological and 
cultural domains. 
 
This thesis taps into the recent resurgence of interest in cybernetics, applied here 
specifically to usage of technology in contemporary music research and practice, 
but also more generally. The thinking and making of Gordon Pask is particularly 
apposite here, and his cybernetic methodology is adopted and adapted to my own 
musical and theoretical needs. This thesis may thus also be of use to those 
interested in the ongoing rekindling of interest in cybernetics, particularly second-
order cybernetics. 
 
This thesis also draws from a historical trajectory of questioning, scepticism or 
concern with overly computational approaches, running from the Macy 
conferences in cybernetics (1946 to 1953), through dissenting voices such as 
Dreyfus, Winograd and Flores, Penrose, taking in respectful but contrary 
approaches such as those of Pask and Pattee, and more contemporary views such 
as those of Cariani and Pickering.7  
 
And as I rewrite this introduction for the umpteenth time, this time, I hope, at the 
end of the process of the PhD, I review what is to come and note one further 
concept that I have found increasingly important, and to which I have not given 
adequate acknowledgement: that of musicking. Christopher Small’s coinage insists 
on music as process rather than thing, verb rather than noun; it highlights action, 
flux, passage, and the complex interweaving of active, engaged agents. It thus 
contributes to a rich philosophical trajectory that foregrounds process, activity, 
performativity and becoming. It is outside of the scope of this thesis to trace 
                                               
7 Both Boden (2008) and Varela et al. (1993) offer comprehensive surveys of this 
historical trajectory, from very different orientations. 
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historical roots of this trajectory; I note, in passing, certain contributions to this 
current, each of which is important to what follows: Simondon (2016), 
individuation; Barad (2007), “intra-action”; Buckminster Fuller (1970), “I seem to 
be a verb”; Maturana and Varela (1992) “languaging”; Varela et al. (1993) 
“codependent arising”; and Pask (1979a, 216), for whom “units of reality are 
processes”. 
 
Other literature germane to the theoretical scaffolding of this thesis includes: 
Andrew Pickering’s recent work on British cybernetics (Pickering, 2011, 2009), 
which confirmed cybernetics as a potent avenue of exploration for this research. 
Attempts in the thesis to understand and define the analogue-digital distinction 
lean on scholarly debate from the beginning, middle and end of its 80 or so year 
conjoined history: the early years are explored in a detailed discussion from 1950’s 
5th Macy Conference in Cybernetics (Gerard, 2016). Here we see that the basic 
tenor of the distinction is very similar to later technical and philosophical 
treatments, but that agreement as to exact definition was ultimately insoluble. The 
middle period of the debate explores John Haugeland’s philosophically oriented 
article ‘Analog and analog’ (1981). Here we learn that the terms are ‘substantive-
hungry’ – they need to take a referent in order to be meaningful. Recent 
scholarship into this area centres on a discussion by Jonathan Sterne (2016), who 
explores the curious state of affairs whereby in popular culture ‘analogue’ comes 
to mean ‘everything outside of the computer’. This thesis disagrees with some of 
Sterne’s assessment of the nature of analogue devices and processes, but agrees 
with his plea to return some technical specificity to the terms and their distinction. 
This surveying of the history of the debate is buttressed by looking deeply into the 
work of theoretical biologist Howard Pattee, who has, since the 70s, used biology 
to critique claims in computation, AI and A-life, around the adequacy of discrete 
and digital processes to embody biological processes such as intelligence and 
evolution. Central to Pattee’s discussion is how the fundamental processes of life 
rely on the power of formal description and code, primarily through the directing 
force of the genetic code, but how such processes only ever tell half the story, and 
must be seen alternating and interacting with continuous dynamical processes that 
are both medium-specific and time-bound. 
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This thesis is offered as an act of cybernetic musicking – resolutely practical in 
orientation, and with a wide-ranging, trans-disciplinary theoretical framework. 
With the emphasis not on things but on ongoing processes in complex interaction 
with a world in constant becoming.  
 
 
Research questions 
 
Research questions informing both practice and theory are grouped into four 
related areas: 
 
Analogue-digital 
How might a combination of technical, historical and practice-based research, 
focused through commitment to artistic outputs in the domain of music 
technology, shed new light on the much used terms analogue and digital, and on 
the nature of the analogue-digital relationship? 
 
Progress narratives and succession logic 
There is a prevalent assumption that digital music-technological processes 
represent a progression from preceding analogue processes; how does this 
assumption stand up to a sustained, committed practice-based exploration? 
 
Cybernetics 
How might both practical and theoretical examination of technological musicking 
be buttressed by the now mostly obscured discipline of cybernetics, in particular 
the little known cybernetics of Gordon Pask? 
 
Transduction and performativity 
How might notions of transduction and performativity help us in explorations of 
complex technical environments supportive of the embodied production of music?  
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CHAPTER 1: CONTEXT (1) – KEY TERMS 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Cybernetics is introduced. Problems of definition are discussed. This thesis’s 
engagement with the cybernetics of Gordon Pask is seen to be part of a recent upsurge 
of interest in Pask’s work. Pickering’s contribution to this re-evaluation is highlighted. 
A Paskian cybernetic methodology is adumbrated and seen to be a prescient precursor 
to contemporary notions of practice-based research. Pask’s cybernetics is participant-
oriented, focussed on processes in ongoing interaction (rather than ‘things’), and 
stresses under-specified goals, rather than tightly defined goal-states. The practical 
nature of Pask’s cybernetic method is highlighted – he saw himself as a ‘philosophical 
mechanic’, and built devices, systems and maverick computers throughout his career in 
order to test theoretical notions. A discussion of contemporary notions of practice-
based research follows, highlighting the work of Schwab, Hacking and Barad. A 
detailed discussion of two other thesis keywords, transduction and performativity, 
rounds out the chapter. Performativity is an interventional act that brings forth a world; 
it is commitment in action. Transduction relates energy, information, patterns of 
growth, or other dynamical processes across media or between domains. It is a 
fundamental studio operation, and will prove invaluable in discussing tractable 
definitions of analogue and digital in the area of technological musicking. In the tape 
studio transduction and performativity come together at the moment that initiates the 
process of recording. 
 
 
Cybernetics 
 
Knowledge is not some free-standing entity in its own right; it should be 
understood as threaded through practice, performance, in a world which cannot be 
itself reduced to knowledge. (Pickering, 2007, 44) 
 
When I started this doctoral project in 2013, armed with little more than a bunch 
of hunches and a desire to learn, I had little idea of what cybernetics actually is, 
other than a vague idea that it was something to do with robots, or computers, or 
both; a precursor of cyberspace, perhaps; inspiration for the Cybermen of Dr 
Who; that kind of thing. Such misconceptions are common, as I have discovered, 
following my own enthusiastic engagement with this deeply philosophical and 
highly sophisticated trans-disciplinary field. That these are misconceptions will 
become clear as we proceed, but for the moment I will note that as a composer 
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using technology for performance, installation and recording, I have come to see 
cybernetics as an extremely potent way of thinking through my artistic practice.  
 
Cybernetics has a complex, multi-layered history, and since its heyday in the 50s 
and 60s has largely lain fallow in the popular consciousness; in the last twenty 
years or so Pickering, Cariani, Haque and others have done much to revive 
interest.8 Such scholars see cybernetics continuing to offer important insights in 
the study of systems, communication and control, and many also see it as 
providing a useful prism through which to view much current artistic practice. 
Much of what follows is an attempt, on my part, at “becoming to know” (Pask, 
1987, 32) the cybernetics of Gordon Pask, as it is his work which expresses the 
strongest resonances with, and relevance to, my practice. My work is therefore 
part of what architect Usman Haque describes as a recent “ground swell of 
interest in Pask’s work by architects, artists and designers” (Haque, 2007, 54). 
What might once have been named ‘cybernetic’ art is now much more likely to be 
dubbed ‘interactive’, ‘generative’ or ‘ecosystemic’, but many of the concerns 
remain the same: the nature of both human and machine intelligence and learning; 
self-organising systems; autopoiesis; feedback; searching for emergence; human-
machine interaction; evolutionary approaches. 
 
Cybernetics, as a term, dates back to Norbert Wiener’s seminal text, first 
published in 1948 (Wiener, 1961). The term is adapted from the Greek kybernesis, 
loosely ‘the art of steersmanship’.9 Put simply, cybernetics is the study of systems, 
control and communication, but precise definition is difficult, and contested: 
“What exactly is (or was) cybernetics? This has been a perennial ongoing topic of 
debate within the American Society for Cybernetics throughout its 50-year 
history” (Cariani, 2017, 120). Katherine Hayles’ (1999) reading through of its 
“seriated” history, in support of her thesis that “we have always been posthuman”, 
identifies three waves, the second of which broadly tallies with what has been 
more commonly dubbed second-order cybernetics – the ‘cybernetics of 
                                               
8 Pickering (2011, 2009, 2007), Cariani (2017, 1993), Haque (2007). See also Hayles 
(1999), Green (2001), Bird and Di Paolo (2008), Boden (2008), Dupuy (2009), Fuller 
(2011), Penny (2013). 
9 ‘Cybernetique’ had earlier been used by Ampère in 1834 (“Cybernetics,” 2018), but in a 
somewhat different context. 
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cybernetics’, in which the observer cannot be wholly separate from the observed.10 
Andrew Pickering’s recent work on cybernetics has a predominantly British cast, 
the two main players of which, Stafford Beer and Gordon Pask, are noticeably 
absent from Hayles’ account.11 The cybernetic focus of my thesis revolves 
primarily around the work of Pask, both in thinking about what cybernetics 
means, and in practical, musical exploration of areas that resonate with Pask’s 
concerns. Pickering’s work has been important in seeding a rich cybernetic 
pasture to which my own detailed study of Pask’s work seeks to contribute.12 
Pickering views British cybernetics as adumbrating, in theory and practice, a 
performative, nonmodern ontology, which he contrasts with a modern ontology, 
representative of “science since the Scientific Revolution and of large swathes of 
contemporary commonsense” (Pickering, 2007, 44).13 This modern ontology is “a 
vision of the material world as passive, something that sits around waiting for us, 
human agents, to represent it (to map it, describe it, theorise it, know it)” (ibid.). 
Whereas in the nonmodern ontology “the world – human and nonhuman – is a 
lively place of performatively interacting and endlessly emergent systems (of 
which we humans are just one sort)” (ibid.). Although we might well be cautious 
of such binaries (Pickering himself uses the terms “crude”, “caricature” and 
“sketch” in relation to the above) there is an important sense in which Pickering is 
contributing to a rich and vigorous tradition of looking differently at cognition and 
representation, which includes Pask and Beer themselves, as well as Varela, 
Simondon, Latour, Haraway, Barad, Andy Clark and many others. “The history 
of British cybernetics offers us a different form of science and engineering, one 
that does not seek to dominate nature through knowledge” (Pickering, 2009, 470). 
The cybernetics of my thesis views control as steering a system one is a part of, 
negotiating contingency in a world of constant becoming. 
 
 
                                               
10 “The distinction between the first- and second-order cybernetics depends […] on a 
change in attitude to the observer who, in second-order cybernetics, is understood to be 
both within the system being described and affected by it. That is to say, the boundary of 
what is being observed is no longer the same” (Glanville, 2004, 1384). 
11 Beer is not present at all, Pask has three brief mentions. 
12 I am equally indebted to other explicatory material: including Beer (2001); Bird and Di 
Paolo (2008); Glanville (2001a); Green (2001, 2004); Haque (2007); Scott (2001). 
13 Pickering follows Latour in his reading of ‘modernity’ (Pickering, 2011, 18). 
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Paskian cybernetic methodology 
 
This thesis takes Pask’s interpretation and adumbration of cybernetics as both 
theoretical underpinning and methodology. 
 
In dealing with systems of any kind, cybernetics is primarily concerned with 
establishing isomorphisms (one to one correspondences) rather than the validation 
of propositions that are true (or have a chance of being true) or else are false. The 
basic mode of argument and development involves analogy. Strict analogies of 
which isomorphism is a special case. The analogy expressed or represented in the 
language employed to account for events is a metaphor. In this sense, cybernetics is 
the science or the art of manipulating defensible metaphors; showing how they may 
be constructed and what can be inferred as a result of their existence. (Pask, 1975a)  
 
Bernard Scott makes clear that in his three key works of the mid 70s (Pask, 1976, 
1975a, 1975b) Pask was staking his claim on both his status as a cybernetician and 
on the status of cybernetics itself: “Pask’s aim was not only to theorise as someone 
already committed to cybernetics but also to make clear, once and for all, what 
indeed are the foundations of cybernetics” (Scott, 1982, 2). In outlining a 
cybernetic methodology Pask makes clear the centrality of analogy, and it is 
interesting to note that in Pask’s definition of cybernetics, above, only one from a 
list of keywords commonly associated with the discipline is present (it includes 
system, but omits control, communication, feedback, information, organisation, 
homeostasis, machine, computer, brain). For Pask, cybernetics demarcates 
systems, germane to a problem under investigation, and draws analogies between 
them that help illuminate operations. For example, Pask investigated the problem 
of learning by demarcating human learning from mechanised learning systems, and 
drawing analogies between them. That is very crudely put, as these are highly 
complex areas, but it indicates the approach. That it is systems that are the object 
of study is crucial, and presupposes a “systematic universe. There is a tacit 
assumption that things, objects, and other elementary entities are interdependent 
(rather than being isolated units, which is the assumption behind the majority of 
the sciences)” (Pask, 1975b, 15). This interdependency means that elementary 
constituents are not adequately distinguishable, not possible to cleave out of the 
ongoing flux of events, and so are not observable or meaningfully manipulable, 
whereas their interactions form systems, which can be observed and manipulated. 
But Pask is also clear that this observation and manipulation of systems has to be 
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participant. The initial systemic demarcation is already an interpretation that the 
cybernetician must acknowledge their own relation to, and part within. Further, 
Pask’s cybernetic methodology is one of process, and so goals, which would have 
been thought of as “goal states” under Wiener’s first-order cybernetics, come to be 
“interpreted as a class of intentions or processes. Under this caveat it is possible, 
without difficulty, to posit underspecified goals” (ibid., 14). Without underspecified 
goals, ground breaking work such as his electrochemical ‘ear’ would have been 
inconceivable (cf. p.101). The deliberately “ill-defined” (Cariani, 1993, 9) nature 
of underspecified goals allows for a richness of development and evolutionary 
potential difficult to achieve with fixed or pre-programmed goal states. 
 
A Paskian cybernetic methodology operates at various different registers across 
this thesis. The thesis presents and manipulates various defensible metaphors, such 
as the mapping between analogue and continuous, and digital and discrete 
(though this has to be viewed from a position of contextual specificity, and does 
not hold in any kind of absolute way). The thesis uses analogy by, for example, 
studying the problem of performance in recorded music by demarcating the tape 
studio system and the DAW studio system and drawing analogies between them. 
This also involves questioning commonly held analogies (often posited as 
isomorphisms), such as those between a physical technical ensemble or piece of 
hardware (tape studio, compressor) and its software emulation (DAW, plug-in). 
The thesis demarcates systems throughout, and attempts to do this in a rigorous 
way (in particular, see chapter 3). It draws distinctions and makes interpretations 
(see chapter 2). Further, it is participant-oriented throughout (I can no more remove 
myself from this work than I can put this sentence into the third person). The 
physical systems built throughout the research manifest a richness in 
interdependence of elements, such that a systemic14 treatment, as opposed to one that 
focuses on constituent elements, is the only way to gain any tractable purchase 
(see especially chapter 5 on modular synthesis, though interdependence is a 
constant throughout the practice). Finally, research trajectories are the result of 
following underspecified goals (hunches, intuitions, abductions); Varela calls this 
“laying down a path in walking” (Varela, 1986; Varela et al., 1993). 
                                               
14 “I.e., patterns of organization” (Pask, 1976, 12). 
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Underspecified goals are also key to modular synthesis performance piece The 
Thing Breathed (cf. chapter 5) and the concept of the self-organising studio (cf. 
chapter 3). 
 
The theoretical approach is buttressed, and tested for fitness, by experiment, by 
building, by making: this is the practice itself. As Pask said: “By disposition, I like 
to think as a philosopher (or a philosophical psychologist). To justify this mode of 
thought and to implement the conclusions experimentally, it is often helpful to 
build physical systems” (Pask, 1976, 17). For example: chapters 3 and 6 question 
the commonly held isomorphism between the processes of tape studio and DAW 
recording. It suggest that this is a facile, or weak analogy because it does not 
sufficiently consider the relation of the performer to the conditions of 
performance; in fact what happens is that the performer in a DAW scenario tends 
to employ foresight of the possibility of post-performance editing to take pressure 
off the situation; performance in the tape studio tends to show a much greater 
commitment to the moment of performance. All of this is gleaned from hours of 
work in the studio, at the same time that I am thinking about the problem of the 
DAW,15 one of the initial fuzzy hunches that launched this PhD. But theory and 
practice are concurrently executed (cf. chapter 3); neither takes precedence; they 
are circularly causal, in the language of early cybernetics. That the analogy 
between tape and DAW recording is weak is important to the overall theory 
because it is one of the things that is used in academic discourse on the recording 
studio (cf. p.116) to justify and normalise a succession logic that posits digital 
technologies as historically new/progressive/innovative (though that story is now 
old), still new/progressive/innovative (which is where we are now) and future 
new/progressive/innovative (which is where we still are). This thesis suggests 
alternatives to this view.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
15 “Any problem can be characterised as the need to bring about or satisfy a relation” 
(Pask, 1975b, 35). The relation here is between the production environment and what is 
produced therein. 
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Practice-based research 
 
Matthew Fuller called Pask’s devices “thought experiments carried out in 
hardware” (Fuller, 2011, 71), and there is a compelling historical continuity 
running from the practical cybernetics of Pask, Beer and others, to contemporary 
practice-based research, as scholarly investigation that generates insight and 
understanding through the outputs – artworks, performances, devices, processes – 
of an artistic or experimental practice. I would contend that much of Pask’s work 
was practice-based research, as currently understood. Pickering concurs: “I am 
interested in ideas as engaged in practice, and at the heart of this book is a series 
of real-world projects encompassing all sorts of strange machines and artifacts, 
material and social” (Pickering, 2011, 4). Peter Cariani, musing on devices with 
emergent sensory capabilities says that “we need to return to Pask’s earlier 
strategy of building, rather than simulating, actual physical devices” (Cariani, 1993, 
11). My practice-based research agrees with the necessity to build physical 
devices, to operate as embodied agents engaged with the resistant materiality16 of 
the real world, and in general, not to simulate. 
 
Recently there have been many expositions of practice-based research (see, for 
example, Candy and Edmonds (2010) and the reference list therein), but one of 
the more interesting, and cogent in relation to my own artistic practice, is the one 
collected under the rubric ‘experimental systems’ by Michael Schwab, relating 
artistic practice to Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s theory of the same name (Schwab, 
2016). Schwab denotes and compares “complete familiarity”, “deskilling” and 
“reskilling” (ibid., 5) as manifest in much experimental artistic practice. In the 
context of musique concrète, complete familiarity would be that evidenced by 
original practitioners (Schaeffer, Henry, etc.). But my own familiarity with 
techniques of sampling, broadly believed to be isomorphic to musique concrète 
techniques, actually occluded my getting to know the historical technique. My 
inability to ‘map back’ techniques and processes of sampling onto its supposed 
‘forebear’ indicated a misplaced assumption of isomorphism. In fact I had to 
                                               
16 I borrow this term from Hogg and Norman’s edited special edition of Contemporary 
Music Review on ‘Resistant Materials in Musical Creativity’ (Hogg and Norman, 2013). 
 17 
unlearn, or deskill, the sampling practices, and reskill myself with the actual 
physical techniques and processes in order to gain any purchase on the 
techniques, in order to create “epistemic things” (ibid., 7), or material objects in-
themselves, which, through their creation, offer insights into both the embodied 
historical practice and a contemporary view on that practice.  
 
Schwab draws extensively on Rheinberger’s approach to scientific investigation, 
but is keen to fold artistic research as practice into the “practice turn in 
contemporary theory” (ibid., 5). Rheinberger’s research into experimental systems 
serves as the relevant critical grounding for the attempt to “trace some links 
between experimentation and artistic practice – by comparing the laboratory and 
the studio, by focusing on material practice, by describing systems of creation, or 
by highlighting temporal or experiential dimensions” (ibid., 6). The work 
presented in this thesis embraces all four of these exemplars: chapter 3 links 
laboratory with studio in attempting to demarcate a cybernetics of the studio, 
explicitly linking Pask’s lab-based experimental systems with my own studio seen 
as a self-organising system. Material practice is highlighted throughout: this thesis 
takes the position that digital simulation and/or emulation is not the same as the 
physical, material or analogue process being simulated, even though the 
distinction is commonly downplayed, overlooked, or occluded by 
skeuomorphism.17 Pattee’s concept of medium-dependence is also apposite here.18 
Systems of creation are examined in chapters 5 and 6, and again, Pattee’s views on 
the creation of symbolic or formal representations as being essentially non-
formalisable, occuring in real-time in a continuous dynamical milieu, are 
important; as is Pask’s views on abduction (analogous though not identical to 
Pattee’s views, cf. p.46). Finally, temporal or experiential dimensions are 
                                               
17 A skeuomorph is “a design feature that is no longer functional in itself but that refers 
back to a feature that was functional at an earlier time” (Hayles, 1999, 17). A common 
everyday example is the camera click sound on smart phones, which samples the sound of 
the shutter opening and closing on a mechanical camera; the smart phone has no such 
shutter, and the sound, whose actual function is to say ‘photo taken’, could equally well be 
a beep. Examples in the DAW often present digital emulations dressed in the clothes of 
hardware, such as the many software emulation of classic compressors like the LA-2A. 
The DAW itself presents a skeuomorphic emulation of the tape studio (cf. chapter 6). 
18 Theoretical biologist Howard Pattee has been deeply influenced by cybernetics. He is 
discussed in chapter 2. 
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highlighted throughout the thesis by a general concern with process, with 
becoming, or ontogenesis, through performativity and transduction, and in the 
creation of participant observed systems.  
 
In discussing the knotty issue of scientific realism within the practice and 
philosophy of science, Ian Hacking also stresses the importance of insights wrung 
from experimentation, arguing that we must pay at least as much attention to 
doing, to practice, as we do to theorising. Hacking’s overriding contention is that 
the philosophy of science, with associated debates about the nature of scientific 
realism, should engage much more deeply with experiment (on which it has little 
to say) than it does with theory (on which is it voluminous). He councils us: 
“Don’t just peer: interfere” (Hacking, 1983, 189), a plea for performative action in 
the world which acknowledges experiment as vital to the creation of insight. He 
goes to great lengths to redress the balance that has been upset by a “single-
minded obsession with representation and thinking and theory, at the expense of 
intervention and action and experiment” (ibid., 130). Like Pickering and Barad, 
who both propose a turn from representation to performativity, Hacking suggests 
a “turn from representing to intervening” (ibid., 145). He believes that the route 
back to a sensible scientific realism will come from our experimental practices 
with their concomitant intervening: “We shall count as real what we can use to 
intervene in the world to affect something else, or what the world can use to affect 
us” (ibid., 146). I do not engage here with debates about scientific realism, but 
nevertheless find the tenor and thrust of Hacking’s argument apposite with regard 
to practice-based research.  
 
Karen Barad draws on Hacking’s critique of representationalism in positing a turn 
from representation to performativity. Like Pask, she distrusts the numinous 
observer of classical physics: “A performative understanding of scientific 
practices, for example, takes account of the fact that knowing does not come from 
standing at a distance and representing but rather from a direct material engagement 
with the world” (Barad, 2007, 49). This focus on material engagement is taken here 
to be primary to any practice-based investigation, which will be performative, 
interventional and experimental.  
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Transduction and performativity 
 
The concepts of transduction and performativity are central to this thesis. Both 
terms have rich histories in scholarly work of the last 70 years and are 
fundamental to my thinking, making and musicking in a variety of ways. 
 
Performativity is an interventional act that brings forth a world. It is the bringing 
into being of meaning, in a shared universe of discourse, through action, 
utterance, performance. It is real-time semantic activity, commitment in action. In 
J.L. Austin’s original usage it is an utterance that makes a difference to the worlds 
of utterer and witness: ‘I do’. Barad points out how, in Judith Butler’s usage, it 
becomes an active construction of identity: “Butler proposes that we understand 
identity not as an essence but as a doing” (Barad, 2007, 62). For Pickering and 
Barad performativity is an alternative to representation. For them, in their 
different ways, it is engagement with a world in perpetual becoming; it rejects an 
idea of a ‘fixed’ world, ‘out there’, that can be explained, controlled, put to use, 
through symbolic representation and (conventional) scientific explanation. 
“Unlike representationalism, which positions us above or outside the world we 
allegedly merely reflect on, a performative account insists on understanding 
thinking, observing, and theorizing as practices of engagement with, and as part 
of, the world in which we have our being” (ibid., 133). Thus Barad’s position 
aligns with Pask’s participant observer (cf. p.60). Pask does not use the term 
performative, but I would argue that his theory is “proto-performative” in much 
the same way as Barad claims for Niels Bohr (ibid., 31). Discussing the “situated” 
nature of knowledge generated by participant observers Pickering says that: “The 
shift from a representational to a performative idiom for thinking about science, 
and from epistemology alone to ontology as well, is the best way I have found to 
get to grips with the problematic of situated knowledge (and much else)” 
(Pickering, 2011, 26), and he explicitly links a “performative epistemology” with 
an “ontology of becoming” (ibid., 519). Barad similarly rejects an exclusively 
epistemic approach, and directly links knowing with being, coining a conjoined 
“onto-epistem-ology” (Barad, 2007, 185). She goes on to stress the importance of 
our own responsibility towards the part we play in such becoming through a 
performative “ethico-onto-epistem-ology” (ibid.). From this position there is no 
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possibility of dominating a world through rational explication, since this type of 
penetration is always one step behind a changing world, and implies a separation 
between knower and world that a performative participation precludes. Rather, 
performativity suggests one must ‘go with’ the dynamics of a system, hitching a 
ride, negotiating contingency, with the possibility of steering trajectories. In this 
sense, performativity itself is resolutely second-order cybernetic: the observer must 
be part of the system; there is no possibility for any absolute, numinous, objective 
observation. Going with the flow means accepting that one’s presence and 
participation alter the dynamics of the system. In this sense performativity is 
closely linked to ontogenesis, as theorised by Simondon, as a constant and ongoing 
individuation (Simondon, 2016). Performativity is the act of inscription, and not 
what is written. It is writing directly onto the world as it becomes, a co-origination 
of meaning, or “codependent arising” as Varela et al. hear it (1993). The results of 
performative action are dynamic, metastable states of being: ‘I now pronounce you 
man and wife’; they are “basins of attraction” (Cariani, 1991, 112) that configure, 
calibrate and constrain further performative action. 
 
Transduction, like analogy, involves a similarity and a distinction. It relates energy, 
information, patterns of growth, or other dynamical processes across media or 
between domains. In physics it is the conversion of energy from one form to 
another. Simondon, who made the concept a cornerstone of his philosophy of 
individuation, gave a much broader definition than this, and his simplest example 
is of the growth of a seed crystal in a saturated solution. The crystal growth occurs 
on the surface, and each layer structures and constrains growth of the next layer 
through progressive iteration. “Hence the transductive process occurs at some 
kind of limit or interface between different orders… From the process of 
individuation results both a new kind of individual – the crystal – and an associated 
milieu… the now somewhat diluted solution with a different solubility” 
(MacKenzie, 2003, 12). Adrian MacKenzie builds on Simondon’s treatment of 
transduction: “The hallmark of a transductive process is the intersection and 
knotting together of diverse realities” (MacKenzie, 2006, 13), particularly the 
emphasis on ontogenesis, or becoming: “Every transduction is an individuation in 
process. It is a way something comes to be, an ontogenesis” (ibid., 15). 
Transduction is about bringing different realities, domains, environments 
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together, through a relation that structures as it differentiates. It is a bringing into 
being, a becoming.  
 
Transduction is also vital to this thesis, since it is one of the essential ingredients of 
any tractable definition of analogue or digital recording. The ultimately insoluble 
problem of defining the terms analogue and digital is discussed at length in the 
next chapter, but for the moment I note that the best definition I can find for 
analogue or digital recording is whether the terminal transduction leads to the 
audio being stored in a continuous or discrete form. The process of digital 
recording involves an analogue to digital converter, which transduces a 
continuous electrical signal into a discrete numerical code; its terminal 
transduction leads to a discrete stored signal. Analogue recording will involve a 
terminal transducer – such as a tape head, or a stylus to inscribe a groove onto a 
record – that leaves a continuous trace that is an analogue of whatever was fed 
into the transducer. The analogy relation is not enough on its own for a definition 
of an analogue recording since it applies equally well to a digital recording, but the 
fact of the continuous nature of audio on magnetic tape, or on vinyl, is the key 
thing that distinguishes it from a digital recording. The ramifications of this 
distinction will be discussed throughout the thesis. This way of defining the 
analogue-digital distinction will not port over to computation, or watch, or what 
have you. 
 
Transduction is a fundamental studio operation. As Allen Strange noted: “One of 
the major processes of electronic music is that of ‘transduction,’ the transfer of 
power from one medium to another. A transducer is a device which reacts to one 
type of wave (voltage, light, pressure, current, etc.) by transforming that wave 
into an analogous wave of another medium” (Strange, 1972, 108). Jonathan 
Sterne also reflects at length on the importance and significance of transductive 
processes in “audile” technologies (Sterne, 2003). 
 
In telegraphy, transduction converts an utterance into a discrete (Morse) code; its 
passage through various relay stations leaves the message unchanged until it is 
decoded at its destination, another transduction. In telegraphy, if the message is 
changed, either during the bookending transductions or in the intervening 
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temporal or spatial passage, then the system is in error. But there is another, 
essential transductive process here, a performative one, in the composing of the 
original utterance, such that its later dual transduction, into and back out of code, 
does not change the nature of the message. The telegram tends to be short, pithy, 
unambiguous. The economic constraint of charging per word further feeds into 
and constrains this originary performative transduction.  
 
A fascinating contemporary example of transduction constraining performativity 
can be seen in the practice of the ‘human microphone’, used by the Occupy Wall 
Street movement in their occupation of Zucotti Park, in New York, but later 
taken up by other protest movements. Responding to a ban on unlicensed 
electrical amplification in public spaces in New York, the human microphone 
operates via ‘people power’. A speaker, standing at the centre of concentric rings 
of human ‘amplifiers’, wields the metaphorical microphone by speaking short 
phrases that are repeated by the wider group, outward in iterating circles of 
human amplification. To start the process, or to reset it if it goes wrong, the 
speaker says ‘mic check’, repeated by the listening crowd: ‘MIC CHECK’, then 
continues with short phrases that are repeated by the crowd.19 The human 
microphone is discussed at some length, and as a transductive process, by 
Suzanne Cusick in ‘Musicology, Performativity, Acoustemology’ (Cusick, 2017). 
Cusick concentrates on the political and transgressive potentials of this 
performance, but just as interesting for me, is the highly contingent tuning process 
that goes on between speaker and ‘amplifier’. If the discrete messages are not 
calibrated in the right way then the whole system breaks down. If the utterance to 
be broadcast is too long then the ‘microphone’ forgets the details and the 
transmission breaks down. If enunciation is not clear, if overly technical language 
is used, if concepts are not broadly shared, then the whole system has to be reset, 
with speaker paying closer attention to the effectiveness of transmission. Thus 
speaker and amplifier are in a direct, contingent, mutually constraining, 
transductive relationship, and it is this kind of multi-directional, contingent, 
concurrently executed transduction that this thesis is particularly interested in.  
                                               
19 The best way to get a feel for what is happening with the human microphone is to 
watch videos such as https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvJqLo_o7AM.  
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In the tape studio (cf. chapters 3 and 6) performativity and transduction come 
together at the moment of pressing ‘record’. This pivotal juncture, at once cusp, 
crux and crunch, is a discrete, catalytic switch, a point of transduction between 
two experiences of time: from rehearsal to performance, from coded description to 
performative execution. On one side of this temporal transduction is a 
discontinuous, halting process that accumulates readiness, that entrains gesture, 
that alternates rapidly between discrete description (plans, notes, memories) and 
continuous expression (practice, performance, interpretation) in preparation for 
the keen edged transductive moment that initiates ‘recording’. On this other side 
of the divide planning, rehearsal, memory are mustered in support of continuous 
becoming, codependent arising: the performance itself, with its commitment to 
meaning in the moment of its making. 
 
Of course, this heightened commitment can occur with digital recording, but I will 
argue that this is one of the problems with the DAW and digital audio in general: 
there is a tendency towards an evacuation of meaning from the process of 
recording, a lack of commitment to the performative unfolding. This occurs because 
the result of the recording tends to be just so much more code, with all the 
accompanying possibilities for manipulation, reinterpretation, rejigging, in fact 
jiggery-pokery of all kinds. Performers and engineers are well aware of such post-
performance possibilities, and so the recording tends to be seen as one more coded 
element in the gamut of production possibilities the DAW affords; this more 
‘constructive’ approach tends to defer commitment until after the recording 
process. All of this will be explored in depth in chapters 3 and 6. 
 
But before we get there it will be necessary to put some fresh flesh onto the old 
bones of that hoary beast: the analogue-digital distinction. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT (2) – THE ANALOGUE AND DIGITAL WHAT 
HAVE YOU 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Analogue and digital are presented as complementary, and the axiom analogue and digital 
always and only coexist is introduced. Historical and technical definitions mainly revolve 
around a mapping of analogue onto continuous and digital onto discrete, but recent 
usage in popular culture diverges by defining analogue as that which exists outside a 
computer (opposite to digital). None of these definitions adequately cover the diversity 
of disciplinary, contextual, historical and technical usage. The history of the analogue-
digital distinction is explored by considering canonical texts from beginning, middle 
and end of its 80 or so year history. Roots of the debate are traced to the rise of 
practicable computational devices in the 1940s and coincide with the birth of 
cybernetics. One extended debate from the Macy Conferences on cybernetics is 
examined in detail. Links with biological, cognitive and physical phenomena are 
explored. Interpretation and level of description are seen to be key to usage, but 
participants are unable to agree on a tractable definition of the distinction itself. 
Philosophical treatment of the distinction from the middle of the history is presented: 
Haugeland’s exploration shores up the notion that the two terms are ‘substantive-
hungry’ – they need to take a referent in order to be meaningful. Sterne’s recent 
exploration of the distinction alerts us to the way popular culture’s definition of 
analogue has changed to mean everything outside of the computer. Transduction is 
seen to be an essential element of all attempts at definition with the audio realm. This 
thesis agrees with Sterne’s plea to return some technical and contextual specificity to 
usage of both terms. The history is expanded upon through a detailed look at the work 
of Howard Pattee, who showed how continuous and discrete processes in life and 
biological evolution are necessarily complementary, how the appeal to the sufficiency of 
the discrete in ambitious digital computational areas such as AI and A-life is flawed, 
and how the frequent alternation between discrete, symbolic, formal, time-independent 
processes, and continuous, dynamical, time- and medium-dependent processes is 
essential to creative processes of life such as cell formation and evolution. The final 
section of the chapter sketches how Pattee’s ideas of this essential alternation between 
continuous and discrete might be applied to creative work such as songwriting. 
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Analogue-digital 
 
The analogue and digital ‘what have you’ is a shorthand adopted in this thesis, 
borrowed from Haugeland (see below), that serves two related functions: (1) It 
indicates that both the terms analogue and digital, as well as a conjoined analogue-
digital, must take referents, substantives, nouns, noun phrases, or what have you, 
in order to have any meaning. (2) What have you refers to all the things analogue 
and digital may be: devices, processes, signals, representations, what have you, 
without deliberately stating what process, device, etc. they do take, while 
acknowledging that they must take such a process, etc. in order to be meaningful. 
 
The dash in analogue-digital means both ‘and’, and ‘complementary relationship’. 
Central to this thesis is the idea that analogue and digital are complementary, that 
they always and only coexist.20 There has been much hyperbole, ramped up 
exponentially in the last twenty years, around the term digital, both in relation to 
AI, which is, for most people, associated exclusively with digital processes, and in 
commonplace phrases such as digital culture or digital age. This puts the pairing 
analogue-digital on an unequal footing, with analogue positioned in various ways 
as digital’s ‘other’: as predecessor, in narratives that rely on a succession logic that 
valourises digital as new/innovative/progressive; as all that exists outside of the 
computer (cf. p.38); or, when dealing with analogue technologies’ stubborn refusal 
to quietly obsolesce, as hipsterish retro-futurist nostalgia.21 The position of this 
thesis is that such oppositional binaries are in urgent need of questioning and as 
such we will need to look, once again, at what the terms analogue and digital 
actually mean, from both a contemporary and a historical perspective. We will 
come to a position that refuses such commonplaces as ‘digital revolution’, ‘digital 
age’ or ‘digital present’ with their concomitant ‘analogue past’, and that asks that 
we take seriously the idea that these two terms are complementary, that neither 
                                               
20 I borrow this phrase from Buckminster Fuller, who used it of complementary 
phenomena such as tension-compression, or convex-concave: “We learn experimentally 
that tension and compression always and only coexist” (Fuller et al., 1982, 357). Fuller’s 
work also manifests a philosophically minded practice-based approach (cf. chapter 1), but 
is outside the scope of this thesis. 
21 See also Born (1995) on progress narratives centred on ‘vanguard’ digital technologies 
at IRCAM, and the related ‘othering’ of both analogue technologies and popular music. 
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one can exist without the other, and that drawing a distinction between them, 
positing any situation, temporality, device, or process as one or the other, is 
always already an act of interpretation, and cannot therefore exclude the observer 
from the act of distinction drawing. 
 
There seems to be broad agreement, in both popular and academic discourse, that 
we have been through a digital revolution and have now entered a digital age. 
Examples (and devices) abound. A very partial illustrative list might include: 
Academia: digital humanities, digital archives, digital history, digital arts, digital 
media, digital lives, digital memory; increasingly it seems that digital can be 
prepended to any discipline or area of scholarly investigation to bring it into the 
digital present, give it currency, make it ‘with-it’, and give it increased likelihood 
of funding. Business: digital solutions, digital innovation, digital entrepreneurship, 
digital transformations. And of course the much discussed contemporary 
phenomenon, without which any discussion of a digital present would be 
incomplete: social networking and a host of associated digital cultures. In the 
popular press there is talk of reactions to such ubiquity in the form of digital 
fatigue and the need for a digital detox.22 Scholarly reaction takes many forms, 
such as recourse to the periodising prefix ‘post’, as in post-digital (Cramer, 
2015).23 The problem, from the perspective of this thesis, is that the various 
positionings of ‘post’, fatigue, reactions against, nostalgic turns, analogue 
renaissance(s), fail to confront, and indeed support, a periodising succession logic 
that aligns digital with the new, the present, and often – in the blissfully optimistic, 
or anxiously dystopian, views of convergence and singularity – with the future.  
 
                                               
22 Which can manifest in all kinds of ways, usually as an injunction to cut down on ‘screen 
time’, an example being the huge growth of adult colouring-in books: 12 million sold in 
2015 (Halzack, 2016). 
23 Although the hybrid nature of much work that comes under the rubric of post-digital is 
welcome, and the wish to move out of the exclusive domain of digital computation into 
wider networks involving physical, acoustic, or analogue processes aligns with much that 
this thesis supports, the term itself is highly problematic, since it normalises ideas of 
historical succession that the following exploration of analogue-digital will question. 
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A foray into the history of analogues and digits24 will be necessary to lend some 
support to the position outlined here: (1) the succession logic whereby a digital 
present implies an analogue past has no actual basis in either fact or history; (2) 
the analogue versus digital debate implies an opposition which is not born out 
through either a technically specific or philosophically acute view (Peters, 2016, 
xxxii); (3) faith in a digital future is just that: faith. Pattee calls this “faith in 
formalism” (Pattee, 1993, 7); (4) progress narratives woven into ‘the debate’ 
benefit an avaricious technology industry that relies on planned obsolescence and 
a rhetoric of novelty and innovation (Sterne, 2007). 
 
Schonbein (2014, 415) identifies the “standard interpretation” of analogue and 
digital: analogue = continuous, digital = discrete. Schonbein draws the distinction 
along representational lines, but it also applies, throughout the wider literature, to 
many other substantives: device, signal, medium, process. Although these 
equivalences should be treated with some caution,25 they do capture something 
important to the distinction as it has been historically drawn. Discrete here refers 
to the stepped, the either/or, the quantised, the formalisable; continuous to the 
smooth, the more or less, to approximation. The following will complicate 
Schonbein’s standard interpretation, primarily by putting interpretation itself at 
the core of the act of making a distinction, demarcating a system, delineating a 
boundary, or however you like to cut it. This thesis does not say that analogue is 
continuous, and digital is discrete; rather, the following analysis will suggest that 
no absolute, one-to-one isomorphism will ever be sufficient to categorically 
demarcate the analogue-digital distinction, but that in certain situations this will 
be a useful shorthand, or way in, to how the distinction may operate.  
 
Lists of canonical devices commonly include many of the following: Analogue: slide 
rule, scale model, map, phonograph, microphone, analogue computer, cassette. 
                                               
24 The phrase “analogs and digits” is used as a section header in Nelson Goodman’s 
Languages of Art (Goodman, 1976, 159). His philosophical account of the analogue-digital 
distinction is important to the history of these terms, and was highly influential to 
Haugeland and others who subsequently explored the distinction. 
25 See for example, Fischer: “Glanville [personal communication with Fischer] however 
cautions that digital and discrete are not equivalent. He associates discrete with 
distinction drawing as presented by Spencer-Brown (1997) and digital with using a basic 
unit in terms of which phenomena are measured” (Fischer, 2011, 1006). 
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Digital: finger, abacus, alphabet, switch, typewriter, digital computer, CD, mp3. In 
fact, fingers offer a fistful of examples from both sides of the divide, suggesting 
both the necessarily conjoined nature of the two terms, and emphasising the 
hand’s unique and primary position in our cognitive apparatus, and in our ways of 
describing and knowing the world. On one hand, fingers are the exemplary 
discrete counting device, and we are reminded that fingers are digits. The finger 
also points up its primacy in the activity of ‘pointing at’ or indexing (Peters, 2016, 
94); both counting and indexing are activities squarely on the digital wing. The 
other, analogue, hand26 is used for measuring and approximating: directly 
measuring the distance between thumb and forefinger, or offering commonly 
understood approximations, four and a half hands high, or the ‘inch’ as half a 
thumb. The hand and its fingers are neither digital nor analogue, but happily take 
on representational duties, or function as descriptive exemplars, for either side.  
 
 
Metronome – complementarity of continuous and discrete 
 
Before launching into a detailed historical examination of the terms, we can briefly 
give an example of analogue-digital complementarity in the form of the 
metronome. The pendulum swing of the arm is clearly continuous, and the ‘click’, 
derived from the toothed escapement, is clearly discrete.27 Here we see a 
complementary relationship where, from one perspective the continuous is 
transduced into the discrete, and from another the opposite directionality holds. 
Actually, both hold in a mutually reciprocal circular causality: the toothed gear of 
the escapement injects a small amount of potential energy, held in the spring, once 
per half cycle, into the pendulum, by nudging it at the extreme of each half 
oscillation. Gravity acting on the pendulum provides most of the energy, but the 
push from the escapement counteracts the friction that would eventually damp the 
oscillations of the pendulum if left unaided. The two processes, continuous swing 
                                               
26 There is also a tentative suggestion of handedness here: the ‘right’ hand opposed to an 
‘other’ or ‘cack’ hand, designated gauche in French and sinistra in Italian (yes, I am a 
southpaw). On handedness (chirality) in chemistry, see Pattee and Kull (2009, 313).  
27 From the perspective of a human using a metronome to demarcate a pulse. From the 
perspective of a digital recording, where one could visually zoom into the waveform of a 
single click, one would see a (short) continuous signal. Again, interpretation is key. 
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of the pendulum and discrete, click-stop motion of the escapement, form a 
circularly causal system, marrying potential, kinetic and gravitational energy into 
an effective timekeeper. This is just the same process as when someone times the 
pushes on a playground swing so that the swing maintains constant height 
through each cycle, or indeed the swinger uses their own body weight to keep the 
swing in motion against friction of the air. The pushes are discrete (viewed from 
the perspective of single, isolated injections of energy, from the perspective of the 
muscles in the body it would appear continuous), the oscillating motion of the 
swing is continuous (at least to our eyes and at a level of description that is 
useful). 
 
The historical discussion of the analogue-digital distinction that follows establishes 
an 80 or so year history, and looks at theoretical discussion from the beginning, 
the middle and the end of this period. 
 
 
Cybernetic origins of analogue-digital 
 
Although the terms analogue and digital are individually much older than the 
1940s, this is when their conjoined significance first manifests, primarily as a 
result of developments in computer technologies. When we take a historical view 
of the analogue-digital distinction, we find that its origins coincide with the birth 
of cybernetics. The nature of analogue and digital computation (in mind and 
machine), communication, signals and, to a lesser extent, representation, was 
debated at length at each of the ten Macy conferences that established and 
formalised the discipline that was, at that stage, only just beginning to know itself 
as cybernetics (Pias, 2005, 545). 
 
In his address to the 5th (1950) conference, neurophysiologist Ralph Gerard picks 
up a subject that had already been debated several times before, “digital and 
analogical mechanisms in the brain” (Gerard, 2016, 172). The attempt to establish 
analogies between brain functioning and the nascent field of machine intelligence 
was absolutely central to all the Macy conferences, and to the establishment of 
cybernetics. Gerard makes clear that he believes that the emphasis on perceived 
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digital aspects of the nervous system was too heavily skewed, at the expense of 
insights that could be wrung from analogue processes: “I personally think that 
digital functioning is not overwhelmingly the more important of the two, as most 
of our discussions would seem to imply” (ibid.). In response to Gregory Bateson’s 
wearied comment “I am a little disoriented by the opposition between analogical 
and digital” (ibid.), Gerard responds with something worth quoting at length to 
indicate that the tenor of the distinction has not really changed at all in the 
intervening 80 odd years in technical and philosophical writing, even if, as Sterne 
notes (discussed below), popular culture’s definitions have diverged quite 
markedly. 
 
The picture that I have of analogical and digital, owing to the expert tutelage that 
I have received here, primarily from John Von Neumann, is this: an analogical 
system is one in which one of two variables is continuous on the other, while in a 
digital system the variable is discontinuous and quantized. The prototype of the 
analogue is the slide rule, where a number is represented as a distance and there is 
continuity between greater distance and greater number. The digital system varies 
number by integers, as in moving from three to four, and the change, however 
small, is discontinuous. The prototype is the abacus… The rheostat that dims or 
brightens a light continuously is analogical; the wall switch that snaps it on or off, 
digital. In the analogical system there are continuity relations; in the digital, 
discontinuity relations. (ibid.) 
 
Von Neumann’s position in the ensuing discussion is complex, balanced, and 
anything but the clear endorsement of digital preeminence that one might expect 
from the ‘father’ of the digital computer: he agrees with Gerard’s position that the 
digital situation may well not be the most important one in the nervous system: “It 
is very plausible, indeed, that the underlying mechanism of the nervous system may 
be best, although somewhat loosely, described as an analogical mechanism” (ibid., 
176). He allows that the underlying substrate of any digital computer will be a 
continuous electrical current, an analogical concept, and that “both for the man-
made artifact as well as for the natural organ, which are supposed to exercise 
discrete switching actions, these ‘discrete actions’ are in reality simulated on the 
background of continuous processes” (ibid., 177). However, it is not at the level of 
simple components that useful analysis should be conducted: we need to look at 
how larger complexes of such elements connect together. Von Neumann 
acknowledges that little is known about the extent to which the nervous system 
uses coded (i.e. digital) messages, and is clear that such coded messages almost 
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certain coexist with hormonal messages, “which have a ‘continuum’ and not a 
‘coded’ character” (ibid.). Importantly, “there seem to be very intricate 
interactions between these different systems” (ibid.). Internal biological 
informational processes, viewed systemically, will alternate between 
complementary continuous and discrete modes of operation. We will meet this 
idea again in the context of the thinking of Howard Pattee, but it is useful at this 
stage to note that von Neumann was perspicacious in this regard. “The last 
question that arises in this context is whether any of the coded ways in which 
messages are sent operate in any manner similar to our digital system. If I 
understand the evidence correctly, it is nonexistent in this regard” (ibid.). Thus, 
for von Neumann, although the digital computing machine may be best suited to 
certain types of functioning, we shouldn’t make the mistake of thereby assuming 
isomorphism between the discrete architecture of the digital computer and the 
brain or nervous system, as ‘strong’ AI and its associated computationalism would 
go on to assert (see Boden (2008), Varela et al. (1993), Winograd and Flores 
(1987)).  
 
Contributing to the debate, Norbert Wiener counsels constructing computing 
machines which are “in part digital and in part analogical”, since that is a freedom 
that he “profoundly believe[s] to exist in the nervous system” (Gerard, 2016, 176), 
and which we should take advantage of in our constructions of automata and 
thinking machines. Wiener aligns himself with later currents in philosophical 
thinking, particularly in reaction to AI, that certain aspects of human intelligence, 
such as learning, creativity and intuition are not possible to simulate in wholly 
digital environments. “I feel that the machines we build in the future for a great 
many purposes should take advantage of nondigital ways of modifying the 
threshold of digital machines. I do not see any reasonable explanation for the 
learning process which does not take advantage of these things” (ibid.). 
 
There is a sustained and lengthy portion of the whole discussion devoted to nailing 
down the definitions of analogue and digital, and which, in the end, fails to hit 
upon something everyone present can agree on. Bateson notes “that the analogical 
model might be continuous or discontinuous in its function.” He considers the 
analogy relation underlying the term analogue as one of the chief causes of 
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difficulty. Von Neumann replies: “It is very difficult to give precise definitions of 
this, although it has been tried repeatedly. Present use of the words ‘analogical’ 
and ‘digital’ in science is not completely uniform” (ibid., 181). Analogue devices, 
though, have a  
 
common trait: certain physical quantities that have continuous motions are 
represented by similarly continuous processes within the computing machine. 
Interrelationships are entirely different in a digital model… The digital procedure 
is usually a human artifact for the sake of description. Digital models, digital 
descriptions arise by treating quantities, some of which or all of which are 
continuous, by combinations of quantities of which each has only a small number 
of stable (and hence discrete) states – usually two or three – and where one tries 
to avoid intermediate states. (ibid., 181-2) 
 
Thus the very human acts of representing and interpreting (‘for the sake of 
description’) are key to the drawing of the distinction, and attempts to cement the 
distinction through appeals to biology miss this crucial fact. As with any act of 
interpretation, the position of the observer must be taken into account.  
 
John Stroud contributes to the discussion with a very clear indication of the 
importance of this act of interpretation, and, at a fundamental level, of the 
importance of the conjoined, complementary nature of the two terms: “I know of 
no machine which is not both analogical and digital, and I know only two 
workable ways of dealing with them in my thoughts. I can treat them as analogical 
devices, and if this is a good approximation I am happy. I can treat them as digital, 
and if this approximation works I am happy. The devils are generally working 
somewhere in between” (ibid.,182). This ‘devil in the details’, this ‘in between-
ness’, is why the act of interpretation is so crucial, as it allows us to simplify, to 
make workable or usable systems which are otherwise too complex to be tractable. 
As Wiener says later in the discussion: “I say that the whole habit of our thinking 
is to use the continuous where that is easiest and to use the discrete where the 
discrete is the easiest… One thing that we cannot do is to take the full complexity 
of the world without simplification of methods. It is simply too complicated for us 
to grasp” (ibid., 197).  
 
Again, on the subject of the complementarity of analogue and digital, Fremont-
Smith contributes: “Capillary flow is continuous and the heartbeat is intermittent; 
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it seems we have a perfect example right there. You cannot take any point and 
decide when the shift from the intermittency of the heartbeat to the continuity of 
the capillary flow takes place” (ibid., 198). This is analogous to the example of the 
metronome, given above, where continuous and discrete processes are clearly 
conjoined through intimate coupling, and where neither process can be said to 
take precedence or be in control of the other. It is this sense of mutuality, of 
codependence, that has been lost in proselytising rhetoric that posits the digital as 
superior to, posterior to, progressive of, the analogue. The distinction and its 
associated ‘debate’ was there, fully formed, right at the beginning of the use of the 
terms analogue and digital. Wiener puts the original use of the terms, and their 
distinction, “at about 1940” (ibid., 192), just ten years before the discussion under 
consideration here. The OED’s etymology of both analogue and digital concurs 
with this dating (see Sterne, 2016). Rather than analogue technology being an 
‘anachronism’, as current debates in music technology would have it (see chapter 
6), and as various commonplace positions around ‘vintage’ equipment, hipster 
appropriation, or ‘technostalgia’ might suggest, the anachronism is to posit either 
term as newer than the other. This thesis takes the position that both terms must 
be seen as complementary, mutually co-specifying, conjoined, always and only 
coexisting. The evidence from the technically and philosophically acute discussions 
of the terms at the Macy conferences supports this view, but somewhere along the 
line, in popular culture as well as in serious, informed scholarly debate, the terms 
have become aligned with historical ‘eras’ (and very short ones at that) that 
occlude this mutuality.  
 
 
Analogue and digital what have you: substantive-hungry terms 
 
Some 30 years later, philosopher John Haugeland, in attempting to answer the 
question of whether “any analog computer can be digitally simulated” 
(Haugeland, 1981, 213), comes up against the same problem as the Macy 
conferees: how to actually define the terms analogue and digital, and devotes the 
majority of his paper ‘Analog and Analog’ to this “tricky and interesting” problem, 
and justifies his “curious title” by positing both “stricter and broader senses of 
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‘analog’” (ibid.). It is, as ever, the analogue half of the distinction that proves to be 
the sticky one.  
 
What I would like to say first, in relation to this difficulty of definition, and if one 
wishes to maintain some sense of technical specificity, is that the terms analogue 
and digital cannot really stand in isolation (either separately or in relation to each 
other). Although recently there has been much recourse to ‘the digital’ and a 
somewhat later, reciprocal ‘the analogue’, as units of language the terms are 
“substantive-hungry”, as philosopher J.L. Austin said of the word ‘real’: they are 
terms that need to take a noun or a noun phrase (Austin, 1979, 68).28 Austin 
argued that the word ‘real’ cannot stand in isolation; in order to have any meaning 
it needs to take a qualifying noun, such as world, time, Rembrandt, cream, 
diamond, leather, ale, etc. In a similar way, analogue and digital prepend in 
technical writing to such substantives as: device, signal, representation, media, 
computer, electronics, watch, recording. Haugeland is aware of the problems that 
arise from treating either term in isolation, thus gives his canonical list of digital 
devices: “Arabic numerals, abacuses, alphabets, electrical switches, musical 
notation, poker chips, and (digital) computers” (Haugeland, 1981, 213). He 
footnotes: “I resort to the non-committal ‘devices’ because anything more specific 
seems wrong; thus (as the above list shows) not everything digital is a 
representation, a process, a computer, a machine, or what have you” (ibid., 225). I 
have borrowed this off-hand ‘what have you’ as non-specific placeholder for all 
the substantives analogue and digital may take, and to indicate that they must take 
one.  
 
What connects Haugeland’s diverse digital devices together is both the discrete, 
quantised base, and the idea that they manifest a coded, or formalised aspect. 
They operate without recourse to a specific substrate or medium. Arabic numerals 
                                               
28 See also Hacking (1983). Austin also calls ‘real’ a ‘trouser-word’, a “genially sexist” 
(Hacking, 1983, 33) way of noting that it is the “negative use [of real] that wears the 
trousers” (Austin, 1979, 70). I’ll say no more about that here, since I don’t think analogue 
or digital are trouser-words, but will note that the lyrics of my song Substantive-Hungry 
Trouser-Word (see http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-
ep/euterprise-ep-lyrics-songwriting-demos/substantive-hungry-trouser-word-lyrics/) play 
on Austin’s original designation. 
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work perfectly well in sand, on paper, on screen and happily move unchanged 
between them; they are medium independent (cf. Pattee, below). To be sure, 
complex digital architectures, such as software written for a particular operating 
system operating on tightly defined hardware, do not ‘port across’ easily, but in 
theory such algorithmic processes could be written in stone.29 Haugeland notes 
three qualities of “theoretically interesting kind” (ibid., 213) for digital devices: (1) 
Flawless copying: the countless perfect copies of Shakespeare sonnets.30 (2) 
Complexity forms from simple components: “all classical symphonies are scored 
with the same handful of basic symbols” (ibid., 214).31 (3) Equivalence across 
media: “the sonnets could be printed in italics, chiselled in stone, stamped in 
Braille, or transmitted in Morse code – and nothing would be lost” (ibid.).  
 
For Haugeland “analog devices comprise a motley crew”, and he is “not at all 
confident that a satisfactory definition is possible” (ibid., 220). This is something 
we frequently witness as we survey the diverse literature of the analogue and 
digital what have you: the digital half of the pairing exhibits a clear cut, all or 
nothing, formalisable definition, and the analogue wing invites approximation, 
‘more or less’ clarity, and a continuum of possible interpretation. In other words, 
each term’s definition seems to exhibit the qualities of its referent’s form and 
function – the terms are exquisitely self-referential in an imbalanced, mutually 
exclusive but codetermining relationship. Haugeland points this up by noting, as 
he does with digital, three salient common features of the analogue device: (1) 
Smooth or continuous variations: no steps, gaps or click-stops; between two 
values there will always be theoretical intermediate points, even if the resolution of 
the carrying medium obscures a finer grained observation. (2) “Within the 
relevant variations, every difference makes a difference”: the tiniest adjustment of 
a knob changes the setting; “not only are all variations allowed, but they all 
                                               
29 Though see Haugeland (1996, 121) on the importance of various levels or layers of 
description that such a writing would have to inhabit. 
30 Digital audio also has this property, and this infinite replicability, especially when it 
manifested in the small size of the mp3 coupled to the mobility of the internet, came to 
terrify and in many ways cripple the music industry, which is ironic when one recalls that 
one of the key benefits to the industry of the introduction of the CD was the ability to 
resell digital copies of individuals’ already existing vinyl record collections. 
31 Also in evidence in work on emergence in cellular automata and neural networks. 
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matter” (ibid., 220).32 (3) However, “only certain ‘dimensions’ of variation are 
relevant” (ibid.); it is irrelevant whether a slide rule is made of metal or bamboo, it 
will still afford comparable (approximate) calculations. It is this last feature that 
makes for the difficulty of definition, for this orthogonal “dimensionality” suggests 
a “‘second-order’ digitalness” (ibid., 222): variation is continuous across one or 
more dimensions, but the number of dimensions will be fixed and limited. The 
black and white photograph has “exactly three orthogonal dimensions: horizontal, 
vertical, and gray scale” (ibid.); or the analogue computer, “with its electronic 
adders, integrators, multipliers, inverters, and the like, each as discrete and 
determinate in type as any mathematical symbol, and their circuit connections as 
well-defined as the formation of any equation” (ibid.). Haugeland calls this the 
digital set-up of an analogue device, where the “component identifications and 
interconnections are positive and reliable” (ibid.). It is a formalising or coding at a 
higher level, and allows the analogue device to have specificity of action and to do 
useful work. This second-order digitality allows Haugeland to answer his initial 
question of whether “any analog device can be digitally simulated to any desired 
degree of precision” (ibid., 223) in a tentative affirmative, but only for devices 
which are analogue in a narrow sense. “But the universal digital simulability claim 
is often made in a more sweeping tone, as if it applied to everything” (ibid.).33 
Haugeland wonders whether there are “systems, perhaps ‘analog’ in some broader 
sense, which are not second-order digital, and not necessarily digitally simulable” 
(ibid.). He concludes there may well be, and has recourse to that ultimate complex 
system: the biological organism. Citing the case of the metabolic system of a rat, 
used as an analogue of the human metabolism to test effects of things such as 
clinical drugs, where some general relationships are known, and some local 
mechanisms are understood, still “these by no means provide a complete 
description, in terms of which responses to strange chemicals can confidently be 
predicted. The millions of delicate hormonal balances, catalytic reactions, surface 
effects, and immunological responses, all interdependent in a bio-chemical frenzy 
of staggering proportions… there is essentially no way to gain detailed, 
                                               
32 These first two characteristics are key affordances that my modular synthesis piece The 
Thing Breathed (cf. chapter 5) explores. 
33 It is worth noting that since Haugeland’s article was written in 1981, the sweeping, 
seemingly inexorable tide of digital simulability has come to encroach on more and more 
aspects of contemporary culture, but that the idea is nothing new. 
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quantitative control over such a mess – no hope of delineating a set of ‘state-
variables’ which fully characterize it at a time” (ibid., 223-4). Such a multi-
dimensional system, with dynamic and ongoing mutual determination and 
circularly causal effects, is not amenable to formal description; there is no fixed 
dimensional element that can be separated out for quantification or coding. In 
relation to the testing of drugs, Haugeland predicts that “there will never be a 
digital simulation of human physiology reliable enough to supplant (or even 
challenge) biological and clinical testing of new drugs” (ibid., 224). Perhaps the 
key thing about this second-order-non-digitality is that biological metabolisms are 
in constant flux, both internally and in relation to a changing environment. There 
is no way to fix the multiplicity of complex, nested, interconnected homeostatic 
processes in formal description or code, since the processes are always running 
ahead of and away from such fixity. This cybernetic principle will be met with 
repeatedly throughout this thesis, and even in the narrow perspective of the 
analogue device with ‘second-order digitality’ there are objections to the above, 
such as when concurrent processes intervene on the neat and clear demarcation of 
separable function in the temporal unfolding of a complex system; when feedback 
troubles the topology of an analogue computer (realised, for example, in my work 
in the form of modular synthesis, discussed in chapter 5) and obscures or 
complicates well-defined ‘discrete and determinate’ components; when the clear-
cut distinction between an oscillator (outputting an audio signal at greater the 
20Hz) and an LFO (outputting a control signal at lower than 20Hz) collapses as 
they are coupled into a closed loop, such that neither can be said to operate along 
their intended dimension and we can no longer say which is in control or even 
where that control exists in the relationship.  
 
 
Analogue is not everything that is not digital 
 
To bring the discussion into the (mixed, hybrid, analogue and digital) present, we 
can consider Jonathan Sterne’s 2016 chapter ‘Analog’, that appears in Peters’ 
edited Digital Keywords (Sterne, 2016).  
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Sterne alerts us to how use of the term analogue has changed in “cultural 
journalism, in humanistic writing, and in everyday talk” to take on “its most 
pervasive contemporary meaning”, as “‘not-digital’ or ‘separate from computers’” 
(ibid. 31). This meaning often carries with it a sense of old fashioned, outdated, 
not current. The detailed OED etymology that Sterne uses as case study has 
familiar sounding examples, such as 2005’s “old-fashioned, analog game of Rock 
Paper Scissors”, from Portland’s Oregonian newspaper.34 In modern parlance this 
game is doubly analogue because it is both not a computer game and it is old. But 
in Haugeland’s terminology this game is a digital device, with its three fixed 
tokens, its immutable rule base, its equivalence across media. Sterne is clear that 
this “expanded notion of the analog as a condition” (ibid. 32) robs it of any useful 
specificity, since it expands to mean everything outside of the computer, that is, 
the entire world apart from ‘the digital’. One of the problems with this is that it 
“effectively diminishes the variety of the world as it elevates conceptions of the 
digital” (ibid.). It works well for “digital boosterism”, but “inflating ‘the analog’ to 
‘the world’ limits the options we have for describing natural, cultural, and 
technological history to one kind of periodization (analog/digital, or maybe 
preanalog/analog/digital)” (ibid.). This periodising tendency, with its attendant 
succession logic, is examined in detail in chapter 6 in relation to music technology.  
 
Sterne indicates how, over the 1970s and 80s, the terms analogue and digital start 
to move out from their more technical habitats – the languages of engineers, 
computer scientists, cyberneticians – and into popular discussion. As such they 
retain their distinction but analogue gets mapped in a more general way to 
technologies that are not digital – the traditional clockwork or quartz crystal 
timepiece, with its face and hands, starts to be called analogue to distinguish it 
from the increasingly prevalent digital watch (which is not called digital for its 
underlying timekeeping technology but for its display, which uses illuminated 
on/off segments to represent numbers). As people begin to discuss and use digital 
recording formats, then existing technologies of recording come to be known as 
analogue. To be clear, the terms analogue and digital were used in audio 
engineering circles long before this, but the act of making this type of distinction 
                                               
34 The OED entry is at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/7029 
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in popular culture coincides with the arrival of mass market digital technologies 
riding the coat-tails of the much publicised and hyped computer revolution. 
“Sometime in the 1980s, the terms analog and analogue began to wildly 
proliferate, a trend that continued into the 1990s” (ibid. 31). 
 
Alongside this analog = not-digital, Sterne notes a trend that develops in media 
theory, where analogue and digital processes are compared and analogue 
processes are found to be “closer to nature” (ibid. 39). To illustrate this 
perspective Sterne quotes Brian Massumi: 
 
the analog is process, self-referenced to its own variations. It resembles nothing 
outside itself… Sensation, always on arrival a transformative feeling of the 
outside, a feeling of thought, is the being of the analog. It is matter in analog 
mode. This is the analog in a sense close to the technical meaning, as a 
continuously variable impulse or momentum that can cross from one qualitatively 
different medium into another. Like electricity into sound waves. Or heat into 
pain. Or light waves into vision. Or vision into imagination. Or noise in the ear 
into music in the heart. Or the outside coming in. (Massumi, 2002, 135) 
 
From the perspective of this thesis, this quote is interesting in that it promotes a 
view which is keen to counterbalance an overweening ubiquitous ‘digital’. But 
Massumi’s rhetoric is too one-sided, too eager to posit a straight opposition to 
millennial zeal around a digital revolution. One of the main problems with this 
passage is that it lumps too many different processes under the term analogue, and 
crucially omits transduction. Transduction can involve analogue or digital signals, 
processes, devices, but Massumi has renamed transduction “analog”: the 
continuous variable “that can cross from one qualitatively different medium into 
another”. I would argue that the crossing process is itself a transductive process. If 
what is crossing is continuously varying on either side of the transduction, then 
the crossing between media may be between analogue processes or signals. 
Whether the transduction itself is an analogue or digital process is a completely 
different matter. And the continuity relation is not, in itself, adequate as a definition 
of ‘analogue’. Consider a canonic transductive process: operation of a microphone. 
The acoustic wave that initiates the sympathetic vibration in the microphone’s 
diaphragm is continuous, as is the analogue electrical signal that the mic outputs. 
But the acoustic wave (a speaker’s voice, for example) is not an analogue signal, it 
is an acoustic signal. To lump all of the sounding world under the rubric 
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‘analogue’ robs the term of any useful specificity. The most useful way to read this 
process is the commonsense one: acoustic signal, transduction, analogue signal. If 
all three of these processes is read as ‘analogue’ then analogue becomes 
meaningless. Massumi continues: “Like electricity into sound waves.” This is what 
happens in loudspeakers, where an analogue electrical signal is transduced into an 
acoustic sound wave. And what of the pulse wave? Clearly, even in the continuous 
realm of analogue electronics this is a digital signal, and as well as sounding in the 
real world, without the need for digital to analogue conversion, it happily acts as 
that quintessential digital device, a switch. The problem with Massumi’s rhetoric 
is that it tries to get analogue to do too much, to be too many things. Sterne is 
right that the equation of analogue with life puts too much burden on the term, 
asks too much of it. I would also argue that the issue of transduction is too 
important to bury it under another term. The concepts analogue and digital 
become both richer and more manageable if thought often in conjunction and 
inter-relation with transduction, particularly when dealing with audio, where 
transductions abound. This emphasises both their conjoined nature and their 
distinction, and suggests that we can make the cut across various dimensions, one 
illuminating one being transduction. The polarity, the binary opposition begins to 
blur, as the relationship takes on a dimensional orthogonality.  
 
What of Sterne’s own definition: “analog denotes a specific technical process, 
where one quality is used to represent another” (2016, 32)? This is in line with 
Pask’s definition in Micro Man,35 and with von Neumann’s at the Macy 
conferences (Gerard, 2016, 181), and emphasises the analogy root of the term. 
Sterne takes issue with the equation of analogue with continuous, citing, as he 
does in an earlier paper (Sterne, 2006), the discrete nature of the ferric particles 
comprising the base of analogue tape. He takes exception to Stuart Brand’s 
“Analog is continuous, digital is discrete (Brand 1987, 18)”, stating: “Brand is in 
fact wrong about the continuous/discrete comparison— his example works with 
vinyl records or optical sound-on-film but not with sirens, magnetic tape, or player 
pianos” (Sterne, 2016, 37). There are a couple of issues here: first, Sterne’s 
                                               
35 “An analog device… works by representing directly the quantities that are being 
manipulated” (Pask and Curran, 1982, 17). 
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definition fails to take account of the continuous nature of the “qualities” that are 
representing or being represented. In analogue computing, where this definition 
seems to be most apposite, it is precisely the continuous nature of the “specific 
technical process” that defines the process as analogue and distinguishes it from 
digital computing, with its discrete architecture. Similarly with an analogue signal 
it is the continuous oscillation of the wave (like radio) that differentiates it from 
the discrete pulses of the digital signal (like telegraphy). Second, not all analogue 
processes are representations, as Haugeland makes clear (though his comment is 
about digital devices it is just as relevant to analogue ones). Sterne won’t allow the 
continuous nature of analogue tape,36 but he will allow vinyl records to embody 
analogue processes; but what here is being represented? I would argue that the 
continuous undulation of the groove of the vinyl is analogue not because it 
represents a sound that occurred at a different time (capture), but because its 
continuously varying qualities mirror the continuously varying qualities of 
whatever was fed into the lathe at the time of cutting – it is an analogue of the 
continuously varying current that drives the cutting needle into continuous 
oscillations that are laid down onto the continuously rotating platter. What we are 
seeing here are chains of transductions that terminate in the groove of the record. 
Of course, at any point further back the chain there may be analogue or digital 
processes driving the next stage, as when a digital file is cut to vinyl in mastering, 
but this last stage of inscribing the disc is analogue. A new chain of transductions 
is initiated when the record is played back, the initial stage of which is also 
analogue. I would argue that vinyl records and other analogue recorded media are 
analogue because the final stage of transduction leads to a continuous linear trace 
or track, something laid down in real time. When this recording is played back the 
                                               
36 In relation to Sterne’s objection to the continuous nature of analogue tape we can notice 
that he does allow a continuous magnetic field to be generated by the discrete ferric 
particles of the substrate (Sterne, 2006, 340), and I would make two points: (1) this is 
another example of the complementary nature of any supposed analogue or digital 
process, device, system; here continuous along one dimension and discrete across another; 
(2) again, it depends on scale and perspective: there may well be a discrete ground to 
tape’s continuous magnetic field, at the molecular level, just as there is a continuous 
electrical field underlying the digital activity of a standard computer, but at the usual level 
of description, the recording of sound to tape – through the chains of transductions that 
lead to the tape head being driven by an electrical current to provide a continuously 
varying magnetic field, laid down onto the continuously moving tape – surely counts as an 
analogue process.  
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first stage of transduction (the movement of the needle transduced to an electrical 
analogue signal, the tape head converting the moving magnetic field into the same) 
will be from an analogue trace to an analogue signal. This definition has nothing to 
do with representation, but its use of continuous as essential is what Sterne dubs 
“wrong” (ibid., 37). My point is that this is the only way that the distinction makes 
sense in this context, but that it falls down as a definition of the distinction 
between analogue and digital computers, or watches. The terms analogue and 
digital exist to draw a distinction; that is their function. They distinguish different 
processes that have something in common, some axis of relationality. Thus it 
makes sense to talk about analogue or digital computation, analogue or digital 
signals, recordings, media, what have you. The distinction drawn plus the 
dimension of similarity is the way in to the definition; without this specificity the 
terms collapse under the weight of having to serve too many definitions at once. 
The corollary of this is that there cannot be any single, general, overarching 
definition of ‘analogue’ and ‘digital’ where those terms are divorced from any 
specificity of device, process, medium, what have you; where their hunger for 
substantives is not fed. The continuous-discrete distinction is not the only way to 
cut the analogue-digital distinction, but it is apposite in relation to certain 
processes, such as recording. 
 
Ultimately, though, Sterne’s plea is one with which this thesis is in wholehearted 
agreement:  
 
We should return some specificity to the analog as a particular technocultural 
sphere. That is to say that reality is just as analog as it is digital; and conversely, 
that it is just as not-digital as it is not-analog... The meanings we commonly 
attribute to the word analog did not even fully exist in the so-called analog era. 
Restoring some specificity to the term will help stimulate our technological 
imaginations... and free us from the burden of a history that was only recently 
invented. (ibid., 41-42) 
 
 
 
Howard Pattee – continuous-discrete and other distinctions 
 
Having explored, in some depth, philosophical and technical theories of the 
analogue-digital what have you from the beginning, middle and end of its 80 or so 
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year history, this next section takes us somewhat deeper into the drawing of 
distinctions as manifest in biology, physical theory and philosophy, which Howard 
Pattee has, at various points in a 50 year career working at the intersection of 
these domains, also applied to various theories of computation. The primary 
distinction Pattee elucidates is what he has termed the ‘epistemic cut’, which 
broadly equates to the distinction between knower and known, subject and object, 
and takes in the mind/body problem, though he is clear that he has “named all 
forms of separation between subject and object the epistemic cut to emphasize that 
it is not a Cartesian ontological cut” (Pattee, 2015, 463).37 The epistemic cut 
implicates the observer in the act of drawing a distinction. 
  
Related to the epistemic cut is the ‘symbol-matter problem’, which Pattee 
describes in relation to one of the fundamental principles of biology and of 
evolutionary theory, the interaction of genotype and phenotype, both in the 
physical expression of a species and in that species’ evolution. Pattee posits the 
genotype as symbolic, discrete, descriptive code, and the phenotype as physical, 
continuous, dynamical interpretation of that code. Once again, we see the 
discrete-continuous distinction on opposite sides of a ‘cut’, but Pattee stresses the 
essential complementarity of the two sides in the frequent alternation between 
processes, and insists on their mutual co-implication rather than exclusion. He 
also notes the unbalanced nature of this reciprocity: “The amazing property of 
symbols is their ability to control the lawful behavior of matter, while the laws, on 
the other hand, do not exert control over the symbols or their coded references” 
(Pattee and Kull, 2009, 320). This refers to the fact that symbolic code, such as 
DNA, steers or directs forces and phenomena that can be described with the 
inexorable and deterministic (reversible) laws of physics, but that the creation of 
such code cannot be described in other that a statistical, irreversible manner. 
 
                                               
37 There are similarities here with Barad’s ‘agential cut’: “A specific intra-action (involving 
a specific material configuration of the ‘apparatus of observation’) enacts an agential cut (in 
contrast to the Cartesian cut – an inherent distinction – between subject and object) 
effecting a separation between ‘subject’ and ‘object’” (Barad, 2003, 815). The ‘knowing’ 
inherent in Pattee’s epistemic cut and the ‘doing’ inherent in Barad’s agential cut both 
insist on a performative, contextual specificity to the drawing of distinctions that rejects 
the absolute dichotomy between subject and object in the Cartesian cut. 
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Pattee’s lifelong ruminations on these matters are not raised here to say that the 
analogue-digital distinction is the same as his ‘symbol-matter problem’. Rather 
that insights can be gained by making an analogy between a contextually specified 
digital-analogue distinction (i.e. with substantive such as ‘recording’) and the 
discrete-continuous distinction as Pattee draws it, with its associated code-
implementation, description-expression, symbolic-physical, genotype-phenotype 
alternations. This is important in music production in the DAW studio, where the 
discrete code aspect also provides the recording medium, in the form of digital 
audio, leading to a situation where sound can be ‘taken out of time’, separable 
from a continuous milieu; in Pattee’s terms audio has become time-independent, 
implementation-unspecific. Some of the implications from this are considered in 
detail in chapters 3 and 6. 
 
There is one more caveat which it will be useful to consider here, concerning the 
apparent binary nature of all these distinctions. As Pattee states it: 
 
I think the ‘symbol-matter problem’ is maybe not the best name because it is a 
triadic relation. The symbol and matter must be connected by an interpreter 
(Peirce’s ‘system of interpretance’). Following the physicists’ use of ‘cut’ to 
separate the measurement from what is measured, I have also called the necessary 
separation of symbol and referent the ‘epistemic cut’ which is also a triadic 
relation that must comprise the interpreter. (Pattee and Kull, 2009, 321) 
 
This is an important caveat, because it precludes the drawing of these distinctions 
on absolute or objective terms of mutual exclusion: there is always an act of 
interpretation that binds as it cuts. This is also one of the ways this thesis treats 
analogue-digital: in order for the distinction to be made, there has to be an 
interpreter. There is no making the distinction without specifying various factors 
and ignoring various others. We call a computer digital because of its discrete 
symbolic control structure, or the constrained switching nature of the material 
transistors at the substrate level; we ignore the continuous electrical base. We call 
a recording analogue because of the continuous nature of the medium, or the way 
the fluctuations of a magnetic field are an analogue of the movements of an 
electrical transducer; we ignore the discrete ferric particles underlying the 
magnetic substrate. There is no absolute definition of the analogue-digital 
distinction that will hold in every case, or at every level. We make the cut along 
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lines that are useful to the conversation. We should acknowledge that how, where 
and why we make the cut thus carry an ethical responsibility. This is why this 
thesis argues against a digital present, a digital revolution and digital culture in 
general. These terms make a cut that posits a misplaced historicising – one of 
contestation and succession. Their use in contemporary conversations cloud those 
conversations with implicit sanctions, specifically, digital is new and analogue is 
old, both positions this thesis refuses.  
 
Pattee’s 1974 paper ‘Discrete and Continuous Processes in Computers and Brains’ 
stresses the need to look at the continuous and the discrete as complementary 
processes, both of which are essential for any full description of complex 
phenomena such as evolution or creative thinking. He questions the belief in the 
ontological primacy of the switch, and presents an argument based on biology, 
computer science, physics and philosophy. 
 
Pattee notes the historical interrelation of theories of computation and theories of 
the brain, citing Turing, McCulloch and Pitts, and von Neumann. Historically, 
this interrelation has often been based on “the assumption, for better or for worse, 
that the nerve cell functions something like a discrete switch” (Pattee, 1974, 1). 
The model of the nerve cell, particularly the neuron, as communicating via all or 
nothing discrete pulses – the classic on or off switching of the digital signal – 
informed the highly influential McCulloch-Pitts artificial neuron,38 as well as many 
other theories linking biological cognition with artificial computation. “We find 
many computer scientists who believe that, given enough switches, creating a 
truly intelligent ‘thinking’ computer is only a matter of programming these 
switches to behave in an intelligent way” (ibid.). A quick survey of how the 
contemporary popular press treats the issue of AI will confirm how deeply 
entrenched in the popular imagination this view has become. The reciprocal belief 
is in a deeper understanding of the brain through better computation. The main 
purpose of Pattee’s paper is to ask some very serious philosophical questions 
informed by hard science about whether the concept of the discrete switch can 
                                               
38 McCulloch and Pitts (1945). See Boden (2008, 190) on the seminal importance of the 
McCulloch/Pitts neuron in the development of the digital computer. 
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provide a sufficient basis either for understanding human intelligence or for 
manifesting intelligence in computers. He agrees that the switch-neuron analogy 
can be useful, and where we can create models of cognitive functions which 
operate unconsciously, such as sensory and neuromuscular systems in interaction 
with the physical world, then a discrete symbolic description would be “very likely 
sufficient” (ibid.). A well-defined (i.e. formalised) model can happily exist as a 
discrete, symbol structure, but how are those models created in the first place, and 
how do they become well-defined? Pattee believes that “symbols are created in 
continuous dynamical time, and are only preserved in discrete, arbitrary structures” 
(ibid., 2). This preservation is held in memory (both cognitive, and also genetic, 
see below), which must compress the continuous, information rich, time-bound 
creative process into discrete symbolic code.39 For Pattee the creative act of 
intelligence happens in a continuous dynamical milieu, and one of its primary acts 
is the creation of something – a concept, a model, a rule – that can be encoded as a 
discrete switching function.40 To support this thesis Pattee mounts a sustained and 
detailed exploration of the switch, coming at it variously from philosophical, 
physical and biological angles. He contests the idea that at the physical level a 
switch is some kind of fundamental, objective element. Rather, it is itself a model: 
“a subjective interpretation made through some external system with which it 
interacts” (ibid., 3). The switch must be based on a physical dynamics, but the 
switching itself will necessarily be a suppression of those continuous internal 
dynamics and must be ‘coded’ by an outside agent; i.e. it is an interpretation. “This 
outside agent has, in effect, created its own internal model of the dynamics, and it 
is this model which we recognize as the switch. The discrete switch and its 
continuous dynamics therefore comprise complementary descriptions of a two-level 
relation which cannot be understood by either description alone” (ibid.).  
 
From the hardware perspective of the computer we see this interpretation at work 
when the continuous dynamics of cross-coupled pairs of transistors are tightly 
constrained to ‘flip-flop’ around either side of a voltage threshold, interpreted as 
either ‘low’ or ‘high’, 0 or 1. This provides the functional base for the discrete 
                                               
39 See Pattee (1995) for more on compressibility of information. 
40 There are similarities here with Pask’s thinking on the use of abduction, distinction and 
invention in the creation of new hypotheses (Pask, 1975a, 82-83).  
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symbolic operations that allow the digital computer its flexibility of programming, 
its substrate independence. The switching function must be independent of its 
underlying dynamics, or it would be called a bad switch.  
 
Crucial to Pattee’s argument is the incorporation of evolutionary theory to the 
discussion of intelligence: “the creative aspects of evolution are our best analogy to 
creative intelligence” (ibid., 5). The biological evolution of switches and discrete 
coding operations, primarily in the form of the genetic code, is something that life 
builds on top of the continuous dynamics of the physical world (from which it 
arose, some four billion years ago), as a way of sustaining its own survival.  
 
Pattee holds that while it is true that a practical programmable computer depends 
on isolating the dynamics of the hardware from the symbolic level that the 
programmer interacts with, “the trouble with discrete automata models of 
intelligence is that theorists have mistaken the necessity of isolation for its 
sufficiency” (ibid., 8). The crucial dynamical and interpretive mode, in the mind of 
the programmer, is left out in this view, and computers show an extreme of 
separation between discrete symbolic operations (inside the computer) and 
continuous dynamical ones (outside the computer). Pattee compares this with 
living systems, where discrete switching modes are also kept separate from 
continuous dynamical ones, but not all lumped together. “Instead we find the 
discrete modes interspersed with dynamic modes at many levels” (ibid.). This 
continuous-discrete alternation is key to both cell physiology and evolution: “an 
essential requirement of evolution is the clear separation of the discrete genetic 
instruction from the phenotypic constructions” (ibid., 9). The phenotypic 
interpretation of the discrete genetic description is a physical, time-bound, 
continuous dynamical process. The example Pattee gives is of a cell’s enzymes, the 
construction of which is directed by a discrete genetic code that “translates the 
sequence of DNA bases to a sequence of amino acids; but the linear discrete string 
of amino acids does not function as a selective catalyst until it folds up into a three 
dimensional active form. This folding is not programmed, and can only be 
described by continuous dynamical interactions of the entire string” (ibid.). The 
dynamical expression of this description is followed by the “sudden action of the 
catalytic event, which has all the characteristics of the discrete switch we have 
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been discussing” (ibid.). For Pattee this has profound significance for what he sees 
as related, ‘higher’ forms of human intelligence, such as creativity and learning: 
 
This complementary alternation and interaction of discrete symbolic modes with 
the continuous dynamical modes goes on at all levels of biological organization 
from the enzyme structure-function levels up through the sensory and 
neuromuscular structure-function levels. One is inclined to ask if this 
complementary discrete and continuous interaction is not also essential for the 
higher forms of intelligent behavior. (ibid.) 
 
I would count any aesthetic practice as a higher form of intelligent behaviour, and 
thus Pattee’s question is also one of the key questions of this thesis, and one I’ve 
been exploring through the deliberate removal of certain discrete elements from 
my aesthetic practice, pushing processes of creation and construction of music out 
of the discrete confines of the digital computer, in order to effect more frequent 
alternation and interaction between continuous and discrete. In contemporary 
technological musicking there is a trend, especially in DAW use and design, for 
more and more aspects of the production process to be “lumped into one box 
called the hardware where no continuous dynamical interactions or interpretation 
is allowed” (ibid., 8). My tape pop practice, which removes certain digital 
processes (specifically digital audio), is a ‘de-lumping’, pushing more of the 
processes of recording and production into continuous physical or analogue 
environments than DAWs encourage, but also allowing more frequent 
alternations between continuous and discrete processes. This is also why I have 
been exploring certain cybernetic principles through modular synthesis rather 
than digital programming languages such as SuperCollider, even though I have 
great respect both for the languages and their expert users. Again, this allows for 
more frequent alternation and interaction between the discrete and the 
continuous, the description and the expression, the score and the performance, the 
production and the recording, the rehearsal and the execution. These alternations 
are not isomorphic, they occupy different dimensions of description and 
temporality, but they all make a cut along similar lines: a coding and an 
implementation. It might seem odd to suggest that rehearsing is like coding, but in 
the sense that it prepares the performance of a program by laying down salient 
aspects of performance into memory there is certainly a coding (see also chapter 3 
on programming the tape studio). This memory is now separated from the 
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dynamics of the performance itself, and serves as an active constraint on further 
rehearsal and performance. 
 
Pattee is clear that if we want to build machines or automata that exhibit higher 
forms of intelligence such as creativity or learning, or that have the possibility of 
evolving in a manner analogous to the open-ended searching of natural selection, 
then we need to take seriously this “discrete-continuous interplay” (ibid., 10). Life, 
evolution, and, in Pattee’s view, intelligence, exhibit this alternation and 
interaction at many levels, and across many timescales, and while the discrete 
mode can be modelled formally, the dynamical, continuous interpretation of that 
model “is not efficiently programmable” (ibid., 12). On the subject of how to 
design computers that display intelligence:  
 
Even the largest imaginable computer, if restricted only to the discrete switching 
mode of present day computers, can at best approximate only half a brain, and this 
will be the sequential, analytic half, not the generative, interpretive half… The trick 
will be to learn how to reintroduce a continuous dynamical mode into an artificial 
computer element at a simple enough level to be practical. (ibid., 14) 
 
The maverick computers that Pask built throughout his life, from Musicolour, 
through the ‘ear’, to the many iterations of teaching and learning machines he 
concentrated on later, all exhibit this complementary alternation between discrete 
and continuous modes, and were all hybrid analogue-digital devices (Pask, 1979a, 
227; 1976, 14). Chapter 3 discusses these in some detail and notes the intractable, 
and ultimately insoluble, problems Paul Pangaro had trying to instantiate Pask’s 
hybrid THOUGHTSTICKER system in a wholly digital environment. A more 
recent example of the unplanned and spontaneous creation of continuous 
dynamical elements in a digital system through the action of a recursive 
evolutionary algorithm in an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) is 
demonstrated in the work of Adrian Thompson at the University of Sussex in the 
1990s (Thompson and Layzell, 1999). Thompson evolved a device, like Pask’s 
‘ear’, that discriminates between two frequencies. The FPGA is a programmable 
physical matrix of connected digital components (transistor gates) which is freely 
reconfigurable. Thompson used an evolutionary algorithm (EA) to successively 
hone in on the desired behaviour through iterative training of the array, rewarding 
desired behaviour following fitness evaluation. Initially the EA selects at random, 
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but promising behaviour in the FPGA means that that configuration will go into 
the next iteration, where it will be ‘mated’ with other promising candidates or be 
subject to random ‘mutation’. It took some 4000 iterations, alternating between 
coded description of the EA and physical instantiation in the FPGA, to evolve a 
reliable frequency discriminator. The final evolved array exhibited several 
interesting properties: it had no master clock, unlike conventional digital systems 
(deliberately not incorporated by Thompson in order to allow evolution as free a 
reign as possible); some of its component transistors now acted in a continuous 
analogue manner, rather than the constrained, high/low flip-flop behaviour they 
were designed to operate with (in Pattee’s terms they no longer function as well-
defined switches); it was highly sensitive to temperature changes: it would only 
operate reliably at the lab temperature it had been trained at; some parts of the 
array appeared, through conventional analysis, to serve no clear function, yet if 
they were removed the whole thing would not function accurately; it had evolved 
complex internal feedback paths that further added to analytical occlusion; in fact, 
the whole thing was not amenable to conventional analysis, since any probing by 
measuring equipment would change its behaviour, and at the early stages 
Thompson admitted he had no idea how it worked at all. What is clear is that the 
evolved array was highly context dependent and implementation specific: if the 
same circuit was configured onto a different, though identically specified FPGA, 
its performance would be degraded. In other words, the device had moved, 
through the process of evolution, which alternated physical expression in the 
FPGA with coded description in the evolutionary algorithm, to just such a hybrid, 
continuous-discrete, “artificial computer element” that Pattee is interested in 
promoting.  
 
Thompson’s work, as well as Pask’s ‘ear’, are discussed in Miller et al. (2014), 
which suggests that computing that makes use of continuous physical dynamics 
has much of significance to offer us. Work on ‘in-materio’ computing (ibid.) and 
reservoir computing (Caluwaerts et al., 2013) also suggests similarly exciting and 
profitable lines of enquiry. Still, the majority of work carried out today in 
computing, AI or otherwise, is carried out entirely within a discrete, coded 
environment (even if, as in the case of some deep learning systems, aspects of the 
code may be impenetrable to human cognisance). Late in his life Pask suggested 
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that physical assemblages based on the structural principle of tensegrity might be 
configured to operate as “elements of a potential concurrent computer” (Green, 
2004, 1436), and it is interesting to note the connection here with reservoir 
computing.41 Tensegrities form bounded structures that alternate discrete 
compression struts with continuous tension wires. I did initiate some work into 
tensegrity, culminating in an installation in the summer of 2016, but at present this 
work remains outside the scope of this thesis (cf. p.151). 
 
 
The life (and evolution) of a song 
 
To round off this chapter I’d like to briefly sketch how Pattee’s ideas might be 
applied to an aesthetic entity. Aesthetic expression exhibits similar processes of 
alternation between description and construction. Consider the life of a song: the 
initial song-writing stage will involve multiple alternations (and interactions) 
between coded description and real-time expression. The writer may start at an 
instrument, playing until something catches, a chord sequence for example, which 
she then repeats, testing while committing to memory. This initial expression may 
be formalised in some way, such as writing down a chord sheet, or recording the 
ditty to a Dictaphone.42 This initial structure then acts as a constraint on the next 
stage, which could be finding a melody for the chords, or finding a contrasting 
section. This searching stage will involve multiple attempts at expression, and may 
involve alternating periods of attention and inattention, which can lead to the oft 
noted moment of inspiration, when a melody, for example ‘just popped into my 
head’. Pattee cites Einstein and Poincaré on the emergence of an idea or moment 
of inspiration and says that “descriptions of the creative process suggest a picture 
                                               
41 Thanks to Chris Kiefer for alerting me to reservoir computing, in connection with 
discussions about tensegrity. The two principles are brought together in Caluwaerts et al. 
(2013). 
42 For many, including me, this is essential. Like many others I have an internal catalogue 
of ‘lost songs’ (or parts of songs, more accurately), that I can remember playing, 
remember parts of the writing process, but cannot remember how to play. The memory is 
often associated directly with an occasion: sat at this piano; playing it to someone and 
saying ‘it’s a bit like Bacharach, don’t you think?’ An interesting reaction to this, that I 
have come across, is to deliberately not notate or record any part of the writing process, 
with the idea that what ‘sticks’ in the memory will be what is good. 
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of singularities arising in a dynamical sea of ideas” (Pattee, 1974, 10).43 
Singularities such as a melody, chosen from the sea of all possible melodies that 
might fit. In turn this melody will constrain possible lyrics. However it is reached, 
at some point the song will be deemed ‘written’. At this mature stage of its life the 
song may be performed, or recorded, or notated, or find other forms of life. Note 
that neither the recording nor the notation is the expression, but the performance 
is. The recording needs to be played, that is, coupled to a material dynamics, to be 
expressed. In some cases the recorded version is ‘definitive’. In many others, 
though, the recorded version expresses just one form of the song’s existence. 
Audiences may hear it at different times (on the radio, at a gig) and construct 
memories that store aspects of the song: a melody, a hook, a lyric. Repeated 
listening informs this memory for an individual, but this building of description 
happens differently for different listeners. Some of those listeners may learn how 
to play the song, which will be a new and changed expression. Some listeners may 
base their performances on mis-transcription, a common enough phenomenon 
with online chord and lyric sites.44 Although undoubtedly irritating, these 
inaccurate versions can legitimately be seen as mutations of the song’s ‘genotype’. 
These multiple new versions may go on to inform the evolution of the song in 
wider ways, as when a band record a cover, or make it their own in concert. 
Multiple pathways are possible for the evolution of a song, but each will follow 
this alternation of discrete, symbolic, time-independent description, and continuous, 
physical, real-time expression. Expression is where fitness is tested, as in an 
individual section making it into the song, or the song making it onto the radio. 
Description is where expression is plotted. Once the song is written, after the 
rather private developmental stage, the song itself exists both as a discrete code 
that informs multiple possibilities of expression, and as that expression. These 
                                               
43 Campbell (1960) and Penrose (1999) also cite Poincaré and Einstein in discussion of 
the emergence of novel or innovative ideas that we tend to call inspiration. There is also a 
link with Pask’s use of ‘abduction’. 
44 See for example the multiple online versions of the chords to ‘Toxic’ by Britney Spears, 
which almost universally get the complex harmonic structure of the song wildly wrong, 
often just duplicating others’ mistakes. The only accurate online version I have found is 
this: https://www.hooktheory.com/theorytab/view/britney-spears/toxic. The transcription 
process itself will also move through alternating iterations of description-expression, 
where description formalises or codes whatever element is being analysed, and expression 
tests the code for fitness. Of course, ‘accurate transcription’ here points to my own 
position within a specifically Western framework of notational practices. 
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expressive possibilities are, to a large extent, now out of the hands of the 
songwriter. The song, as code, is a compression of all the possible expressions, 
into a stable, communicable store of implementation-independent information that 
that can be used to construct or express the song. That this code is not fixed or 
immutable is readily evidenced by following the multiple versions of any jazz 
standard; in other words, the song evolves. Chapter 6 zooms in on these processes 
in relation to the production of a recorded version of a song. From a slightly 
different angle, my modular synthesis piece The Thing Breathed is described at 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/modular-synthesis/the-thing-
breathed/, which gives a prescription for the building of this piece, in 
implementation-independent form that delineates functional blocks. The patch 
diagram plus associated description is a plan for construction of the functional 
architecture, but gives no indication of how this is to be performed, since each 
performance is a remapping of zones of aesthetic significance laid down in the 
memory of the performer, through rehearsal and repeated performance. 
Expression depends on memory of previous expression (if the piece is to have any 
cogency in performance and not just be random search liable to bore both 
performer and audience), as well as essential symbolic constraints such as my own 
working patch notes that I had to refer to each time the piece was performed. 
 
 
The analogue-digital what have you 
 
Although there are occasions where one can say with reasonable accuracy 
whether some thing is analogue or digital, at the systems level, particularly when 
dealing with a complex system, it becomes increasingly a matter of interpretation. 
Perceptive analyses, like those of Pattee and Pask, acknowledge the hybridity and 
the complementary nature of analogue and digital elements in complex systems. 
For example, the process of a cutting needle inscribing a vinyl record is best 
described as analogue, with very little need to acknowledge digital processes. But 
the cutting needle is not in itself a system, and when we view it in the systemic 
context of a disc cutting machine there will be digital control elements (switches, 
relays, etc.) without which it could not operate effectively, and when we zoom out 
to the level of the mastering room where the record is cut, then it becomes clear 
 54 
that we are considering a system with multiple analogue and digital elements and a 
richly interconnected nesting of continuous and discrete processes. It seems 
sensible to view activities such as vinyl cutting within a systemic context, rather 
than focussing too tightly on a single constituent process that is actually 
impossible to extricate from its wider technical environment. At the systems level 
disc cutting is a hybrid affair, with rich chains of transductions alternating discrete 
and continuous processes. It still makes practical sense to call the disc cutting 
machine an analogue device, since its function is the production of analogue vinyl 
records, but we shouldn’t take the demarcation in any absolute way, rather as a 
matter of interpretation that fosters understanding. 
 
That something is a matter of interpretation does not mean that it acquires less 
importance. On the contrary, the fact that we can choose how to draw a 
distinction gives us a responsibility. Terms like ‘digital age’ make it easy to 
overlook unforeseen effects on practice when recording becomes digital, by 
drawing on the assumption of progress and succession – if digital is the present, 
why record onto anything else? But this folds in too many contradictory practices, 
puts too much weight on the word digital, asks it to be too many things at once. 
Surely the multiplicity of practices that take the term digital vastly overweigh any 
possibility of monolithic meaning? 
 
I am appealing for taking seriously the need for hybrid approaches that 
acknowledge the complementarity of the terms analogue and digital in actual 
technical (rather than linguistic) usage, and that refuse the “faith in formalism” 
that posits any single digital environment as sufficient for complex creative or 
aesthetic work. This is not to say that the programming of computers cannot be 
creative, for clearly it can and often is; rather that the process of programming is 
not digital, even if the result is. I am saying that I question the assumptions of 
strong AI, that a single digital environment might be sufficient for creative 
intelligence or learning. I am also suggesting that the trend of the DAW to 
swallow more and more physical or analogue elements of traditional studio 
engineering, including personnel and key creative processes, such as mixing, is 
problematic in all kinds of ways.  
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Analogue and digital always and only coexist is a polemical plea to consider carefully 
the implications of phrases like ‘digital age’, or ‘analogue past’, and to see the 
relationship between the two terms in a much more balanced way that 
acknowledges both their complementarity and the interpretation necessary in 
drawing the distinction. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT (3) – CYBERNETICS OF THE STUDIO 
 
 
Chapter summary 
The systems under examination are defined rigorously. An adumbration of Pask’s 
cybernetics is explicitly linked to the domain of the recording studio. The 
composer/producer inhabiting and operating the studio is seen to be a participant 
observer who accumulates technical know-how through heuristic exploration. This 
embodied, tacit knowledge differs from that engendered by either surveying the 
literature of the domain, or by simulating in a different domain. The triadic relationship 
between composer/producer, technical environment, and music produced therein, form 
a cyclic, interdependent, dynamic stability that can be seen to evolve, manifesting the 
cybernetic property of self-organisation. The cybernetic system is seen to be an 
abstraction whose efficacy depends on isomorphism with real world systems (such as 
the recording studio). Pask’s exploration of the relevance of cybernetics to architecture 
is expanded to include the recording studio. Studios, like buildings, demonstrate 
functionalism – how the system is meaningful only in terms of its use by human 
inhabitants – and mutualism – how the system both serves and regulates its users. A 
comparison of the ways the tape studio and the DAW studio regulate use is presented. 
Despite progress narratives that position the DAW as enhanced successor to the tape 
studio, issues such as the planned obsolescence of the computer industry, and the facile 
analogy between performance to tape and performance in the DAW studio, indicate 
that this move is not a straightforward progression. Pasks’ Conversation Theory (CT) 
indicates that processes unfolding in a dynamic world of becoming explicate systems 
better than an emphasis on things. Concepts such as ‘information’ are not fixed things, 
rather they are contextually specified processes shared between interacting 
participants. Programming, in CT, is not a process unique to digital computers. When 
we compare the type of programming required for execution of the tape studio with 
that required in a DAW we find that they are of a different order. Appeals to 
isomorphism ignore essential complications. This can be seen most clearly in the area of 
studio performance (of the producer as well as the traditional performer): the tape studio 
marks a manifest commitment to all types of performance; the DAW tends to defer or 
abnegate such commitment. Pask was, in general, dismissive of ambitious claims made 
by computer scientists and AI proselytes – he did not believe all of reality could be 
modelled within a digital environment. The computers he built were hybrid, analogue-
digital devices. He sought concurrent execution of multiple simultaneous processes, 
something the digital computer (and DAW) is not capable of, but the tape studio is. A 
discussion of self-organising systems presents a tentative formulation of the self-
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organising tape studio, the most interesting historical examples of which have the 
composer as producer, directly operating the studio system to produce their own music, 
forming a cyclic evolving unity: composer – studio – music produced. DAW studios 
present a serious obstacle to self-organisation in that one crucial element – the code the 
DAW is built upon – is not available to the user either to change or to aid the evolution 
of. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter maps a specifically Paskian cybernetics onto the domain of the 
recording studio. It attempts to do for studio recording what Pask did for 
architecture and other aesthetic endeavours and takes us necessarily somewhat 
deeper into Pask’s Conversation Theory (CT). It is thus, I hope, complementary 
to Pickering’s Cybernetic Brain, which gives Pask’s work on CT “short shrift”, as 
outside the remit of his book (Pickering, 2011, 330). 
 
As noted below, the following is not a prescription for building a cybernetic 
studio. Rather it uses Pask’s cybernetics as a provocative (and under-explored) 
way in to understanding the complex system that is the recording studio in practice, 
and as support for one of the central tenets of the thesis as a whole, the 
questioning of progress narratives that position the DAW (and other ubiquitous 
digital media) as successor to, and improvement on, analogue ‘forebears’. It thus 
paves the way for (while also drawing on) the practice-based comparison between 
the ‘tape studio’ and the ‘DAW studio’ presented in chapter 6. 
 
 
Definition and description of systems examined here 
 
As with any cybernetic undertaking, we must demarcate and delineate, in as 
rigorous a way as possible, the systems under examination in this chapter and in 
chapter 6. Like any systemic demarcation there is an interpretive bias that needs 
to be acknowledged, and in practice there are many instances of hybridity that 
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complicate the somewhat arbitrary distinctions mapped below. Still, for purposes 
of comparison, the following will serve us well: 
 
Recording studio 
Environment for recording and/or production of recorded music.  
This may be a physical or virtual environment. The and/or distinction becomes 
necessary with the incorporation of the DAW, since this environment affords a 
constructive approach, from prefabricated recorded music or internally 
synthesised sound, and may not involve recording at all.45 It is important to note in 
all cases that at least one user/operator is part of this system.  
 
Definition of key terms: 
Recording – the laying down or storage of a reproducible transduced audio signal. 
Has to happen ‘in time’.  
Production – the construction of recorded music. May involve recording but not 
necessarily.  
Recorded music – music laid down onto a medium that allows repeated 
reproduction, such that it can be listened to. Output of both the recording and the 
production process. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis the wider recording studio system is divided into 
two distinct sub-systems: 
 
Tape studio 
Recording studio with a multitrack tape machine as main recording and production device. 
• A fairly minimal system comprises multitrack tape machine, 2-track tape 
machine, mixing desk, loudspeakers, headphones, microphones, outboard 
equipment, instruments, personnel to operate the equipment, and a 
                                               
45 The irony of the system potentially not including half its own nomenclature is not lost, 
but commonly agreed upon terms have the utility of shared meaning, even if “your 
personal concept of something is not identical to my personal concept of what we (may 
choose to call) the same thing” (Pask, 1987, 18). The inclusion of the DAW in the 
‘recording studio’ system is uncontroversial and necessary to what follows. 
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physical space to house all this, preferably partitioned into an area for 
performance (live room) and an area for engineering (control room). 
• At minimum this system could be a song writer with a single ‘boombox’ 
(with built in microphone) with two cassette decks allowing sound on 
sound.  
• Majority of work in studio revolves around performance, both musical and 
technical, and it would be highly unusual if a tape studio operated without 
recording of any kind. 
• Recording happens onto a continuous medium. 
• This type of studio was dominant from the mid 1950s until the mid 1990s. 
 
 
DAW studio 
Recording studio environment with DAW as main recording and/or production device. 
• May include some or all of the elements of the tape studio, but multitrack 
tape will be replaced with DAW.46  
• At minimum this system comprises computer, software, speakers or 
headphones, and user.  
• Recording happens onto a discrete medium. 
• Performance tends to play a less dominant role in production than in the 
tape studio, and there may be no recording involved at all. 
• This type of studio has been dominant since the mid 2000s. 
 
With these systemic demarcations in mind we can proceed to flesh out a Paskian 
cybernetics of the studio.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
46 Though multitrack tape may still be part of the system, as in the practice of recording to 
multitrack tape (for the sound) and dumping the multitrack into a DAW (for the editing). 
This scenario would still count as a DAW studio since the DAW would be the critical 
production environment.  
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Participant observer 
 
We must be participants – hypothesizing, scheming, testing, experimenting, 
prototyping, protecting our own interests – but still participants. (Pask, 1987, 9) 
 
In the studio practice described in chapter 6 I inhabit many related roles: 
composer, performer, engineer, producer. In my reflection on this practice I 
cannot adopt a “view from nowhere” (see Varela et al. (1993, 27) for a brief 
discussion of Nagel’s phrase); I cannot stand outside the practice, cannot be an 
external observer reporting in an unbiased manner. There is too much ‘me’ in the 
mediations, too much ‘I’ in the interactions therein. In this cybernetic exploration 
of the studio the observer is necessarily participant.47 This causes some problems 
for a ‘classical’ scientific analysis of salient processes, procedures, constraints and 
affordances, where the observer is assumed to be external, outside the system: 
“Most scientific writing, even in behavioural science, takes it for granted that an 
observer can, in principle, act as a numinous and unbiassed entity called an 
external observer” (Pask, 1975a, 81). Pask notes that there are many advantages 
to this classical position, but there are also consequences that are not desirable, 
and situations where such a position is untenable.  
 
Pask is clear that the central mental activity of the participant observer, when 
constructing hypotheses about the system in which they participate, must depart 
from the more usual induction and deduction of the external observer, and will be 
“a mix of abduction… of distinction, predication, or of cleaving out from a flux of 
events… and of rule invention to collect the distinguished fragments under the 
abduced principle” (ibid., 83). Abduction, for Pask, and following C.S. Peirce, is 
“the process of arriving at a new kind of rule or logical model” (Pask, 1961, 114), 
and is linked with both innovation and analogy construction (we will recall from 
chapter 1 that the construction and manipulation of analogies is central to Pask’s 
cybernetic methodology). There are also similarities with Pattee’s creation of 
formal, time-independent symbols as a dynamical, time-bound, medium-specific 
process (cf. p.46). The important point is that the creation of hypotheses about the 
                                               
47 Of course, the participant observer is not exclusive to second-order cybernetics. 
Anthropology, quantum physics, ethnography and other disciplines have all dealt with 
similar problems of observation and objectivity. 
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nature of a complex system requires that the participant observer employ their 
own embodied technical acumen in conversation with a dynamic technical 
environment. The “cleaving out from a flux” indicates that the system is dynamic, 
that it will not stand still, waiting around to be explained and understood by a 
numinous, external observer, unconnected to the system itself, and we are 
reminded of Ian Hacking’s dictum: “Don’t just peer: interfere” (Hacking, 1983, 
189, cf. p.18), and Pickering’s “nonmodern” performative ontology (cf. p.12).  
 
The key thing for me, here, is that insights wrought from physical engagement 
with material practices are different to those that come either from surveying the 
literature of a domain (as explored in chapter 6 in relation to the studio) or from 
the attempt to simulate within a different domain (as is so common these days 
with computational approaches to a bewildering profusion of areas). In the cases 
under examination here, the observer is participant and uses various forms of 
expertise and embodied experience (e.g. tacit knowledge guiding heuristic 
exploration in search of underspecified goals, such as the successful production of 
a pop song) to help in the formation of hypotheses that may then be tested 
through further experiment and exploration. Conclusions drawn from this 
practical research are detailed in chapter 6, and are mainly centered on 
performance, commitment, gesture and contingency.  
 
For Pask, the participant observer “engages in activities such as exploration, 
attention direction or non-trivial learning in which he exerts control over his 
environment and consequently changes the universe (either real or modelled) in 
which he operates” (Pask, 1975a, 87). In other words, in any situation where the 
system is dynamical and can be said to evolve as a result of interaction and goal 
directed exploration (even if goals are underspecified), as is the case in the 
systems under examination here. The tape studio, a system comprising both 
technical assemblage and engineer/composer/performer, changes through use, as 
its operator comes to know it through practice. As I come to know the 
environment through directed exploration, I change both its configuration 
(affordances) and my own knowledge of possibilities (constraints); this cyclic 
process leads to an ongoing dynamic stability which can be seen to evolve. In 
cybernetic terms, the system can be seen to manifest the property of self-
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organisation (cf. p.77). We will come back to this important cybernetic concept, but 
for now the important thing to realise is that all elements of the self-organising 
system (including the participant observer) are in a contingent, interdependent, 
mutually accommodating relationship. 
 
For our purposes, the cogency of CT stems from examining processes in 
interaction rather than positing pre-existing objects (including concepts) in a 
world ‘out there’. It looks at conversation between individuals (or groups, or 
within an individual) from the point of view of meaning inherent in the 
conversation, as it is construed by individuals in a shared universe of discourse, 
and not from the perspective of pre-given realities (facts, concepts, knowledge). It 
doesn’t attempt to establish factual truth, in any kind of universal, objective 
manner, rather it values agreement between participants, a shared bodying forth 
of ‘knowing’, a process of becoming.  
 
 
Modelling and the cybernetic abstraction 
 
The [cybernetician’s] object of study is a system, either constructed, or so 
abstracted from a physical assembly, that it exhibits interaction between the parts, 
whereby one controls another, unclouded by the physical character of the parts 
themselves. He manipulates and modifies his systems often using mathematical 
techniques, but, because in practical affairs cybernetics is most usefully applied to 
a very large system, he may also build mechanical artifacts to model them. (Pask, 
1961, 15-16)  
 
The ‘cybernetic system’ is an abstraction. Whether instantiated in mathematical 
model, physical assembly or a logic of distinctions, the cybernetic system itself is a 
winnowing out of principle, “abstracting a controllable system from the flux of a 
real world” (ibid., 15). In the cybernetic abstraction ‘particulars’ are irrelevant; 
these might be energetic considerations, physical specifics, disciplinary 
constraints. The cybernetic method looks for commonalities of principle that 
bridge disciplinary boundaries, physical instantiations, modalities. It is the 
‘abstracting out’ of these principles that is the key cybernetic procedure. In answer 
to the criticism that cybernetics is trivial, since “anything whatever can be defined 
as a system”, Pask holds that “an answer can be given, provided we do not confuse 
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the strict identity of principle between the workings of several assemblies, which 
the cybernetician tries to embody in his abstract system, with mere facile analogy” 
(ibid.). Cybernetic models do not attempt to imitate the workings of a particular 
device, assembly or system, and at this stage it may be useful to note, in contrast to 
the “popular, but deeply misguided, conflation of cybernetics with computers” 
(Cariani, 2017, 123), that the DAW is not a cybernetic model of a tape studio. Of 
course, it imitates all kinds of features, but it cannot be said to form a cybernetic 
abstraction of the tape studio, since the principles of operation, and the behaviours 
it manifests and engenders in its users, are of a completely different order. The oft-
made, but mistaken facile analogy would state that the tape studio and the DAW 
are isomorphic because the end result, a piece of recorded music, is the same; 
alternatively, they are analogous since both are about the capturing of a 
performance. From the perspective of this thesis both statements are outright 
denied. In the first case the analogue recording, in its relatively fixed and 
‘definitive’ status, has a very different character and universe of operations to the 
fluid, mutable and endlessly recombinant digital ‘recording’. In the second, as we 
will see, both the status and nature of performance change between tape studio 
and DAW, in terms of the centrality of the procedure to the domain, and in the 
commitment given to it in practice. 
 
In discussing “brain models” that fail to reach the level of the cybernetic 
abstraction (and thus are not terribly useful in elucidating the workings of an 
actual brain) Pask notes that it “is easy to cite brain models which are merely 
imitations; most well-behaved robots, most of the tidy automata that imitate a 
naughts and crosses player… There are not so many cybernetic models to choose 
from, but one of them, made by Ashby and called the Homeostat, admirably 
illustrates the distinction” (Pask, 1961, 17). He insists that “if the device is a 
cybernetic model, then it is almost certainly a very poor imitation” (ibid., 16), and 
that it “is only at the level intended in the cybernetic abstraction that the self-
regulation in a homeostat is identical with the self-regulation in a brain, and with 
reference to this feature the homeostat is a cybernetic model of all brains” (ibid., 
17). The homeostat does not imitate the workings of a brain; rather it instantiates, 
physically, the abstracted out principle of self-regulation. The homeostat cannot 
be regarded as a cybernetic model until there is an acknowledgement of the 
 64 
abstracted out principle – in this case self-regulation – that is isomorphic between 
the model and what it is modeling. The homeostat by itself is not a cybernetic 
system. The homeostat plus the analogy with brain function through the similarity 
of self-regulation is the cybernetic system.  
 
We will keep these ideas of the cybernetic model and the cybernetic system in 
mind as we proceed in our investigation and exploration of the tape studio and in 
our comparison with the DAW studio, which will proceed via a comparison with 
an article Pask wrote in 1969 about architecture. 
 
 
The relevance of ‘The Architectural Relevance of Cybernetics’ to the 
cybernetics of the studio 
 
In elucidating a cybernetics of the recording studio, it will be useful to look at the 
ways in which cybernetics drew parallels with other practices and disciplines that 
operate across a spectrum of aesthetic and client-based professional activities. In 
1969 Pask wrote an article on ‘The Architectural Relevance of Cybernetics’, and 
although architecture and the recording studio are clearly different domains, there 
is much here that is apposite to the studio dynamic, explored from a cybernetic 
perspective. Pask had little to say about music, but he did comment at length on 
design, which is a principle of operation and practice that applies at all kinds of 
levels to the studio: physical design of the studio including layout and ergonomic 
constraints as well as systemic technical schema; design of the song (composition); 
design of the recorded expression of the song (production); design of a software 
emulation of a piece of hardware, and so on.  
 
In 1969 the use of computers in architecture was still somewhat novel, and Pask 
notes that “Computer assisted design is a ‘cybernetic’ method and there are several 
instances of its application to architecture” (Pask, 1969, 494). Why does Pask 
scare quote his own discipline? Because by this point, to him, the link between 
cybernetics and computers had descended to the level of stereotypy, devoid of 
cogency; it had become “facile analogy”. The filial relationship between the 
interdisciplinary domain and the general or special purpose computational artifact 
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had been acknowledged since their co-implicative births in the 1940s.48 
Cybernetics used the computer as model builder, as exemplar, as systemic 
functional component, and in a host of other ways. The computer used cybernetics 
as theory builder, as consultant, as meta-language, and in a host of other ways.   
 
The point for Pask was that linking cybernetics and computer aided design was 
trivial, as much as it was obvious: “If we leave the matter at this level, then 
architects dive into a cybernetic bag of tricks and draw out those which seem to be 
appropriate” (ibid.). What he’s much more interested in are the deeper 
connections and correspondences that operate at the level of the cybernetic 
abstraction: “cybernetics and architecture really enjoy a much more intimate 
relationship; they share a common philosophy of architecture in the sense that 
Stafford Beer has shown it to be the philosophy of operational research” (ibid.). 
 
Many musicians are used to diving into the “cybernetic bag of tricks”: any time 
they explore feedback; or when they develop a meta-language to talk about 
technical systems, as modular synth users do; or draw on homeostasis, autopoiesis, 
self-regulation or cellular automata in the making of sound installations. Despite 
this, the common ancestry in cybernetics is seldom acknowledged.49 Studio 
operation is still an under explored area from a scholarly or critical perspective; it 
surely could benefit from a philosophy of “operational research”, and might then 
share in the kinship Pask proposes for cybernetics and architecture. 
 
Pask adumbrates architectural functionalism and mutualism. A building may be 
functional (as opposed to decorative), but “the concept of functionalism can be 
usefully refined in an humanistic direction. The functions, after all, are performed 
for human beings or human societies. It follows that a building cannot be viewed 
simply in isolation. It is only meaningful as a human environment. It perpetually 
                                               
48 This is, of course, a somewhat arbitrary dating. We could go back further and link 
Babbage’s Analytical Engine (1837) with Ampère’s coining of ‘cybernétique’ (1834), or 
further still and note the coincidence of J. H. Müller’s theoretical anticipation (1786) of 
Babbage’s Difference Engine with the Watt Governor (1788). (“Analytical Engine,” 
2017, “Centrifugal governor,” 2017, “Cybernetics,” 2017, “Difference engine,” 2017). 
49 This is not to say that cybernetics invented or originated all these concepts, rather 
cybernetics is the first place where their conjoined significance is manifested and 
explored.  
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interacts with its inhabitants, on the one hand serving them and on the other hand 
controlling their behaviour… I shall dub this notion architectural ‘mutualism’ 
meaning mutualism between structures and men or societies” (ibid.). As a studio 
user, denizen and designer this quotation is strongly redolent of studio operation, 
and could be rewritten thus:  
 
The functions of the studio are performed for human users. It follows that a studio 
cannot be viewed simply in isolation. It is only meaningful as a human 
environment. It perpetually interacts with its inhabitants, on the one hand serving 
them and on the other hand controlling their behaviour… I shall dub this notion 
studio ‘mutualism’ meaning mutualism between the studio environment and its 
users.50 
 
This co-implication of human user/inhabitant and technical ensemble/environment 
is central to Pask’s cybernetics,51 where it is given a much more rigorous and 
reciprocal treatment than either the usual user-centered approach that posits 
technical milieu or built environment as serving inhabitants, or the other equally 
one-sided pole that considers design of device or environment in their own terms, 
without due regard for individual difference of user or evolving patterns of use.  
 
One consequence of functionalism and mutualism… is that architects are required 
to design dynamic rather than static entities. Clearly, the human part of the system 
is dynamic. But it is equally true (though less obvious) that the structural part 
must be imaged as continually regulating its human inhabitants. (ibid.) 
 
Clearly, this is equally applicable to the studio environment, and this issue of the 
dynamics of the studio environment regulating the uses to which it can be put, and 
the ways in which it is used, is central to this comparison between tape studio and 
DAW. No studio environment is neutral with regard to its usage, and although we 
                                               
50 An interesting and relevant historical example of such studio mutualism can be seen in 
the ‘at hand’ ergonomics of the Studio 54 setup at Pierre Schaeffer’s GRM from the late 
1960s. “The Studio 54 desk allowed a single user to perform tasks which, according to 
conventionally hierarchised (and fiercely union-defended) roles, previously involved a 
composer, desk technician, and studio manager. The new work situation, which evokes 
the future garage or bedroom type digital creative industries practitioner as much as the 
traditional lone genius composer, was a revolutionary social aspect of the GRM’s general 
organology: artist-technicians could explore sounds independently, in freely looped 
listening, learning, and shaping activity” (Norman, 2018). See also Teruggi (2007, 219). 
51 See also Varela et al. (1993, 197): “The opposition between inner and outer causal 
factors is replaced by a coimplicative relation, since organism and medium mutually 
specify each other.”  
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might suspect (because this is how it is invariably presented in the literature) that 
the DAW is more neutral, since it is seen to have greater affordance and less 
constraint, my practical exploration of both shows this not to be so. Regulation 
(control, homeostasis, feedback) is a central concern of cybernetics, and a 
cybernetic theory of the studio must put regulation at its heart. Not just tuning, 
maintenance and control of the technical milieu, but equally how the technical 
environment regulates use. This ‘less obvious’ type of regulation often eludes 
attention precisely because of the assumptions we make about technologies 
serving our needs; but every time we struggle with a function in a DAW, every 
time we check out a YouTube ‘how to’ tutorial, or use the default reverb preset on 
a plugin, we are being constrained, conditioned and regulated by the very 
technology we assume we control. The constraints of the tape studio are better 
known and more commonly acknowledged, since they are written into the very 
history of the DAW, a history that is presented as emancipatory and progressive, 
by dint of how the DAW ‘saves’ us from those constraints: increased editing 
functionality, cheaper infrastructure, greater numbers of tracks, etc. Of course, 
the tape studio also conditions us in ways which tend to remain below the radar 
until we actually start to use it. 
 
Broadening his remit from individual building to larger ensembles, such as cities, 
Pask notes that the city, also, cannot be viewed as a neutral container of society: 
“On the contrary, its structure acts as symbolic control programme on a par with 
the ritual constraints which are known to regulate the behaviour of various tribes 
and which render this behaviour homeostatic rather than divergent. Hence the 
architect is responsible for building conventions and shaping the development of 
traditions” (ibid., 494-5). 
 
Here, via a typical cross-disciplinary analogy, we are back to regulation and we 
should note the concomitant ethical imperative: the responsibility of the architect. 
Pask notes that this comment “simply elevates the idea that a building controls its 
inhabitants to a higher level of organization” (ibid., 495). In terms of the studio we 
can compare this to ecologies of studio production in a culture, and note the ways 
in which the dominant trends in studio design and use, which these days are often 
outside of an actual physical studio (‘bedroom’ production), condition, constrain 
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and regulate the music that is made in them; we see how these nested and 
interconnected sets of studio practice evident in a culture mutually inform and 
determine each other. We, the studio designers and users, have a responsibility 
towards the establishment of conventions and the ongoing development of 
traditions. My own studio work, presented here, in its small and local way (but 
not disconnected from the wider studio ecology), is attempting to ask questions 
about these conventions and developing traditions, by examining in critical detail, 
through practice, the regulatory and controlling natures of both the dominant 
DAW paradigm and its supposed forebear, the tape studio. 
 
Developing his theme Pask notes that “systems, notably cities, grow and develop 
and, in general evolve” (ibid.). Architectural designs should therefore have “rules 
for evolution built into them” (ibid.), and the responsible architect must be 
concerned with evolutionary properties and shouldn’t just sit back and watch 
change happen. One of the more unfortunate, and in no way necessary, aspects of 
the ‘evolution’ of the DAW, is the planned obsolescence inherited from an 
avaricious computer industry.52 Although many engineers initially welcomed the 
adoption of DAW systems that meant they weren’t having to spend portions of 
each session calibrating tape machines, they soon came to realise they would have 
to spend significant amounts of time on calibration and infrastructure 
development as hardware and software go through their supposedly essential 
‘upgrade’ cycles. One example of this enforced evolution comes from Apple, who 
have deliberately precluded any kind of backwards compatibility between their 
DAW Logic X and its precursor, Logic 9: its purchase is more or less forced on 
professional studio operators as a new crop of clients come to sessions with Logic 
X projects that cannot be opened in Logic 9. There are alternatives, of course, to 
any DAW – engineers could, for example, switch to an open source system 
running on a Linux OS. But, as Apple are well aware, inertia and the prospect of 
significant financial and time commitments necessary for adopting a new system, 
put many engineers off such a change. There are a lot of grumbling engineers and 
producers out there who don’t have control of, or even a say in, the evolution of 
the very systems they rely on. We are, in the studio environment, a very long way 
                                               
52 On planned obsolescence see Rodgers (2015, 12), Sterne (2007), Nelson (1987, 53).  
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from Pask’s responsible architect, building adaptive systems that respond to and 
evolve alongside patterns of use that change between individuals and through 
time. 
 
 
Conversation Theory 
 
Conversation Theory grew up as a body of hypotheses, often focused upon social, 
psychological, or educational matters. These matters arose out of my work of 35 
odd years, dealing with a curious mixture of mechanical, philosophical and human 
issues - such as for example (mostly deviant) computing systems, social support 
systems (including that most important social support called entertainment), 
human machine systems for training, maintaining vigilance or workload, learning 
concepts and skills, police organisation, selling, innovation and decision making, 
by people or by small teams. It became clear, chiefly in the context of educational 
support, that the existing paradigms were insufficient. Hence, Conversation 
Theory grew up, albeit slowly. (Pask, 1987, 18) 
 
To further flesh out the cybernetics of the studio it will be necessary to delve a 
little deeper into Conversation Theory. CT is a process philosophy, a cybernetics of 
becoming. It does not attempt to explicate a given world ‘out there’ but to explore 
the processes by which meaning is created and shared by participants through the 
interaction Pask dubbed ‘conversation’. Concepts, language, even information are 
all seen as processes unfolding in a dynamic world of becoming. Rather than being 
some fixed, measurable entity, information is defined “in, roughly, the sense of 
Carl Adam Petri, to mean the becoming of a coupling between otherwise 
independent systems, or, equisignificantly, the becoming of a synchronization 
between hitherto asynchronous systems” (Pask, 1992b, no pagination). 
Information is not something that can be separated out from the context of its 
communication; it is an active, dynamic process involved in coupling between 
autonomous systems; it is a becoming of coherence. Concepts are similarly seen as 
processual, contextual and dynamic: “Concepts (alias, skills, usually intellectual 
skills), are processes, resulting from the execution of a cluster of procedures 
where, in turn, a procedure is defined as the compilation of a program in a 
computing medium; either a human brain, or an artifact” (Pask, 1979a, 2). 
Throughout his writing Pask is extremely careful in his use of language, which is 
itself a process at the heart of CT. He rigorously defines his concepts throughout, 
not to ‘say the last word’ on a concept such as ‘concept’, but to allow the theory to 
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be formal, consistent and general, and to allow it to be ‘ported out’ into media 
other than academic writing, such as a modelling facility, a (mostly deviant) 
computing system, or a dynamical formal logic. Before exploring Pask’s 
“computing medium” in detail, we can draw on his notion of programming in 
relation to tape studio and DAW. Programming can be seen to be a broader 
concept than the image of (digital) computer coding, but does, nevertheless, have 
a strict definition in CT. 
 
 
Programming 
 
One of the problems with much of the literature of the DAW is that it positions 
the DAW as isomorphic to the tape studio (cf. chapter 6), whereas their 
relationship is one of weak analogy, at best. They are both control systems. They 
may operate in similar fashions. But as control systems they operate with very 
different sets of programming languages. This point is lost when the DAW is 
presented as the evolution of the tape studio, and when they are assumed to speak 
the same language: “We appropriate terms [in DAW use] from the analog 
recording world all the time, because the concepts remain the same, and they 
work” (Leider, 2004, 168). Unlike John Stroud, who argued for an acceptable 
workability of terms and approximations, with the devil in the details situated 
somewhere between (cf. p.32), Leider’s comment presents a problematic 
obfuscation. The programming language of the tape studio is generalist and 
transferable in scope, even as it is personal in application: familiar with the general 
set of elements such as multitrack tape machine, analogue mixing desk, cables and 
patchbays for connecting elements together in standard ways, the tape studio 
operator can easily move to another tape studio environment and rapidly apply 
general principles to the novel environment so as to quickly allow their individual 
predilections to come to bear on the environment. The programming language of 
the DAW is substrate specific, and, in the case of a ‘closed’ platform like Logic, 
intractable, a black box: inputs and outputs may be parametrically interacted with, 
but the box is closed; the operator cannot get ‘under the hood’, and the coupled 
system of DAW and user cannot evolve in the way that an open programming 
language such as Pure Data, coupled to a community of users, can and does. The 
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Logic user might happily take their skills to another Logic enabled environment, 
but if the novel studio is based around Pro-Tools, Cubase, Reaper, or any other 
DAW then they will struggle, and it will take them much longer to get ‘up to 
speed’ than in the comparable tape environment. To make matters more 
complicated, the DAW appears to offer exactly the programming opportunities of 
the tape studio, and thus masks and diverts attention away from the fact that the 
type of programming is of a very different order.  
 
Programming the tape studio for execution involves a gamut of embodied, 
gestural, performative routines where know-how is embodied, setup and 
calibration is gestural, and execution is performed as a coherent, concurrent 
synchronisation of otherwise separate and distinct autonomous or semi-
autonomous elements. This type of programming is antithetical to that which leads 
to the serial execution of the digital computer, since all elements form a cyclic 
organization: they mutually inform, determine and interact with each other, and 
this co-determination is concurrent and continuous. In the tape studio, the 
execution of a program starts when you hit record (cf. p.23), or when some other 
technical performance, such as tape editing, occurs. The key point is that the 
execution of the program is performative – it has to happen in real time, as a 
synchronous coupling of autonomous elements. At its simplest a performance is 
recorded to tape. Layers of programming complexity can be added to this simple 
base, as is the case in the performances of the mixes discussed in chapter 6,53 or 
the laying down in one pass of a rhythm track with multiple interacting elements, 
common (and less common) clocks, and a performer to play with the whole thing.54 
To be sure, the execution can be rehearsed, and often this process is necessary and 
lengthy, but the process is only made concrete when the ‘red light’ is on. The case 
of tape editing is slightly different, but there is the same gestural-embodied-
performative cyclic organisation, and the same ‘moment of truth’ when you cut 
into the tape or splice cuts together.55 
                                               
53 See, for example: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/letter-
game/#Final_mix  
54 See, for example: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-
ep/substantive-hungry-trouser-word/#Rhythm_tracks  
55 Similar programming affordances and constraints can be seen in the mixing desk. Once 
you understand the basic operating principles of an analogue mixing desk (through 
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For Pask, program execution has to happen within a particular computing 
medium. He makes a sharp distinction between program, processor and 
procedure:  a program, such as an algorithm or standard computer program, is a 
series of syntactically valid instructions. A processor, such as a brain or other 
computing medium, is the environment in which a program is compiled and 
interpreted. A procedure is the execution of the program within a specified 
computing medium. “It is nonsense to say ‘Ex (Prog),’ meaning ‘Execute Prog’ 
[program] with no processor implied, as it would be in standard computer science; 
one can say Ex (ProcA) [execute procedure A]” (Pask, 1979a, 231). 
 
The important point is that programs are context dependent: they have to be 
executed within a specific (computing) medium. The program ‘record’ might 
appear as a simple algorithm, e.g. setup microphone on performer, connect output 
of mic to preamp, connect output of preamp to recording device, set gain, press 
record. This program has the benefit of generality, and looks as if ‘tape machine’ 
and ‘DAW’ will fit equally well into the ‘recording device’ of the algorithm. But 
once we start executing the program, by actually recording to tape, or to the DAW, 
then we start to see that the procedures are different. At the level of the general 
algorithm above there certainly seems to be an isomorphism between tape and 
DAW, but the problem is that we humans, as performers, operate at a much more 
complex and messy level than this simplistic rendering affords. Specifically, we 
carry with us histories of practice and foreknowledge of procedures: as indicated 
in chapter 6, the experienced performer has a different attitude towards 
performance in the DAW realm, as they are aware of the affordances of post-
recording editing and manipulation, and as a result, perform in a different way to 
the more highly charged, ‘moment of truth’ nature of tape recording. Further, the 
different emphases given to sensory modalities, differences of gestural interaction 
and ergonomics, and their own knowledge of post-recording manipulation 
                                               
practice), you will find it fast and unproblematic to adapt to a ‘new’ (to you) analogue 
desk. The situation with digital desks is the exact opposite: if you learn how to operate 
one it gives you no general principles that you can apply to other desks (digital or 
analogue), and the learning required in any new situation will be complex: you may very 
well get very good at learning how to read, and operate from, manuals in a fast and 
efficient manner, but the only sense in which it makes any sense to say ‘I understand the 
operating principles of digital desks’ is to say ‘and that is that they are all different, and all 
require significant cognitive investment to make then functional’. 
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possibilities, mean that the engineer is also operating in a different manner and 
exhibiting different behaviours with execution of ‘recording’ in the tape or DAW 
environments.  
 
Exploring these differences in a practical way, with conviction and commitment to 
what is produced, soon leads one to realise that the procedures ‘recording to tape’ 
and ‘recording to DAW’ are categorically not isomorphic. Skeuomorphic 
emulation in the DAW occludes this distinction, and does so in collusion with the 
progress narratives written into the history of succession, increased affordance 
and ‘democratisation’ of the DAW. 
 
 
Computing media 
 
At points, the language of CT sounds like computer programming language: 
procedures are formed from programs, compiled and interpreted for execution 
within a computing medium. But Pask’s computing medium is not the same as 
‘computer’, as generally understood. The human brain is the computing medium 
he is most interested in, but all kinds of other systems can be usefully employed, 
such as a modelling facility, or a well-specified formal logic such as Pask’s Lp,56 
operating as a shared interface through which conversation can happen: “An 
interpretation (semantic) of Lp expressions consists, invariably, of many 
‘universes’, a priori independent, but rendered locally dependent by analogy; each 
‘universe’ consisting in a process (not, for example, a set). Refer to this collection 
of universes, non-commitally, as the ‘computing-medium’, whether they are brain, 
or machines, or organisations in society (urban structure, information search, 
communication, transportation)” (Pask, 1979a, 1-2). The generality of cybernetics 
is once more in evidence. Throughout his life Pask built physical devices, artifacts 
and systems to explicate and exemplify the principles he was exploring, all of 
which were, in the general sense here, computers. But Pask’s computers are not 
what we have come to understand by the term; Pask tended to avoid the standard 
                                               
56 Lp is the “proto-language” or “proto-logic” underlying CT; a dynamical, formal logic 
used to compute CT processes. See Pask (1979a). 
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digital, Turing/von Neumann architecture, since he found it unable to compute the 
kinds of concurrent processes he was interested in: “Process in general is not Turing 
representable” (Pask, 1979c, 486). The serial, one step at a time, paradigm was 
found to be inadequate as a way of modelling the kinds of dynamic, kinetic 
cognitive processes underlying the interaction of actors through conversation. 
Pask built Musicolour, “the first coherence-based hybrid control computer” (Pask 
and Curran, 1982, 144); he built the ‘ear’, an “electrochemical device… having 
emergent sensory capabilities” (Cariani, 1993, 1); and throughout the 60s and 70s 
he built “epistemological laboratories” such as CASTE and 
THOUGHTSTICKER, which physically modelled CT in an interaction interface 
of analogue/hybrid form, which allowed both instantiation of theory and an 
environment in which to observe interaction and glean “hard” data (Pask, 1979a). 
All of these devices had digital elements, but never was the entire system housed 
within a single digital environment. Paul Pangaro, who built a digital “simulation” 
of CT in the form of the software implementation of THOUGHTSTICKER 
makes the point clearly: 
 
‘THOUGHTSTICKER’ indicates a user interface written in software and 
connected to a software embodiment of Lp structures and processes (‘Lp 
software’), within the constraints of present digital technology, which constraints 
are very great compared to the intention behind the formal protolanguage itself 
(‘Lp’). Multi-process, concurrent, conflict-ridden as well as conflict-free 
computation are a few of the gross omissions inherent in any present-day 
THOUGHTSTICKER. Even the proposals of modern AI for non-von Neumann, 
many-processor digital hardware is not capable of the proper processing that is 
required for Lp. (Pangaro, 1987, no pagination) 
 
This version of THOUGHTSTICKER was an attempt to make portable and 
marketable the rather large hybrid device Pask and associates had built at 
Systems Research, Pask’s laboratory and base. Pask’s paper ‘An essay on the 
kinetics of language’ gives considerable detail: 
 
The main focus is THOUGHTSTICKER as an epistemological laboratory (EL) 
in which plans, expositions, etc., are spelled out as Lp expressions which are 
checked for legality and represented in a canonical graphic form, the entailment 
mesh (EM). The EM is an interface between participants (authors, planners, 
curriculum designers or learners). Emphasis on computers is only a convenience, 
and may be misleading, (a) because Lp and CT are machine independent 
(epistemological, social, psychological) constructions of considerable generality; 
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(b) because, insofar as generality is achieved, Lp and CT provide a theory of 
general intellectual operations, whether carried out by human beings or not, 
which surely includes intelligent other-than-human, or other-than biological 
systems. However, the computing machines able to embody such operations are 
concurrent with many independent loci of control (their implementations 
resemble a group, or population, of devices), and have little in common with serial 
processors, or the operations usually associated with ‘artificial intelligence’. (Pask, 
1979a, 1) 
 
Here the computing medium is seen as a population of devices, or more 
accurately, a population of processes executed in a population of interpreting 
media, including at least one brain, interacting concurrently only in local 
synchronisation (i.e. with no master clock). The systems Pask put together as 
epistemological laboratories were created to explore the areas mentioned 
(epistemological, social, psychological), but there is no reason why such a system 
shouldn’t be designed along similar lines, to explore studio recording. Once one 
starts to look at it like this it appears very much as if such a system already exists: 
the tape studio. It is a population of autonomous processes, coming together in 
only local synchronisation, steered by one of more human actor. Of course, the 
DAW studio can operate in a similar manner, primarily if the focus of attention is 
outside of the DAW itself, e.g. on performance, on outboard hardware and 
instruments, on people. But if the majority of time is spent operating ‘in the box’ 
then the system ceases to be concurrent and moves further away from the rich 
spectrum of interactive possibilities that CT proposed and that its instantiations in 
hardware went some way to realising in human-machine interaction. 
 
There are, of course, large differences between THOUGHTSTICKER and the 
recording studio, the most important being not the difference in domain, rather 
that THOUGHTSTICKER existed not just to embody the principles of CT, but 
also to collect verifiable, empirical results about hypotheses of learning and 
cognition. Pask built physical devices and assemblages to test out philosophical 
and cybernetic ideas in empirical situations, where evidence could be gathered and 
analysis of evidence could feed back into the ongoing scientific quest of disproving 
hypotheses (in the sense of Popper). Presented as a scientific research operation 
Pask could continue to secure funding to enable the whole thing to keep 
generating itself, self-organising, if you will. The recording studio is obviously a 
very different environment, concerned as it is with the production of recorded 
 76 
music. Evidence gathered from this aesthetic environment is necessarily of a 
different type to the hard scientific data Pask sought to generate. Still, we need 
not be strict in our demarcation of science and art. Pask himself saw them as 
complementary and coexistent: “For myself, I have never been able to see the 
distinct cultures of C.P. Snow as divergent; art and science, psychology and 
aesthetics seem, to me, part of much the same enterprise and they coexist 
together” (Pask, 1992b, no pagination). His own work happily crossed over into 
theatre, installation art, music/computer interaction, architecture, and so on. I’m 
certainly not proposing that had Pask been asked to help design a recording 
studio he would have accepted that which already existed; I don’t think he would 
have seen the tape studio as an EL in the manner of THOUGHTSTICKER. He 
would most certainly have wanted to design a system that learnt about its operator 
as she learnt about the system. I can though, be certain that Pask would not have 
designed the entire system within the architecture of a digital computer, had the 
stipulation been that the system embody CT’s “theory of general intellectual 
operations”. 
 
The cybernetics of the studio, outlined here, is not a prescription for how to build 
a cybernetic studio. The plan for that is being hatched, as this thesis grows itself, 
and as the business of cybernetics proceeds through exploration, model building 
and research, all both practical and theoretical. At present, the tape studio system 
I’ve built (and am part of) is cybernetic, to a degree, in that it is self-organising 
and it does evolve. It does not, as yet, reach the conditions Pask outlines as the 
conclusion to ‘The Architectural Relevance of Cybernetics’. A truly cybernetic 
studio would be responsive and adaptive, it would learn about the wishes, needs, 
predilections of its user(s), it would act as an “odd mixture of catalyst, crutch, 
memory and arbiter” (Pask, 1969, 496). Pask says that these “are the dispositions 
a designer should bring to bear upon his work (when he professionally plays the 
part of a controller) and these are the qualities he should embed in the systems 
(control systems) which he designs” (ibid.). 
 
At present it is me, as user and controller, who is embodying these qualities in the 
tape studio, which is why it is ‘less cybernetic’ than the Paskian cybernetic studio. 
Note though, that these dispositions are not ones one associates with ‘command 
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and control’, of imperious will, of forcing technology to do our bidding; they are of 
coaxing, of going with the grain, of steering: in short, they are cybernetic. I 
catalyse reactions, I prop up ailing tech, I keep copious notes of my interactions to 
serve as memory and to aid evolution, and I continually arbitrate what will, 
ultimately, ‘make the cut’. 
 
The cybernetic studio would take some of these duties off my hands, or take the 
place of my hands, where gesture could be delegated to the system. But the 
objection is quickly raised: surely that is what is happening when the DAW 
automates processes? The point is that the DAW in no way learns about the 
individual operator, in no way does it adapt itself to the predilections and quirks 
of the user; quite the reverse in fact: it regulates and encourages all kinds of 
behavior based on assumptions that may well have nothing at all to do with the 
way the operator wants to use the system. Goals are too tightly specified to allow 
for any kind of open ended evolution (cf. p.14). The user has little agency in 
steering the evolution of the system that includes herself. Conversation is stifled 
because the machine doesn’t listen.57  
 
Neither, at present, does my tape studio, but it is no further away from this 
condition than the DAW. ‘Growing cybernetic ears’ is about trying to find ways to 
encourage the system to listen, so as to be a more compelling conversational 
partner. The greater incorporation of modular synthesis into the studio 
environment is one possibility; greater engagement with sensors linked to a 
programming language like SuperCollider is another. As it stands, the DAW voids 
serious contention. 
 
 
The self-organising studio 
 
[A]ny system with a behavior that becomes more ordered (according to some 
vague criterion or other) is called a ‘self-organizing system.’ (Pask, 1964, 110) 
                                               
57 “To listen is to join in with what has been said. To speak is not to join in: to speak 
maybe to offer, but it is not to join in. To listen is to respond: to speak is not. Speaking, 
we have no influence and no companionable listeners unless others chose to listen. It is 
the listeners who collaborate” (Glanville, 2001b). 
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Naturally occurring networks, of interest because they have a self-organizing 
character, are, for example, a marsh, a colony of micro-organisms, a research 
team, and a man. (Pask, 1959 232) 
 
Self-organizing systems was perhaps the most visionary subfield of cybernetics 
research. (Cariani, 2017, 121)  
 
Both the tape studio and the DAW studio are self-organising systems, both in 
terms of one individual in their own studio, and in terms of wider cultures of 
practice. One key difference, which presents a major obstacle to self-organisation, 
is that in the DAW one significant part of the system, the computational 
architecture, the code, is inaccessible to the system itself. The DAW system can, 
and does, evolve, but the nature and order of this evolution is very different to that 
of the tape studio where every element is available to be tinkered with, improved, 
personalised, misused, pushed into unfamiliar shapes, and the wider tape studio 
culture has been witness to the vast spectrum of activities of ‘making fit’ in 
individuals’ and small groups’ own studios. Making fit could mean reading the 
manual for everything, doing everything by the book, going to class; excellent 
results have been achieved like this. It might mean jerry rigging your tape 
machine to put an extra record head before the playback head to enable sound on 
sound recording (Bell et al., 2015, 2): Les Paul’s particular creative misuse comes 
right at the start of the ongoing evolution of the tape studio and is rightly dubbed 
‘revolutionary’. Making fit could mean burying your master tape in the garden for 
three weeks to mature, after you urinated and blew ganja smoke onto it;58 
although it is unclear exactly how this misuse affected the subsequent release, it is 
an example of the kind of extreme tinkering the tape studio will happily 
accommodate.  
 
                                               
58 See Veal (2007, 160–162). Lee Perry’s studio Black Ark is certainly a high point in the 
history of the self-organising tape studio. Perry himself seems to have seen the whole 
system as a dynamical, symbiotic entity: “I see the studio must be like a living thing, a life 
itself. The machine must be live and intelligent. Then I put my mind into the machine and 
the machine perform reality. Invisible thought waves - you put them into the machine by 
sending them through the controls and the knobs or you jack it into the jack panel. The 
jack panel is the brain itself, so you got to patch up the brain and make the brain a living 
man, that the brain can take what you sending into it and live” (quoted in Toop (1995, 
113)). 
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How does this figure in the evolution of these domains? In the case of the DAW 
the vast majority of agents employing the system do not have direct access to, and 
therefore cannot directly influence, the evolution of the system. The access they do 
have is with each other, as communities of users who are in turn accessed by the 
programmers: they help each other out on forums indicating gripes and glitches to 
be thought about or ironed out by programmers who also frequent these sites. In 
some cases the evolution of the software seems primarily to be driven by financial 
consideration (e.g. Logic X’s lack of backwards compatibility); this frustrates and 
alienates users. In any case, the channel is narrow and possible injection of variety 
is low. Evolution is forced, from a certain direction, is not open, and is certainly 
not self-adapting.59 
 
The situation in the tape studio is one where every element is open to 
manipulation by the users. This internal process of change is not the same as the 
evolution of, say the multitrack tape machine, from 2 to 4 to 24 tracks, or of the 
analogue mixer, from home made to SSL; rather it is one of the whole tape studio 
environment and the user/operator and the music which is made there, all in 
mutual, ongoing, evolving interaction. This evolution is particularly marked where 
the studio is operated primarily by a single artist/producer, such as the case with 
Lee Perry, and artists such as Prince, Kate Bush, and Laurie Anderson,60 who 
eschewed the standard practice of a record label paying for professional studio 
time, and built studios for themselves where they produced their own music. The 
self-organising character of such studio spaces – where artist, studio environment 
and music produced are all in ongoing interdependent and mutually 
accommodating development – manifested in groundbreaking albums such as 
Prince’s Lovesexy or Kate Bush’s Hounds of Love, albums that sound like no other 
album, and where one can hear how songwriting and production are in an 
intimate and co-specifying relationship. A self-organising studio such as this has 
“evolved its own relevance criteria” (1993, 4), as Cariani said of Pask’s chemical 
computer, the ‘ear’ (cf. p.101). 
                                               
59 There are open coding environments for development of plugins, but these still have to 
be hosted within the DAW which is not open.  
60 Both Prince and Kate Bush also employed additional in-house engineers, though Prince 
could certainly operate the studio on his own (Helmreich and McMurray, 2017, 138). 
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Clearly any studio that releases music into the world is self-organising to a degree. 
The most interesting case of the self-organising tape studio, as I see it here, is 
where the composer is the primary studio denizen, where they have their hands 
(literally) on the means of production, and where this ‘at handness’ requires an 
accumulation of embodied know-how for adequate expression of the song in 
development. This embodied musical cognition directly feeds into the sound of the 
song in production, or even into the initial conception of the song (writing in the 
studio); in many cases the evolving technological infrastructure becomes 
substance of the composition itself. To be clear, it is this triadic relationship – 
composer/producer, studio, music produced – that forms the system which can be 
seen to become progressively more ordered, to recapitulate Pask’s definition of the 
self-organising system at the top of this section. 
 
That it is the composer steering a studio that has shaped itself around their own 
musicking is the important distinction between this and the traditional client-
studio model. Practical, embodied know-how, coupled to the need to service the 
song adequately, directly feeds into the sound of the song, through an ongoing, 
increasingly ordered evolution. The artist’s performative interaction with the 
studio technology often leads to the technology itself being subject and substance 
of the act of composition. We hear this with Kate Bush’s use of the Fairlight on 
The Hounds of Love and other albums produced in her own studio; with Prince’s use 
of tape speed manipulation of his multi-tracked backing vocals on albums 
produced at Paisley Park; with Lee Perry’s live dub mixing at Black Ark. Truly 
exceptional studio self-organisation occurs when execution of a repertoire of 
techniques by the composer/producer becomes virtuosic. The exemplary image of 
operation of the self-organising tape studio is Lee Perry performing a dub mix, 
with hands dancing around knobs and controls, with devices patched into the 
“living brain” of the jack panel, multiple tape reels rolling, feedback flying around, 
producer and music-in-production locked into local and very meaningful 
synchronisation with each other and with the “living man” of the studio (see 
footnote 58, above). 
 
At the beginning of the era of the tape studio, many of the original designers of the 
infrastructure of multitrack tape machine, mixing desk and outboard processors 
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were the operators of the environment: Les Paul modifying his Ampex to allow 
sound on sound recording; Bill Putnam designing and building some of the earliest 
studio mixing desks; Tom Dowd evolving the ergonomics of Putnam’s invention 
by exchanging rotary pots for linear faders, eight of which could be operated 
simultaneously, one per finger, so that when mixing he could “play the faders like 
you could play a piano” (Bell et al., 2015, 2-3). They built these systems to service 
their own needs, and because existing, off the shelf solutions were not available. It 
soon became clear, though, that these inventions had very general and widespread 
applicability, and their utility and functionality was built upon and improved by a 
new generation of specialist inventor designers such as Rupert Neve, who, though 
not a studio engineer, has spent his entire career in conversational (technical, 
interpersonal, innovative) interaction with studio environments.  
 
Even if users are given access to the code, as in some open source DAWs,61 there 
is still the fundamental problem that this part of the system, the code, is only 
indirectly related to what they are trying to achieve: the production of music. They 
have to learn another, more or less completely unrelated language, in order to get 
at what the DAW actually does. This is not the case with actual music 
programming languages, such as SuperCollider or Pure Data. It could be argued 
that modifying the operation of a tape machine by altering its electronics is also far 
removed from the production of music, but most tape studio users have some 
knowledge of electronics, even if only at the level of intuitive ‘grasp’ or ‘feel’, since 
much of what they do in the studio deals with sound in its electronic form; many 
can wield a soldering iron and some are able to make their way through a 
schematic in a service manual. There are many examples of studio engineers with 
a bent for electronics moving from ‘modding’ their own gear, to building outboard 
devices and studio tools from kit form electronics, to designing their own 
equipment and eventually forming their own ‘boutique’ company to market the 
designs. Of course, modifying or designing electronics, at the device level, is only 
one way that the tape studio system is open to internal development: other types of 
                                               
61 Such as Ardour, https://ardour.org/. 
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creative misuse or novel reconfiguration litter the history of pop music 
production.62 
 
By the time DAW designers come along an entire professionalised domain, the 
recording studio, has been established, and so it is impossible, not to say unfair, to 
try to make one to one comparisons between original studio equipment and 
infrastructure designers and DAW designers. However, it is still moot to note that 
DAW design deals with code, with issues of Human Computer Interaction (HCI), 
with the specificity of digital audio, and these wider, computer-based priorities get 
‘ported over’ to, instantiated within, a skeumorphic virtual studio environment. 
DAW design is accomplished by teams of people, most of whom are coders, not 
studio engineers. There is plentiful dialogue between designers and users, often 
within the design team itself, but the fact remains that the design and maintenance 
of these tools is primarily locked in to a specific platform or coding environment 
which is not, even in the case of open source platforms, accessible to the majority 
of users, either to maintain or to develop. 
 
As befitting a chapter highlighting the thought of one individual, I give the last 
word to Pask, who treats a similar point in ‘Conversation and Support’. Although 
here he is discussing the design of “collective support systems”, we note that these 
can be read as “including that most important social support called entertainment” 
(Pask, 1987, 18), and can perhaps suggest the liberty of replacing ‘model’ with 
‘DAW’: 
 
It would surely be no worse, and it might be much better, if potential users were 
allowed not only to interact with the model designers during the formulation and 
revision of the model, but also if their own creativity was mustered in support of 
the model maintaining operation. Without such interaction a ‘loss of distinction’ 
will occur between the users (or equivalently, a variety reduction). This may be 
derived from the fact that the distinct problem formulations and domains of 
potential users are not participantly observed (rather than numinously, or 
externally observed). Clients will be treated as uniform, and alienated if they will 
not wear the uniform. The design forces the users to be less distinct than they 
wish. (ibid., 10)   
                                               
62 Such as, for example, slapback echo on Elvis’ voice; the Beatles’ use of ‘automatic 
double tracking’; Kraftwerk’s extensive array of modified instruments and bespoke 
devices; Lee Perry’s dub mixes; Trevor Horn pushing the limits of nascent digital studio 
tech. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRACTICE (1) – TAPE MUSIC COMPOSITION AND 
TAPE INSTALLATION 
 
 
Chapter summary 
The first of three chapters dealing with the practice, covering the earliest practical work 
completed in the area of tape music composition and installation. The chapter explores 
a contemporary tape music practice, utilising historical electronic music techniques 
prevalent from the 1950s through to 70s. The importance of practical investigation is 
stressed, leading to different insights from surveying the literature or simulating in 
another domain. A successful tape music practice requires embodied know-how, and 
can be linked to notions of craftsmanship, centred on the nexus of hand-ear-mind. Even 
expert listening in the tape studio is accompanied by a gestural interaction with the reel 
to reel. The process is extremely time consuming, and affords much time for reflection. 
Personal experience in areas deemed isomorphic, such as sampling, presents an 
obstacle to learning the technique, since procedures expected to be straightforward, 
such as synchronisation, turn out to be extremely difficult in practice. Three insights 
follow: (1) Digital techniques that present themselves as isomorphic to tape techniques 
do not map backwards in a straightforward manner. (2) Such difficulties may help in 
explaining the eschewal of rhythmic synchronisation in canonical examples from the 
historical practice (such as a great deal of musique concrète). (3) Historical music 
practices that do foreground such techniques (much of the output of the Radiophonic 
Workshop) do so only by demonstrating an extraordinary virtuosity: an embodied, 
performative mastery that one is only able to truly acknowledge through attempting 
similar things oneself. These embodied techniques form an essential part of the 
aesthetic of the music produced. The physical interface and embodied interactions of 
the tape music studio directly affect the types of musical cognition that takes place 
there. Tape music installations broadened the remit of the tape studio, placing the 
materiality of tape directly into the physical presence of installation participants. 
Playful interactions with these environments were enthusiastic and emergent.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The next three chapters deal with the practice that has been developed through 
this PhD. It proceeds chronologically, taking in my early work in this chapter, 
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modular synthesis performance in the next, and my practical explorations of the 
tape studio in chapter 6. 
 
Let us first step back, for a while, to a time before I knew cybernetics. When I 
started this research, in 2013, I had but a vague idea of what cybernetics actually 
is. This thesis grew cybernetic ears as a result of my discovery of how the 
concerns and practices of Pask’s cybernetics resonated so deeply with my own 
artistic concerns, but before we get there we can consider the earliest practice-
based research I conducted into tape music composition and installation. 
Concerns at the heart of this work revolve around craftsmanship, tacit knowledge, 
gesture, risk, commitment and playfulness. The discussion also explores how 
practice-based research is able to generate insights that are often not available 
from either a purely theoretical, textual standpoint, or through simulation, 
especially when exploring practices and techniques generally considered 
historical, such as tape music.  
 
The practice lies in two areas, both analogue tape-based. (1) Experimental work 
in tape music composition, 63 which, although it did not result in any finished 
pieces, was a thorough exploration that did lead to significant insights, and laid 
important groundwork for the tape pop productions discussed in chapter 6. (2) 
Two tape music installations, The Long Loop and What are the Benefits of Sound?64  
 
 
Tape music and craftsmanship 
 
This chapter refers to ‘tape music’, meaning the clutch of practices, prevalent from 
the 1950s to 70s, that used analogue tape for the recording, manipulation and 
assembling of what came to be termed ‘electronic music’. This includes, but is not 
limited to, musique concrète, Elektronische Musik and the early work of the 
Radiophonic Workshop. A contemporary tape music practice can be seen to be 
part of a ‘turn to the physical’ (material, corporeal), manifesting in many social, 
                                               
63 Documented at http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/musique-concrete/  
64 Documented at http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/sound-installations/  
 85 
cultural and academic areas in recent years. A few, specifically musical examples 
will give a flavor: the upturn in sales of vinyl records; the profusion of DIY 
cassette labels; live coding in electronic music performance; extended instrument 
design; use of gestural controllers and other sensors in live performance; motion 
tracking as a source of control. Analogue tape is still being manufactured (despite 
a short hiatus in the 2000s), indicating a healthy demand. High quality tape 
machines are easy to come by on eBay and elsewhere, and are, in the main, cheap, 
compared to the time of their manufacture. And since starting this PhD, German 
company Ballfinger have manufactured the first new series of reel to reel machines 
to go on sale for many years.65 Two of my reel to reels came from the college 
where I taught at the time; the technician who gave them to me was only too 
happy to see them pressed into further use – they would have been scrapped 
otherwise. The conditions are good for setting up a contemporary tape music 
studio, which is what I have done. I stress the importance of a practical 
investigation of these techniques and technologies, rather than a theoretical or 
simulated one. My experience here has shown that this embodied practice cannot 
truly be understood either by surveying the literature (textual, from both 
practitioner and commentator, and recorded) or by employing digital simulations. 
You have to do it to know it.  
 
After familiarising myself with basic tape music techniques (cutting, splicing, 
looping, reversing, tape speed manipulation, etc.), my first committed 
compositional tape music work used the sounds that resulted from the installation 
What are the Benefits of Sound? (discussed below). These sounds were originally on 
endless cassette, and were noisy and low quality, but not without sonic interest. 
The first task I set myself was to create a looping melody from portions of these, 
so the cassettes were recorded to reel to reel tape and I searched for any single 
notes that could form the basis of a melody. Promising candidates were extracted 
from the tape. Once the individual sounds are extracted they are spliced into short 
loops using leader tape (silent, non-magnetic tape). The looped sounds can then 
be recorded multiple times onto a second reel: a manual copying process that has 
to be approached carefully, since each re-recording of a sound introduces 
                                               
65 See http://www.ballfinger.de/tape-recorder-m-063-h5  
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increased tape noise: sound can appear more and more ‘buried’ with each iteration 
of re-recording. I spent a great deal of time experimenting with EQ and 
compression in order to make usable notes. Eventually there were enough 
different notes to form a complete melody. Careful calculation of physical length is 
required, translating beats per minute into tape length. One of the unanticipated 
challenges was that every separate piece of tape had to be meticulously labeled (on 
the tape itself), since there is no indication on the tape of what sound is on there. 
Once a small piece of tape has been extracted, if it has not been labelled, the only 
way to tell what is on there is to splice it into a loop, which takes time. One learns 
to be highly organised in the tape studio, with administrative duties equally 
important to more ‘creative’ activities.66  
 
Every aspect of the technique requires physical, learnt skill, which includes an 
embodied practice of listening, necessary in order to remove fragments of sound 
from longer sections. To find the sound you want to extract you have to manually 
‘rock’ the tape reels back and forth, listening the whole while.67 As you get closer 
to the beginning or end of the sound you are trying to extract, you have to move 
the reels more and more slowly, which lowers the pitch of what you are hearing, 
making it more and more difficult to tell what you are actually listening to. This is 
not too difficult to pick up where there are strong, individual transients, such as 
the drums you see me edit in the second video of footnote 67, but in dense musical 
material it is a tricky procedure. This difficulty is made more acute by the fact that 
you can only tell if you have got it right by physically cutting the extract out, 
putting it into a loop, and then playing back the loop. At this point, if you’ve got 
the edit wrong, you have to splice the whole thing back together and try again. 
This is an extremely time consuming process, but the risk involved sharpens the 
commitment one makes not just to the cut, but to the initial act of listening. This 
heightened, embodied cognitive activity – centered on the nexus of hand, ear and 
musical mind – leads to a very deep engagement with sounds that are inextricable 
from their material instantiation. I would argue that differing cognitive 
                                               
66 See section ‘Melody’ at http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/musique-
concrete/  
67 See me do this at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=27&v=lihzmlxPJcw 
and https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=33&v=_VJxasayZSs  
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engagements with sound and materiality lead to very different sounding musics, 
and we shouldn’t necessarily expect a practice dealing with the materiality of the 
digital computer to be either isomorphic to a tape music practice, or to reveal 
anything much about the ‘precursor’ techniques (such as happens when, for 
example, an undergraduate course exploring historical electronic music techniques 
uses sampling in the DAW to teach musique concrète). 
 
Of course the other thing is that if one gets the cut slightly wrong (i.e. there is a 
touch of a previous note in the loop) then one might well accept this (due to how 
long it would take to correct) and this unintended aberration then goes on to be 
part of whatever one is making. Thus contingency and deviations from a plan can 
form an important part of the sound of the music being produced. This encourages 
one to adopt underspecified goals as the most productive approach (cf. p.14). 
 
Tape music is now an unusual or marginal practice. Although the historical 
practice has been well documented, with many useful sources that explicate the 
processes,68 I found when I started to explore it that there was much I had to learn 
for myself, and there was much that was missing from the manuals. Learning by 
experiment, somewhat in the dark, I found that many things that seemed self-
evident from the literature turned out to be anything but in practice. Here I will 
highlight one aspect I found difficult: synchronisation. Getting two separate 
sounds on two separate pieces of tape to play at the same time is a challenging 
procedure, particularly if you want two rhythmic sections to stay in time, and the 
literature has very little of use to say on the subject. I have, in my heuristic 
fumbling, found some ways to facilitate this,69 but the medium’s synchronic 
intransigence led to three important insights. First, as a digital audio and 
sampling-literate composer, I expected this to be easy: if you have two pieces of 
audio in a DAW it is extremely easy to drag one of them to another track so that it 
vertically aligns with the other sound. In fact you don’t even need to listen to do 
this. If you want two rhythmic sections to stay in time there are a host of 
procedures that facilitate this relatively easily, mostly utilising digital audio’s 
                                               
68 E.g. Keane (1981); Strange (1972). 
69 See me do this at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZhvPUR-V_I. Discussed below. 
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temporal plasticity (‘take-out-of-timeness’ as it is dubbed in this thesis) and the 
presence of an external grid (timeline, masterclock) in a sequencer or DAW. It 
became clear that many of the techniques of electronic music that I took for 
granted in the digital realm would not easily map back onto the analogue 
techniques, even though these digital techniques appear to owe their ancestry to 
analogue forebears. Second, that the difficulty of rhythmic synchronisation in tape 
music directly fed in to the sound of the music produced in the era of classic tape 
music composition: examples from musique concrète and Elektronische Musik show 
very little in the way of rhythmic synchronisation between different layers of 
sound. They tend to display a succession of (very interesting) sounds, and where 
there is layering this tends not to be metrical organised, or have a clear sense of 
pulse. It is important to remember the cultural context of electronic music in the 
1950s and 60s: the lack of regular pulse was part of the aesthetic of serialism that 
dominated the post-war musical avant-garde. But it does seems likely that this 
difficulty of rhythmic synchronisation was an important motivation in 
practitioners avoiding it. The major exception to this is the work of the 
Radiophonic Workshop, whose work on the creation of theme tunes and other 
pieces of incidental music for radio and TV dramas and documentaries displayed a 
masterful command of these very difficult synchronisation techniques. Examples 
like the one seen in ‘The Delian Mode’ (Blake, 2009, at 4’42”) where Delia 
Derbyshire manually synchronises three rhythmic tape loops, display an 
extraordinary level of virtuosity (though like many virtuosi she makes it look 
easy). It was only through trying to do similar things myself that I was able to 
truly acknowledge this virtuosity, and to truly understand that the mastery of the 
machine displayed here is a performance. That led to my third insight: there is no 
making tape music without this embodied, performative acumen.   
 
One reason for highlighting the virtuosity of Delia Derbyshire and others is that 
even in the 60s, at the height of tape music’s dominance of electronic music, there 
were many who were looking for alternatives to the often painstaking labour and 
hard-learned, embodied technique that it required. It is slow, and it does require 
many, many hours of practice to attain any kind of control over technique. Peter 
Zinovieff, a pioneering British electronic composer, whose company EMS 
provided the Radiophonic Workshop with their first synthesiser in the early 70s, 
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said in a documentary from 2006: “it was very early on that I realised: cutting tape 
was a hopeless procedure” (Bate, 2006). Zinovieff was an early advocate of 
computer music: “digital computers were already used for process control in 
factories; that was exactly what we wanted – we wanted to process control for 
different sounds” (ibid.). In other words, he was looking for a situation where the 
production of electronic music did not depend on physical, embodied procedures 
that relied on skill that had to be acquired through practice; rather the control of 
sound was seen as a process that could be automated, leaving the composer free to 
concentrate on composition (rather than production). This indicates a rather 
traditional view of the act of composition as generation of a score that then has to 
be assembled (whether through electronic means or through instrumental 
performance). From this perspective it matters little whether the subsequent 
construction is (meticulously, slowly) assembled by hand or (quickly, efficiently) 
generated automatically by computer; the assumption is that the result will be the 
same, since the accurate construction of what the score specifies is the important 
thing. This though, is a completely different methodology of electronic music 
production to that practiced by Delia Derbyshire (or Pierre Henry and other 
musique concrète practitioners), which sees the direct generation and manipulation 
of sound as the key compositional activity, and this cannot be separated either from 
the medium of construction, or the embodied, skilled techniques necessary for 
such generation.70 Derbyshire, Henry and others did use notation, scores and 
plans of various kinds, but a large amount of their work involved a kind of 
exploratory wayfaring, coupled to an extraordinary repertoire of technique, in 
pursuit of sounds, gestures, motifs, rhythms that were then assembled, via further 
embodied tape techniques, into the finished piece. This is more akin to 
craftsmanship – dealing directly with this piece of wood, with its particular knots, 
grain, and physical specificity – than the “process control” that Zinoviev was after, 
with its implications of automata serving the will of the composer: a hierarchical 
separation of composition and production, along the traditional lines of performers 
                                               
70 There is an interesting irony here, since the general public tended to hear such 
productions by the Radiophonic Workshop as disembodied, eerie, otherworldly. As the 
Workshop’s Dick Mills recalled: “most of the stuff that we produced in the early days 
[was]… tormented, to say the least. There [were] many letters in Radio Times about 
‘what is this fearful noise coming out to accompany these so-called arty programs. It 
sounds like skeletons on a corrugated iron roof!’” (Blake, 2009, 7’14”) 
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servicing a score. In cybernetic terms, Derbyshire and the musique concrète school 
followed underspecified goals, whereas Zinoviev’s approach demanded tightly 
specified goal-states. 
 
There is no doubt that tape music techniques are physically and cognitively 
demanding, but I found I had a deep engagement with the physical manipulation 
of tape and razor blade; I enjoyed the slow, methodical pace of the practice, and I 
appreciated the time for reflection that slowness affords; I was fascinated by the 
practice as a form of craftsmanship, as a way of structuring and ordering the 
thinking/making mind in its embodied engagement with physical tools and the 
environment. Richard Sennett’s philosophical treatment of craftsmanship 
highlights the “slow craft time” that “enables the work of reflection and 
imagination” (Sennett, 2008, 295). One of the things that interests me working in 
this medium is its own resistance to my own assumptions about what can be done 
with sound: thinking through a particular problem (like how to extract from a 
noisy sound something that can form the basis of a melody) with my sampling-
literate mind, I find (after much time and effort) that the answer I initially 
imagined does not work (I subject the noisy sound to processes which, involving 
repeated re-recording, serve to increase the noise) and I have to go back to the 
drawing board, armed with knowledge more appropriate to the constraints of the 
medium. This forces me towards a more exploratory, improvisational form of 
creative thinking around the problem; this halting, circuitous wayfaring leads to 
many failures, that have to be accepted as part of the process, but there is a great 
sense of satisfaction when you get it right. As Sennett notes: “The difficult and the 
incomplete should be positive events in our understanding; they should stimulate 
us as simulation and facile manipulation of complete objects cannot” (ibid., 44). 
The reward is something rich and unexpected. A personal high water mark in my 
tape music composition work was the example of getting two quite long, 
meticulously constructed loops to play in sync for an extended period.71 Though 
not at the level of virtuosity that Derbyshire displayed, this certainly gave me a 
much greater appreciation of her performative acumen: a combination of 
extremely precise craft skill – cutting the loops to exact lengths such that they can 
                                               
71 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZhvPUR-V_I 
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synchronise – and masterful performance skills in setting them going. Both types 
of skill manifest an embodied cognition, involving tacit knowledge, gesture, risk 
and commitment, and we shall look into these issues a little more deeply in the 
next section. 
 
 
Embodied cognition in the tape music studio 
 
Klemmer, Hartmann and Takayama (2006), working within the broad tradition of 
human computer interaction (HCI), go to great lengths to establish the 
importance of the physical interface and environment in cognitive work, and how 
“theories and research of embodied cognition regard bodily activity as being 
essential to understanding human cognition” (ibid., 141).72 Their discussion 
centers on interactive design, but much of what they say has rich relevance to the 
practice of tape music. They point up the importance of tacit knowledge, of 
embodied know-how. They highlight gesture: “systems that constrain gestural 
abilities (e.g. having your hands stuck on a keyboard) are likely to hinder the 
user’s thinking and communication” (ibid.). And they draw our attention to risk 
and commitment: “Digital artifacts often do not exhibit commitment to actions; in 
fact, being able to index at random into the past of our creation through 
undo/redo and versioning may be the single most important characteristic that 
separates the digital from physical interactions” (ibid., 145). In the tape studio the 
embedding and subsequent embodying of tacit knowledge is essential before any 
serious work can be done; indeed this know-how is an essential prerequisite to any 
serious thinking about what can be done. Likewise, the gestural – the performative 
playing out of embodied routines such as tape editing – is essential to the crafting 
of sound, where the engagement with the materiality of tape is inseparable from 
ongoing musical cognition. Similarly, the inherently risky nature of working with 
                                               
72 Klemmer et al. build on work by Kirsh and Maglio, whose concept of “epistemic action” 
highlights how certain actions taken by an agent in the world operate not to advance a 
specific plan (“pragmatic action”) but to effect a changed view in the agent’s mind on 
what is possible in the world, unearthing “valuable information that is currently 
unavailable, hard to detect, or hard to compute” (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994, 515). This is 
also relevant to the loose, exploratory, physical work with tape discussed here.   
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tape teaches one to pay close attention to the consequences of action: errors of 
measuring, cutting, labeling can all lead to extremely time consuming corrective 
work. One of the axioms of carpentry ‘measure twice, cut once’ applies equally 
well to tape work, and this inevitably leads to a commitment to the actions one 
takes (cf. chapter 6 on commitment in the tape studio).  
 
To return to one of the key themes of this thesis – questioning the progress 
narratives that underpin the assumption that digital technologies will succeed 
analogue or physical ‘forebears’ – it will be useful to note one further comment 
from Klemmer et al.: 
 
The project of technology is the creation of increasingly malleable materials, and 
computation is perhaps the most malleable created so far. Given the techno-
utopian ideology of computer science, it can seem heretical to suggest that one 
should undertake a project other than replacing the physical world. Clearly, the 
digital world can provide advantages. To temper that, we argue that because there is 
so much benefit in the physical world, we should take care before unreflectively 
replacing it. (ibid., 147) 
 
I take seriously Klemmer et al.’s urge to reflect on the consequences of digital 
simulation of analogue, physical or mechanical processes, techniques and 
practices. There is no simple replacement, no ‘pure’ musical intention that survives 
the translation from embodied, physical skill to computational simulation or 
automated output (whatever Zinoviev might have hoped for). They are simply 
different techniques with very different musical outputs. For most musicians the 
sampler and digital audio have completely replaced the older tape music practice 
and, although I’m certainly not advocating a disavowal of the newer technologies, 
there is, I believe, much still to be gained from working with the resistant 
materiality (see footnote 16 above) of the tape music environment. As I can attest 
from the time I’ve spent engaged with tape music, the combination of tacit 
knowledge, gesture, risk and commitment provides a very different cognitive 
environment for technological musicking than one predominantly revolving 
around the digital computer. Cutting tape might be a ‘hopeless procedure’ if you 
want your electronic music to produce a pre-existing score with precise pitch and 
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duration,73 but if your electronic music practice is interested in physical, embodied 
interaction with a material instantiation of electronic audio, then it can provide a 
very stimulating environment. If one is prepared to put in the time and effort one 
finds that the embodied cognition of the interdependent hand-ear-mind lead to the 
tape studio being an inherently “aesthetically potent environment” (Pask, 1971, 
76).  
 
In the next section we will broaden this potent studio environment out into the 
wider world of sound installations. 
 
 
At play with the materials of tape 
 
Around the same time as my studio-based tape music explorations, I took the 
materials of the tape studio out into the wider world in two sound installations. 
One was installed in a gallery, and one displayed at an evening of postgraduate 
music at Sussex. In both cases the materiality of tape itself formed the central 
focus.  
 
In the gallery tape installation The Long Loop (2013) I designed an environment 
that invited an audience to play:74 there were instruments to pick up and play, 
there was the tape loop feedback system to play with (either with an instrument or 
with the voice) and there was the space of the gallery to play; the whole thing was 
an ecology of playfulness.75 The invitation was freely and spontaneously taken up, 
and the audience certainly seemed to be enjoying this playing for the sake of 
playing. The long loop, of the title, was some 30 feet in length, running between 
two rooms of the gallery, with a reel to reel machine at both ends. Track 1 on the 
first tape machine was set to record, and its output would be heard from track 1 
                                               
73 See also Born (1995) on how the rationalistic, formalist ideology of IRCAM in the 
1980s enforced a similar disavowal of the empiricist, hands-on approach of musique 
concrète, and related analogue technologies, in favour of ‘cutting edge’ new digital 
technologies. 
74 On the importance of play to theories of craftsmanship see Sennett (2008, 269). On 
playfulness in HCI and interactive design see Gaver (2002). 
75 See http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/sound-installations/the-long-loop/  
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on the second machine. It took 15 seconds or so for the sound to travel to the 
other room and be heard, and audience members took some delight in following 
the physical passage of a sound they had deposited, moving to the second room to 
hear it. The principle operated in reverse for track 2 of the loop: recording on the 
second machine and then being played back 15 seconds later from the first 
machine. The microphones also picked up the output from the tape, and a low 
frequency feedback drone soon emerged that accompanied the various sounds the 
audience added to the live mics. The audience showed a fascination with the 
actual materiality of the tape: the way it wobbled as it moved, the way they could 
follow sounds they had recorded from room to room. The technology employed 
here is old: Pauline Oliveros and Terry Riley were exploring similar tape delay 
systems in the 1960s, but to a contemporary audience the experience seemed fresh 
and engaging. I am quite certain that had the installation been set up in a similar 
way using digital technology (fairly simple to do) engagement would have been 
quite different, primarily because they would not have been able to follow the 
movement of the sound from one machine to the next. This physicality, this direct 
and palpable linking of the materiality of tape with the space of the gallery and the 
sounding environment, was key. 
 
A second invitation to play, enthusiastically accepted by an audience of musicians, 
students and scholars, can be seen in the second installation What Are the Benefits of 
Sound?76 The rather curious title came from a conversation prior to the opening of 
the show that I had with a media student. He said he’d like to interview me, and 
would probably ask questions such as “what are the benefits of sound?” As a 
musician and composer who is obsessed with sound, the question was 
disconcerting, hilarious, and perfect for the title of the piece. In this installation 
the tape loops are locked up in ‘endless cassettes’ (originally used for answerphone 
messages and the like), deposited into cheap portable cassette players, suspended 
from the ceiling, each with a toy instrument attached. There were six of these 
hanging sound stations distributed around the performance space. Audience 
members could intervene into these loops (prerecorded single notes from the toy 
                                               
76 See http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/sound-installations/what-are-the-
benefits-of-sound/  
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instruments) with their own recordings, by stopping the tape, pressing record, 
depositing their contribution, pressing stop, and pressing play. Their intervention 
couldn’t be heard until the loop went round its minute-long cycle (neither rewind 
nor fast-forward function with endless cassettes), but participants generally didn’t 
stick to individual cassette machines long enough to listen to their contribution, 
tending to be part of a faster moving dynamic through the whole space. The 
messy, noisy, participatory environment was enthusiastically engaged with by an 
audience who latched onto the simple procedure and the complex, chaotic 
emergence; who seemed to enjoy exploring both the physicality of the 
tape/instrument coupling and the social space of the installation; and who seemed 
to be focused primarily on play, fun and performance. Here, again, we see the 
pursuit of underspecified goals (play for its own sake) as leading to interesting 
examples of emergence in potent aesthetic environments. 
 
The tape music work, discussed above, formed an invaluable bed of know-how for 
the later tape pop production discussed in chapter 6. There were certainly things 
that I could have gone on to develop from the two installations, but in the 
meantime I discovered cybernetics, and so I laid down a path in walking to 
exciting and, to me, uncharted territories, as mapped in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: PRACTICE (2) – MODULAR SYNTHESIS 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Chapter summary 
The chapter explores performative modular synthesis environments that feature 
complex, nested feedback networks. Early work attempting to create self-organisation 
through self-playing modular systems was unsatisfactory: once set in motion they did 
not exhibit an increase in order. A system was devised that required a performer to 
navigate zones of sonic interest: The Thing Breathed was performed in public multiple 
times. Such zones are obscure due to the multiply nested feedback paths. Performance 
is real time search for these rare zones. The system is a black box, impenetrable to 
direct articulation of the performer’s will. The modular system is viewed as ‘maverick’ 
computer, in line with Pask’s expansion of the nature of computation beyond the 
confines of digital devices. Such hybrid devices are better able to compute concurrent 
operations. The concerns of the chapter are thus part of the larger concerns of the 
thesis: the questioning of the ubiquity of digital devices in contemporary musical 
composition and research. The physical nature of the modular system is discussed, 
highlighting a primarily aural modality, and how emergence comes from the 
interconnections of simple elements. Concurrency in the system encourages direct 
interaction with the bringing into being of sound. Pask’s maverick electro-chemical 
computer, the ‘ear’ is discussed and paralleled with The Thing Breathed: it is impossible to 
stipulate where ‘control’ is manifest in such a system; typically distinct elements of 
modular synthesis are blurred in the interlinking of control signals with audio signals; 
co-constituted feedback paths add to this occlusion. The system resists analytical 
penetration, performing a ‘dance of becoming’ that cannot be pre-programmed or 
predicted, except in terms of high-level tendencies. The performer’s memories of 
sounding behaviours, activated in conversation with the modular system, are deeply 
‘burnt in’, indicating a high level of engagement and foregrounding embodied processes 
of listening. Injection of requisite variety comes from neither random generators or 
environmental perturbations; it comes from non-linear iterative processes instantiated 
in analogue electronics.  
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Introduction 
 
Admittedly, we enter into a strange world, continually evolving but continually 
conserving all that has gone on, as fractal traces. It is, for all that a very beautiful 
world, at least insofar as I am able to glimpse it. (Pask, 1992, 57) 
 
The work discussed in this chapter explores performative modular synthesis 
environments built around complex, nested feedback networks. This work 
coincided with my first blush of excitement researching cybernetics, but also 
continued concerns from the previous chapter such as alternatives to ubiquitous 
digital technologies, embodied cognition, gesture and ergonomics, and physical, 
resistant materiality. Initially it addressed the idea of self-organisation (cf. p.77), 
through attempts to build ‘self-generating’ patches, as they are known in the 
modular synthesis community:77 systems that ‘play themselves’, without the need 
for human intervention, while maintaining sonic interest, such as Douglas Leedy’s 
Entropical Paradise, documented and discussed at length in Strange (1982, 244-
247).78 After initial experimental work in this area it became clear that a fully self-
generating system was unsatisfactory, and a performer would be necessary, though 
intervention could be minimal at times. In practice wholly autonomous self-
generating patches tend not to be self-organising: once they are set in motion they 
do not exhibit an increase in order. Though ‘order’ (from some perspective or 
another) may well ebb and flow in such pieces, and this may be a significant part 
of the piece’s interest, over a sustained period order will tend to even out, and the 
piece will not demonstrate evolution or adaptation to a changing world. In 
general, the self-organising aspect of a self-generating patch will be in the initial 
‘discovery’ stage, putting the system together, a long, often circuitous process 
whose goal-directed nature encourages evolution (though the desired state of 
‘sustained sonic interest’ is necessarily subjective and goals are underspecified, in 
the manner of Pask). One such evolution is shown at 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/modular-synthesis/self-
generating-modular-systems/, which charts the various different systems I 
                                               
77 Particularly among the denizens of Muff Wiggler, the pre-eminent modular synthesis 
forum (muffwiggler.com). See, for example: 
https://www.muffwiggler.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=31698&postdays=0&postorder=asc
&start=0&sid=f178425b4978dc36ac1d34f7d5d35ec3  
78 Strange calls such systems “self-playing dream machine[s]” (1982, 244). 
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explored before finally arriving at the piece The Thing Breathed (TTB), which has 
been performed in public eight times. In this piece the performer is necessary to 
move between the zones of sonic interest, zones that are often hard to come 
across, but that burnt themselves into my musical memory as I conversed with the 
system in rehearsal and performance. The search process, effected through 
twisting knobs, moving faders and listening, became the piece: how to move from 
one interesting area to another and form a satisfying structure. Video, audio and 
photo documentation, plus a detailed technical description of the system are 
shown here: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/modular-
synthesis/the-thing-breathed/  
 
Even though I put the TTB system together and perform with it, patching cables 
and turning knobs,79 the locus of the multi-way interaction is a black box80 to me, 
and I cannot directly impose my will on the system; I cannot directly ‘write’ the 
result I desire. I have to work with it, coaxing fruitful zones of exploration. It 
means accepting the limitations of the equipment; going with the grain of the 
materials at hand rather than trying to subject the material medium to the will, the 
score, the plan, the program. In this way, the interaction feels more like a 
conversation, and we must learn each other’s tolerances and predilections in order 
to reach some form of consensus. Of course, being the one who will be final 
arbiter of consensus, I have an important element of control in the relationship, 
but if the questions I am asking are about the machine’s fitness for autonomous 
operation, then we have a chance, through sound, to explore control itself, and the 
nature of the devolution of control in human-machine interaction. These are 
notably cybernetic concerns, and the point is that they can only be addressed 
through a performative unfolding of the system, since the complex nature of the 
feedback network precludes analytical penetration, resists being separated out 
into constituent parts, and makes pre-programming an intricate, unpredictable 
                                               
79 ‘Wiggling’, as they say at Muff Wiggler. 
80 “The black box is a way of saying we cannot know what goes on inside any system, we 
have only our descriptions of behaviours we set up and observe: and when we find 
regularities, it is in the behaviours of the black box vis-à-vis our observation and 
interpretation as and when we interact with it” (Glanville, 2001b, 654). See also Rabardel 
(2002). 
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balance of memory and contingency. In ongoing interaction one must allow the 
machine its agency, one must let it be as it becomes. 
 
 
Modular synthesiser as maverick computer 
 
The Thing Breathed and related work uses analogue modular synthesis to navigate 
terrain more usually explored today through digital means. Pask’s confidence in 
computation (broadly writ, and not, in general, restricted to digital systems), and 
his practical use, throughout his career, of ‘maverick’ computer systems, provide 
an illuminating parallel to the non-digital methods of exploration discussed in this 
chapter. In Micro Man, Pask and Curran’s non-technical book on computing from 
the early 1980s, and prefiguring academic work on the post-human by a decade or 
so, Pask declared his confidence that the human-computer relationship could be a 
hugely beneficial symbiosis: 
 
Our hope – and our belief – is that the two species [human and computer] will co-
operate, and that by doing so they will continue to enrich each other’s continuing 
evolution. From this mutual accord there could emerge a metamorphosis, a 
transformation both of the human mind and of the nature of computing, leading 
to the genesis of a novel, interdependent pair of species. (Pask and Curran, 1982, 
3) 
 
But, as we saw in chapter 3, Pask’s notion of computation is not a standard one. 
Pask’s general optimism in Micro Man about the future for these new species is 
tempered throughout as he urges us to take seriously our own part in shaping this 
mutual evolution, and cautions that the conventional architecture of the digital 
computer may not afford as much as we might hope: “At present, the computer is 
limited in two ways: by its architecture – the ways in which it can manipulate 
numbers and symbols – and by the fact that not all of reality can be modeled in 
terms of numbers and symbols open to logical manipulation” (ibid.). We will recall 
from chapter 3 that Pask did not believe the standard von Neumann/Turing 
digital computational architecture to be capable of computing the kinds of 
concurrent processes that lay at the heart of Conversation Theory, such as 
learning, abduction, analogy construction or the creation of (shared) knowledge.  
 
 100 
I take seriously Pask’s directive to play a part in shaping the world, and am 
attempting, in my practice, to cast some questions on the ubiquity of digital 
computing devices, and on the seemingly unshakable faith large aspects of 
contemporary culture place in them. The Thing Breathed addresses areas which are 
currently, for the most part, addressed through conventional computation: A-life 
concerns like emergence, adaptation, and of course, liveness itself; cybernetic 
concerns like boundaries of systems, signal flow, feedback, homeostasis. But in my 
case, the interest in performative emergence, and the desire for fluidity of 
boundaries in conversational musical systems, has been most satisfyingly 
answered through use of analogue modular synthesis. Truly complex and 
fascinating zones of sounding behaviour can be reached through the 
interconnection of relatively few, simple modular elements, and in performance 
my interaction with the system involves twisting knobs, riding faders, and often 
just listening. I find this tactile/audile ergonomics preferable to the interface of the 
computer, where listening is so often accompanied by looking.81 I like that my 
modular systems don’t have a screen, that the focus of engagement is always 
primarily aural. Also, and crucially for me, as a musician creating performance 
systems, there is no lag as processing happens, because all processing is 
concurrent. There is no sequential ordering of constituent parts or events, there 
are no interrupt routines. There is a flow and a coming into being. Of course, the 
A/D converter – processing – D/A converter lag is a byproduct of one of the 
digital computer’s huge strengths: if you can make recorded sound (almost) 
immediately available for manipulation, then you have a very powerful system for 
having a conversation with a processed historical version of your own sound 
making, and much excellent electro-acoustic music has been made in this vein; but 
if you are more interested in the bringing into being of sound, and a direct, 
concurrent interaction with that becoming, then this lag can present some serious 
problems.  
 
This bringing into being of sound in The Thing Breathed displays a palpable 
‘liveness’, which manifests in the tight linking of order and unpredictability, and 
                                               
81 And where I find I already spend so much of my time – writing this thesis, researching, 
teaching, communicating with others, being entertained, etc. 
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seems to echo various natural processes. The chaotic, non-linear dynamics of the 
multiple, mutually interacting feedback paths instantiated in analogue electronics 
– nested chains of continuous transduction – allow for predictable large-scale 
rhythmic and timbral tendencies, but preclude moment to moment anticipation of 
the behaviour of specific details. Somewhat like the difficulty of trying to predict 
how a cloud formation will develop, or when the next drop of rain will land on 
one’s left ear. In Micro Man Pask points up possibly fruitful and under-explored 
links between natural, biological processes and computation: “Because of the 
success of the microprocessor, it has become conventional to see computing 
generally in terms of micro-miniaturized electronic circuits. This has had the effect 
of stifling computer designs that do not necessarily require electronic components 
at all. Biotechnology offers one such design possibility” (Pask and Curran, 1982, 
24-25). A bio-computer would be a “maverick” in Pask’s reckoning, and the whole 
chapter of Micro Man devoted to bio- and other maverick computing systems 
indicates the importance Pask placed on these unconventional alternatives. I think 
it highly unlikely that other ‘introduction to the computer’ books of this period 
would have mentioned, or even been aware of, these alternatives. It seems clear 
that Pask’s germinal, practical experiences with chemical and biological 
computing in the 50s had a lasting influence on his thought. Both Musicolour and 
the electro-chemical ‘ear’ appear in the Micro Man chapter on mavericks, as does a 
picture of a pond, with the caption: “A real-life modular processor?” (ibid., 143), 
indirectly referencing Pask’s collaborator Stafford Beer’s work.82  
 
The maverick computer that Pask built in the late 50s, dubbed Pask’s ‘ear’ by Bird 
et al. (2003), consisted of an electro-chemical solution, with several conductive 
elements inserted into the solution that act as inputs and outputs. Currents are 
drawn through the solution and deposits of metallic iron threads grow in the 
solution, tracing paths of least resistance to current flow. These ‘dendritic’ threads 
in the ferrous sulphate solution are unstable and grow unpredictably. They 
dissolve and reform rapidly and flexibly, and as the network of dendritic branches 
forms over time there is an indication of “how such a system might be seen as 
                                               
82 See Pickering (2011, 231-4) on Beer’s experiments with biological computing and his 
attempts to co-opt an entire pond ecosystem as an adaptive controller. 
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conducting a search through an open-ended space of possibilities” (Pickering, 
2009, 481). Pask managed to ‘train’ this system to differentiate between two 
different frequencies of sound – through the direct interaction of the sound waves 
with the sympathetic vibrational properties of the dendritic threads, a transductive 
relationship – without the need for any kind of additional interface, such as a 
microphone. The dendritic network vibrated differently in response to the 
changing frequency of sounds in its vicinity, and Pask’s ‘reward’ system entrained 
the dendritic growth to act as a filter between the two desired frequencies. This is 
very different to the much more usual case of an external sensor ‘bolted on’ to a 
robot or digital computer; here the sensing emerges from the actual computing 
substrate itself. Stafford Beer, who collaborated with Pask on the cybernetic ear, 
commented:  
 
This was the first demonstration either of us had seen of an artificial system’s 
potential to recognize a filter which would be conducive to its own survival, and 
to incorporate that filter into its own organization. It could well have been the 
first device ever to do this, and no-one has ever mentioned another in my hearing. 
Moreover, this facility would transform the world of information technology, if it 
could ever forget and transcend its origins in mere data processing. But that 
would require the overthrow of yet another paradigm. (Beer, 2001, 555) 
 
Beer goes on “Meanwhile, back in the pre-computer 1950s…” to make clear just 
what paradigm he would like to overthrow. Pickering speculates that “the long 
trip through chip manufacture and digital computation certainly appears as a 
massive detour” (Pickering, 2009, 489), in reference to Beer’s related concept of 
“the infinite computing power of nature”, and echoes Beer’s wonder at the ear:  
 
There is something truly remarkable about this episode. I can think of no 
equivalent in the history of Modern science and technology… It is common 
enough in the history of electronic computing to add senses to a machine—Grey 
Walter made it possible for his tortoises to hear by wiring a microphone into their 
circuits—but this has always been by design, something imposed from the outside 
by the designer. Beer and Pask, in contrast, simply exploited the inner agency of 
their adaptive Black Box—a possibility which I think could not even be imagined 
in the Modern paradigm. One way to see what is at stake here would be to say 
that the Modern detour through knowledge and away from the world can also be 
a block, a trip that forecloses options that Beer and Pask’s work demonstrates lie 
actually already at hand. Perhaps we are more impressed by this technoscientific 
trip than we should be. (ibid, 486) 
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Pask notes how, in the case of the ear and related devices, “there is no clear 
boundary between programming and adaptation” (Pask and Curran, 1982, 141). 
If one wanted to use such a biological or chemical computer as an automated 
adaptive controller, then one would have to work with the controller, interact with 
it to learn its ways in order to be able to ‘train’ it in a mutual to and fro 
conversation that involves compromise and accommodation. To program the ear, 
as Pask did when he trained it to differentiate two frequencies, means working 
with the adaptive dendritic growth in response to stimuli. “The very ambiguity of 
devices like this has important implications. Because it is not easy to decide which 
components respond to vibration or which components compute the conditional 
reaction, the whole question of where the computer’s boundaries lie becomes 
deeper and more complex” (ibid., 135). 
 
This questioning of boundaries, particularly where complex systems interact such 
that it is impossible to state clearly where control is manifest, runs through much 
of Pask’s thinking, and resonates with the ambiguity and unknowable nature of 
systems such as The Thing Breathed, where multiple feedback paths occlude the 
distinction between the production and the processing of sound, and between 
‘sound’ and ‘control’. My rational mind, steeped in the standard pedagogy of 
modular synthesis, is good at the top-down thinking that understands the 
difference between an LFO that outputs a control voltage (CV) and an oscillator 
that outputs an audio signal, and is happy to draw the distinction between their 
respective functions as ‘modulator’ and ‘producer’ (of sound), and the related 
distinction between a control signal and an audio signal. The distinction will be 
maintained in the labeling of inputs and outputs – the LFO may have a CV in, to 
modulate its frequency, and will have a CV out, so that its frequency can modulate 
another device; the oscillator will have a CV in to modulate its frequency and will 
have an audio out. But this distinction is instantly complicated by feeding the 
audio output of an oscillator into the CV input of an LFO, which in turn sends its 
output to the CV in of the original oscillator. At this point it is impossible to say 
which is controlling which.83 The addition of only a few modules to this kind of 
                                               
83 The first, ‘simple’ system, documented at http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-
research/modular-synthesis/self-generating-modular-systems/  explores this kind of 
ambiguity of control. 
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feedback network, and where control and audio signals are mixed up, makes for a 
system of high complexity that resists attempts at analytical understanding, and 
performs, in the present, in a dance of becoming84 that can’t be pre-programmed, 
and can’t be predicted, except in terms of tendencies and patterns of organisation. 
For me, as a musician, this establishes a potent environment for conversation, 
because it gives the machine a real chance of agency as we converse. Direct 
‘wiggling’ with the system affords the opportunity to ask questions, and some of 
the most productive questions have been about the fitness of the system for 
autonomous operation. I’m asking the system to do as much as it can on its own, 
without needing me to intervene. Wiggling is, of course, programming, and the 
behaviour I am trying to program is sustained sonic interest with rich possibilities 
for the evolution of these engaging sounds, textures and rhythms. There is a sense 
in which I, the programmer, am being programmed, as I gain familiarity with the 
various combinations of settings which could lead to interesting behaviour, and 
begin to map these zones in my mind – a mental laying of breadcrumbs. I have the 
sense of being an explorer in a strange sonic topology85 where one can chance 
upon a rich seam of complex evolving rhythms and timbres, and where very small 
adjustments of knobs can lead to wild lurches of behaviour. Later, the memory of 
these temporal and timbral patterns will lead me to search for the zones again, not 
infrequently unsuccessfully. One of the really interesting things is the depth to 
which these memories seem burnt in, and it is a very exacting arbiter that often 
says ‘no, that’s not the same’ to the results of the search. The very strong and 
distinct nature of these musical memories indicates a deep engagement both with 
the processes of exploration in sound making, and with the listening at the heart of 
these explorations. Each performance of TTB navigates this strange sonic 
topology, and as I write this, months after the last performance, years after the 
first explorations, I can still clearly hear some of its most distinctive sounds and 
textures. 
 
The use of feedback networks in analogue circuits to make music is not new: 
Strange notates two in Electronic Music (Strange, 1982, 84 & 244), and the practice 
                                               
84 In the sense of Pickering’s ‘dance of agency’ – see for example Pickering (2007, 44). 
85 “Topology investigates questions of connectivity and boundaries” (Barad, 2003). 
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loops back through David Tudor and Nicolas Collins, at least as far as the 
Barrons’ self-built electronic circuits used to create the music and sound effects for 
the movie Forbidden Planet.86 Most research into autonomous musical 
environments is currently conducted through digital or digital/environmental 
means (see Holopainen (2012) for a comprehensive overview). Modular synthesis 
is not, in general, subject to the same narrative of obsolescence that we will meet 
in the next chapter, but it may still appear odd or even perverse, to some, to insist 
on the continuing relevance of ‘old’ technology, to deliberately not use whatever 
technology is currently deemed ‘cutting-edge’. But I believe there are important 
parallels with Pask’s wish, espoused in Micro Man, that we don’t forget the 
important lessons to be learned from obsolete ‘mavericks’ about the nature and 
possibilities of computation, and that by widening the scope of our definition of 
‘computing’ we might begin to get beyond tired analogue/digital polarities and the 
succession logic that continues to promote digital technology to the vanguard.  
 
The modular feedback system of TTB is a ‘deviant’ computing system, and from a 
conventional perspective makes quite a poor computer: it is barely programmable, 
and recall of ‘pre-programmed’ states is a hit and miss affair; its unpredictable, 
chaotic behaviour makes it impractical for representational duties; its powers of 
calculation are limited. In what way then, is it a computing system? It is a 
maverick, in the sense Pask described in Micro Man. In working with the modular 
I am looking for a human-machine entertainment-entrainment system, something 
that might do some justice to the legacy of Musicolour, “the first coherence-based 
hybrid control computer” (Pask and Curran, 1982, 144). The modular system 
directly computes, through the “active fabric” (ibid., 139) of the continuous flow 
of electricity, the areas of musical activity I’m interested in exploring: variety in 
repetition; rhythmic complexity amid structural stability; 
rhythmic/structural/timbral interdependence; concurrent interaction of multiple 
elements; ambiguity around the locus of control.  
 
 
                                               
86 For Collins, see Collins (2011, 2002); for Tudor, see Nakai (2014); for the Barrons, see 
Dunbar-Hester (2010). 
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Neither random nor perturbed 
 
One of the things that sets The Thing Breathed apart from many of its self-
generating antecedents and from other feedback systems, is that variety is injected 
into the system from neither random generators nor from environmental 
perturbations. As Pask noted: 
 
It is clear that haphazard perturbations… may contribute variety to the system, 
but they are inessential, the predictable chaos of non linear, iterated, processes, 
approaching a chaotic attractor would provide sufficient variety to suffice, were 
there no perturbations from an outside. (Pask, 1992, 35) 
 
In terms of synthesis we may read “haphazard perturbations” as random 
generators, and many attempts to create self-organising or ‘life-like’ behaviour87 in 
synth patches employ random components, just as many environmental feedback 
systems inject perturbation from the unpredictable contingency of the 
environment. For example, the two self-generating ‘dream machines’ in Strange 
(1982, 84 & 244) both use one or more random voltage generators; Collins’ Pea 
Soup (Collins, 2011) and di Scipio’s Audible Ecosystems (Di Scipio, 2003) both 
employ feedback paths between the environment and the system (through 
microphone/system/speaker couplings) to form self-organisation and variety. But 
Pask reminds us that systems themselves can be lively and “of sufficient variety” if 
they have non-linear iterative processes at their heart.88 The Thing Breathed uses 
neither random generators nor environmental contingency to achieve its variety 
and liveness, instead it relies on its inherent internal non-linearity, residing in 
iterative, circularly causal, multiply nested chains of interdependent continuous 
transductions.  
 
The contemporary synthesist whose work The Thing Breathed resonates most 
strongly with is Jessica Rylan. Her self-designed and constructed analogue 
modular synthesis devices are presented as black boxes. There is no ‘legending’ on 
the fascia, and the ‘manuals’ themselves are terse, conversational, and seemingly 
                                               
87 “Self organization is often, and rightly, considered to be an index of animation; the 
extent to which a system is living” (Pask, 1980, 397).  
88 See also Pask (1971, 76) on how “sufficient variety” is one of the attributes of 
“aesthetically potent environments”. 
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deliberately under-analyse the workings of the devices: “The most important thing 
is to try a lot of different combinations, and don’t be discouraged if you don’t find 
what you want straight away. Because when you do find the magic spots, it makes 
it all worth it!” (Rylan, 2008). This directive to search, to explore, not necessarily 
to understand, but to become to know the system is an important part of the 
interaction with her devices. Like The Thing Breathed there are sweet spots of 
interest, or aesthetic potency, in Pask’s terms, but their locations are not obvious, 
and the process of finding them is not necessarily rationally explicable.  
 
The desire to ‘understand’ through analysis is a strong element of the history and 
theory of modular synthesis. Muff Wiggler founder Mike McGrath said this of his 
own modular system: “what I love about it is quite often I play with it and it 
surprises me by doing things I never thought it was capable of, and they make me 
stop and figure out why did that happen, and I need to understand analytically 
now why it responded this way” (Botstein, 2014). This impenetrability to 
analytical understanding is exactly what interests me, though McGrath’s desire to 
open the black box is part and parcel of ‘learning the system’, and a strong 
component of the pedagogy of synthesis: “It is essential that the musician 
understand the difference between the signals and controls – signal is sound and 
control is structure. Both are voltage activities, and what is musician A’s sound 
may be musician B’s structure. For musician A and B to perform efficiently, 
however, each must be very certain in his own mind about the flow of these two 
kinds of information” (Strange, 1982, 33). Strange does point up that the 
boundaries between signal/sound and control/structure are not fixed, but still 
insists that the musician must understand where those demarcations lie in their 
own systems. Both Rylan’s and my patches question this boundary marking.  
 
The language Rylan uses to describe her devices, and others that interest her, 
directly echoes my own hearing of The Thing Breathed: “The most interesting 
Serge89 module is this kind of magic thing, called the Smooth/Stepped Generator. 
You can run noise through it and it generates these neat fluttery patterns. You get 
these very reality-sounding time frames and repetitions, the kind of natural 
                                               
89 Pioneering modular synth designer Serge Tcherepnin. 
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patterns where it doesn’t repeat exactly but it stays within its range of motion” 
(Rodgers, 2010a). This could serve as a very good description of what I have 
encountered performing The Thing Breathed: lively, sometimes ‘life-like’, behaviour 
where small scale details are completely unpredictable, but exist within cyclic 
frames with definite predictable tendencies; and where the areas of sonic interest, 
the aesthetically potent tendencies, have to be searched for, and are chaotic in 
their sensitivity to initial conditions. This search is the performance, and from time 
to time it fails, or falls flat, but often enough it surprises and even delights both me 
and its audience. 
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CHAPTER 6: PRACTICE (3) – TAPE POP RECORDING 
 
 
Chapter summary 
The chapter details tape studio production of four songs: the Euterprise EP. The music 
is produced under the rule: no digitisation of audio. The point of the rule is to establish 
what can be learnt about both analogue and digital recording through removal of the 
element which is ubiquitous in contemporary pop music production: digital audio. 
Practice-based work in the tape studio coupled with extensive experience in the DAW 
studio allow comparisons between the two domains. Despite the centrality of an 
analogue recording medium, various digital processes are still evident in the tape studio: 
buttons and switches, clocks and triggers, digital documentation (including special case 
documentation involving the DAW), and digitally mediated studio research. The tape 
studio work is not an attempt at ‘analogue purity’ and lays no claim on being ‘closer to 
nature’. Despite a prevalence for analyses based on the notions of nostalgia and 
authenticity in much current scholarly work on the recording studio, particularly where 
‘vintage’ equipment (such as a reel to reel multi-track) are foregrounded, this work 
questions, and ultimately refuses, the usefulness of either term. Pervasive progress 
narratives in scholarly work on the historical transition from tape studio to DAW 
studio are questioned, and the importance of skeuomorphic emulation in service of such 
progress narratives is highlighted. Increasing orders of traditionally performed 
elements of the tape studio are formalised and instantiated in the computational domain 
of the DAW. Fundamental differences between editing in the tape studio and in the 
DAW are highlighted: these are seen to be differences in kind rather than of degree. 
Conclusions drawn from the tape studio practice highlight the following areas: 
Commitment: all performance (musical and technical) in the tape studio manifests 
commitment in action. Versioning, undo, and the hyper-plasticity of digital audio in the 
DAW studio leaven such commitment. Performance and editing: on tape, for something to 
sound like a performance it must be a performance. In the DAW, emulation, correction 
and construction of performance are commonplace. Correction in the tape studio 
always involves further performance. Even tape editing involves gestural performance 
on the part of the engineer. Visualisation of waveform in the DAW does not require 
performative commitment. Decision-making: the making of decisions happens constantly 
in the tape studio, and is a much more heavily weighted part of the ongoing production 
than tends to be the case with the DAW. Decision-making in the DAW tends to be 
deferred to a final construction phase (the mix), and is often not concurrent with actual 
performance. Contingency: on tape, the song in the making is highly context dependent, 
and issues such unpredictability, error, deviation from a plan, and the uncontrollable 
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are often tightly woven into the final sound of the production. The DAW affords the 
possibility of exerting total control and eliminating contingency. Listening and gesture: 
despite the DAW attempting to present itself as isomorphic to the tape studio through 
skeuomorphic emulation, such assumptions miss essential differences around modality, 
gesture and how the embodied agent moves around the space of production. The tape 
studio is the domain of the ear. Once waveforms become visualised in the DAW we 
start ‘looking at sound’. Such ocularcentrism changes the nature of embodied musical 
cognition in the studio. The ‘at handness’ of the ergonomics of the tape studio 
foregrounds gestural choreographies and an embodied engagement with the dynamics 
of the studio. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents practice-based research into pop music recording and 
production using analogue multitrack tape. The practical output forms an EP 
which will be the third Junior Electronics release,90 and comprises four recorded 
songs. The making of these songs is documented at 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/.91 The ‘rule’ behind 
the production of these songs: 
 
Audio shall not be digitised at any point in the process from source sound to final product 
(vinyl or other analogue format).  
 
No digital instruments, samplers or synthesisers are used - sound sources are 
analogue electronic or acoustic. All recording happens to tape: all tracking is to 8-
track ½” multitrack;92 this is then mixed to ¼” 2-track; the mix is then cut to vinyl 
                                               
90 Junior Electronics is the moniker of my solo pop music project. The first two releases 
(Junior Electronics, 2012, 2007) were made using the DAW. 
91 Within this page you can find the links to the very detailed descriptions of the 
production process of each of the four songs.  
92 The reason why I use 8-track is mainly financial: 16- and 24-track machines are still 
fairly expensive, and the 2” tape they use is very costly now. There is no doubt that the 
constraints of tape discussed here are made much tighter by using only eight tracks, but I 
do hold that with due care and diligence it is perfectly possible to make high quality 
recordings on this format, and, of course, some of the finest pop music ever made used 
eight or less tracks (though generally on machines that operate at higher spec than the 
‘prosumer’ Teac 80-8 I have been using). 
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via an analogue mastering process. At no stage will tape tracks be dumped into the 
DAW for editing (a common hybrid process); mastering will not include a digital 
stage for procedures such as brickwall limiting (a normative contemporary 
procedure even for most recordings presented as ‘analogue’); in other words, there 
will be no conversion of audio into or out of the digital domain. 
 
The idea behind the rule is to see what can be learnt about recording, in its 
analogue and digital guises, by the removal of the elements that are, in 
contemporary practice, normative and ubiquitous: digitised audio and the DAW. 
Ironically, as a digital-audio-literate engineer, I’ve found that removing the DAW 
altogether is the best way to learn how it shapes and regulates studio practices. 
This removal forces one to confront, and places into sharp focus, those aspects of 
recording and production that have become second nature – such as micro-
editing93 and a primarily visual environment – and that simply don’t exist in the 
tape studio.  
 
 
Digital processes still in evidence 
 
However, it is important to note, and in keeping the view of analogue and digital 
as complementary, mutually dependent, ‘always and only coexisting’, that digital 
processes and technologies are still much in evidence throughout the process. The 
following is a partial list:  
 
1. There is extensive use of drum machines (with analogue sound production) that 
use digital memories, either programmable or preset. All such storage tends to be 
digital, since it is an instruction for where to place an event on a grid: this is not 
dynamic, ‘more or less’ information – the event goes here and only here – it is an all 
                                               
93 Micro-editing refers to one of the key affordances of digital audio and differs from the 
macro-scale editing possible on tape in two ways: (1) the ability to edit with extreme 
precision (down to the sample level) that comes from the ability to view the waveform 
and from the removal of physical constraints; (2) the ability to dissociate one track from 
another once it exists in the DAW – on tape you cannot move one multitrack element 
relative to another. The second is a fundamental, and frequently downplayed, difference 
between the two production environments of tape and DAW. 
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or nothing statement that would be made more ‘expensive’ and less reliable if it 
utilised the approximations of a continuous milieu.94  
 
2. All buttons and switches are, at the functional level (cf. p.46), digital, for similar 
reasons to 1. It makes no sense to ask ‘how far down is this button pressed?’ If 
that question needs asking then it is a very poorly defined switch. A button needs 
clear and unequivocal on/offness. This is especially vital on a device like a tape 
machine which has a fairly sophisticated digital logic matrix underlying the tape 
transport, which does important work like not allowing the machine to enter fast 
forward and rewind at the same time!  
 
3. Clocks and triggers are frequently used to allow syncing of many different 
devices at once, often in the initial laying of a rhythmic ‘bed’ that other elements 
will sit on top of and reference. For example, a drum machine sends a clock signal 
to a clock divider which sends a ½ time trigger to an arpeggiator on a synth and a 
¼ time trigger to another drum machine. If synchronisation of elements is 
important then time needs to discretised so that devices can lock to a common 
pulse. This is a good example of the synchronous coupling of otherwise 
asynchronous processes that Pask refers to in his definition of information transfer 
(cf. p.69). Interesting tricks can be played with clocking devices with different 
cycle lengths (phasing), or having one leg of the clock feed interact with some 
other, non-clocked process. 95 Tricks like this are rather more difficult to achieve in 
the DAW, where one is under the rule of the master clock.  
 
4. Digital documentation processes have been used throughout. The iPod has an 
excellent camera and readily lends itself to easy, cheap and portable photographic 
and video documentation. For the sharing of this documentation, modern digital 
portals such as YouTube are also easy and convenient, with excellent potential 
reach. It is also important to note that this documentation is not neutral – it is part 
of the process of recording/building these songs: although (documentary, CCTV, 
                                               
94 See http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/letter-game/letter-
game-606-patch-sheets/ for an example of the discrete programming grid of a drum 
machine. 
95 For a good example of this see: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-
research/euterprise-ep/substantive-hungry-trouser-word/#Rhythm_tracks  
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etc.) cameras have a tendency to disappear from consciousness when ubiquitous, 
here the camera is not set up in the corner of the studio and left to run throughout 
the whole session. When a piece of recording is to be done to tape I set up a 
camera to record all such attempts, so it is part of the working method, and I’m 
always somewhat conscious that my performance may, at some point in the future, 
be seen (deliberately contrasted to heard), and this may have some impact on how I 
perform.96  
 
5. The DAW itself is also used throughout the process, but in very specific and 
restricted ways. The copying of 8-track tape to DAW allows for another type of 
documentation, as one can build a picture of how the tape evolved over time: some 
record of individual tracks can be preserved that are erased on the actual tape any 
time a bounce happens.  
 
6. Digital processes are of course in evidence in much of the ‘background’ work to 
the analogue studio production: finding a manual for an esoteric piece of analogue 
kit online; researching mic positions on Gearslutz; listening to relevant musical 
examples online. 
 
In short, this is not an attempt at ‘analogue purity’, or any such idea as being 
‘closer to nature/the past/life’ (see Sterne (2016, 2006) and cf. p.39). The practice 
removes one digital aspect of procedure – digital audio – in the hope of learning 
something about recording and production, and about that digital procedure itself. 
It foregoes the obvious benefits and affordances of the DAW to ask some 
questions about those benefits and affordances, and to push at the boundaries 
between analogue and digital, building on the supposition that we might just have 
tipped the scales too far towards the discrete in our wholehearted embrace of 
digital everything. Analogue and digital always and only coexist – here, in the work 
of analogue tape pop recording, just as in all other aspects of our ‘digital age’.  
 
                                               
96 In the video here http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-
ep/substantive-hungry-trouser-word/#Bass you can see me check the framing on the 
camera and then change position. This may have been a factor in the duff playing soon 
after. 
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Nostalgia and authenticity 
 
It is important to note that this practice is not an exercise in nostalgia or 
authenticity. The former term, much discussed over the last twenty years, 
especially in relation to pop music recording (see, for example, Bennett (2012), 
Kirby (2015), McIntyre (2015), Williams (2015)), implies just the kind of 
periodising logic that this project attempts to question: the work presented here 
does not yearn for the past, does not believe that things were better yesterday, is 
not attempting to be retro, vintage, old school or any other term that valourises 
times gone by. Current academic work on the studio that draws on narratives of 
nostalgia often focuses on use of ‘vintage’ equipment, such as Williams’ argument 
that “an element of nostalgia is present when 20th century machines are used to 
capture 21st century music” (Williams, 2015); or Théberge’s comment that “the 
association of multitrack studios with the sound of much classic rock has, in the 
digital age, resulted in its own form of nostalgia for ‘vintage’ analogue gear” 
(Théberge cited in Kirby, 2015, 318). But as Samantha Bennett notes: 
 
So far, there is very little evidence that recordists and practitioners using vintage 
technologies or precursors do so due to fashion, trends, nostalgia or 
sentimentalism… [T]he attribution of vintage technology usage to nostalgia alone 
is deeply flawed and ignores more important factors such as musical and 
recording aesthetic intention on the part of the musicians and recordist(s), sonic 
characteristics of chosen technologies, client expectations as well as time and 
budget constraints. (Bennett, 2012, 14)  
 
Bennett’s reasoned account is a result of extensive conversation with studio 
practitioners and resists many of the implicit progress narratives that colour other 
contemporary accounts (though her persistent use of the term ‘precursor’ to refer 
to analogue equipment indicates an evident succession logic). For my own part as 
practitioner I can assert that nostalgia is not a motivating factor in the work 
presented here. 
 
The notion of authenticity has similarly been heavily mined in studies of studio 
technology and practice (e.g. Auner (2003), Dickinson (2001), Knowles and 
Hewitt (2012)), and is, I’ll admit, one of the terms I find most difficult when 
encountered, as it often is, in the mouths or writing of my students, where it is 
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generally used in isolation, as a stand-alone term that has meaning in and of itself: 
authentic (good), more authentic (better), less authentic (bad), not authentic 
(very bad). The idea that authenticity must be relational, that the object, process, 
performance, identity, what have you, can only be authentic in relation to 
something else,97 seems to have been lost somewhere along the way, and I suspect 
the word itself is best consigned to an authentic metaphorical dustbin.  
 
Still, the word exists and holds meaning for many. One of the more interesting 
treatments of the concept, and of direct relevance here, is from Simon Zagorski-
Thomas, who discusses anxieties around “performance authenticity” which result 
from the affordances of digital micro-editing in the studio, where “a proportion of 
editing is done because it is possible rather than necessary – or even desirable” 
(2010, 206). These issues arose from “an observation several interviewees made”, 
such as: 
 
Justin Scott – as a generic rather than specific story – sitting with an engineer 
who would look at the wave forms of his drum performance on a computer 
screen, at a scale where several centimeters of screen represented only a few 
milliseconds of audio, and correct inaccuracies in his bass drum timing through 
this visual representation even though neither of them could hear the difference. 
(ibid.) 
 
The anxieties arise from negotiations around the question ‘how tight to edit a 
performance’, given that the DAW allows the whole gamut of responses, from 
‘leave it as it is, warts and all’ to ‘let’s hard-quantise the entire drum track, and 
while we’re at it let’s nudge the overheads forward so the transients line up with 
the close mics’. Does leave-it-as-it-is equal authentic? Or does it just sound out of 
time? Does hard-quantise sound like a robot? Do we need to ‘humanise’ the 
quantise value? Should we leave some of the original timing in there 
(personality/feel) but correct the more egregious moments?   Engineers, producers, 
composers and performers all have their ways of dealing with this anxiety, and it 
is a serious topic of negotiation in the studio. One of the results of working on tape 
is that the question simply never arises. 
 
                                               
97 ‘Authentic’, related to ‘real’, is, I would argue, another substantive-hungry term. See 
Austin (1979), and cf. p.34. 
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This work is not an exercise in nostalgia or authenticity. In fact, this is not an 
exercise at all – it commits to tape, and to the world at large, a new Junior 
Electronics record. Of course, scholars are welcome to view this work in any way 
they choose, and if it fits, or gives support to, their theories of nostalgia, or 
authenticity, that is their prerogative, but it is not, as far as I can tell, the 
motivation for what I do.   
 
 
Progress narratives98 and skeuomorphic emulation99 
 
[D]igital audio technology is progressively substituting most devices and tasks 
traditionally implemented via analogue electronics and components. In this sense, 
digital audio technology may be considered to represent a progression of practices 
and techniques known during many past decades in electro–acoustics and audio 
engineering. (Mourjopoulos, 2005, 300)  
 
The narrative that positions the DAW as successor to, evolution of, and 
improvement on the tape studio is a commonplace that has assumed the position of 
commonsense, such that it is rarely questioned. The quotation from Mourjopoulos 
above plus a short sampling give a flavour:  
 
[The DAW has] deeply broadened the process of music creation and reception. 
(Savage, 2011, viii) 
 
Due to the inherent micro editing and automation possibilities, a DAW exceeds 
the capabilities of a conventional studio. (Kirby, 2015, 17) 
 
After the DAW became the common recording and mixing environment the 
traditional studio model rapidly became an anachronism. (ibid. 269)  
 
Digital audio systems are quite elegant, suggesting that they easily surpass more 
encumbered analog systems. (Pohlmann, 2005, 20)  
 
Computers can quite easily assume the role of a fully-equipped traditional 
production facility. (Leider, 2004, 46)  
 
The DAW can effectively replace and encapsulate much or all of the functionality 
present in a traditional console- and outboard-gear-based studio. (ibid.) 
                                               
98 I borrow this term from Tara Rodgers, whose “long-term perspective on the history of 
synthesized sound resists the linear and coherent progress narratives that characterize 
many histories of technology and new media” (2010b, vi). 
99 See the definition in footnote 17, above. See also Bell et al. (2015, 1) on the use of 
skeuomorphs as “analog audio metaphors” in the DAW.  
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These assertions all come from scholarly enquiry and all display more or less 
celebratory assumptions of progress; they all assume a logic of succession; several 
also posit an idea of replacement (of a specific piece of analogue technology by a 
digital version) along lines of continuity (the replacement ‘does the same thing’).  
 
To make his point about ‘technostalgia’ and a contemporary fixation on 
“outmoded frameworks” (2015, 5), Alan Williams compares ‘semi-solitary’ 
producer/composers Prince and Trent Reznor, who he positions on either side of a 
historical analogue/digital divide. In the 80s Williams idolised Prince because he: 
 
seemed to have mastered all of the elements of music making in the analog realm. 
And he appeared to do it on his own… Had I grown up a decade later, I might 
have found Trent Reznor to serve the same purpose, though utilizing a very 
different set of processes. Reznor often operated within the semi-solitary template 
that Prince espoused, but he did it by rejecting many of the old school 
methodologies that Prince had employed. Primarily, Reznor’s mastery of the non-
linear editing possibilities that DAWs afford granted him a far greater 
compositional flexibility than his purple-minded idol. Whereas Prince performed 
to and alongside his programming, Reznor programmed recorded fragments of 
his performance. (ibid., 2)  
 
But why should the ‘constructive’ approach of the DAW imply “far greater 
compositional flexibility”? One cannot deny increased editing flexibility, but that 
editing should be seen as synonymous with composition is a view that betrays a 
bias steeped in the computational culture of our time; it is a view that devalues 
contingency, performance and improvisation as essential parts of some 
compositional processes. And of course, this type of polarising comparison misses 
essential complications: Prince’s use of the studio (like much studio production in 
the 80s) was hybrid – he used analogue and digital processes; he recorded to tape 
but used MIDI to lock instruments together; he programmed digital drum 
machines that sat alongside analogue and digital synths; he used sampling 
technology as well as extensive tape speed manipulation; he flipped tape over to 
produce reversed reverb, but the reverb was digital (Helmreich and McMurray, 
2017). His programming of the tape studio (cf. p.71), alongside engineers such as 
Susan Rogers, was highly sophisticated, resolutely hybrid and showed a 
 118 
technological flexibility and performative agility, both inseparable from his 
compositional processes, that has been rarely matched, before or since.100 
 
To be sure, there is no questioning the ‘periods of dominance’ that these progress 
narratives lean on: the tape studio was the dominant mode of production from the 
50s to the mid 90s; the DAW has been the dominant mode since the mid 2000s, 
with the intervening decade or so one of transition and hybridity. In that these 
periods coincided with the maturing of the respective technologies there is no 
doubt. In that this narrative posits inexorable technological and concomitant 
sociological ‘progress’, there is much that can, and, I believe, should, be 
questioned. The most commonly cited sociological benefits are those of 
‘democratisation’, bringing the power of production to the masses, and the related 
ease of use or efficiency. Paul Théberge’s investigation is one of the more 
insightful accounts: “‘Democratization’ came to be equated with the availability of 
consumer technologies and prefabricated music resources… The conflation of 
democracy, consumption and ease of use is, of course, a hallmark of contemporary 
capitalism. This ideology continues to dominate the promotional discourses of 
digital culture (musical and otherwise) in the early twenty-first century” 
(Théberge, 2015).  
 
One of the most notable aspects of the ongoing evolution of the DAW is the way it 
has encouraged more and more of the traditionally performed elements of studio 
recording to be offloaded onto the computational domain. Performance here refers 
not only to the traditional role of the instrumentalist or singer, but also the many 
and varied activities of engineer and producer. Performative real-world studio 
activities include: musical performance; calibrating and operating hardware; 
editing; mixing; conversing with various personnel (musicians, writers, arrangers, 
etc.); and, of course, listening. All of these activities have, to some degree, 
‘benefited’ from digital ‘solutions’ which automate, appropriate and assimilate the 
activities into formalised algorithmic representations. These, in general, appear in 
the guise of skeuomorphs which offer replacement along the lines of continuity, 
                                               
100 Prince’s relationship with his studio Paisley Park is another high-water mark of the 
self-organising tape studio (cf. p.80). 
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and promise to remove or ease those aspects of studio procedure that are deemed 
‘difficult’, ‘hard to learn’ or ‘expert’. They are thus presented as beneficial, 
particularly to the (increasingly prevalent) ‘amateur’ producer. This process, 
present from the earliest MIDI specification that separated performance from 
instrument, shows no sign of letting up, and we are now witness to virtual 
performers, such as Logic X’s ‘Drummer’, as well as machine learning based 
‘intelligent’ mixing and mastering: “Mixing multichannel audio comprises many 
expert but non-artistic tasks that, once accurately described, can be implemented 
in software or hardware” (De Man and Riess, 2013, 1). But why are these ‘tasks’ 
considered ‘non-artistic’? For many, the mixing process is one of the most creative 
and artistic parts of the job of engineering. ‘Accurately described’ here means 
formalisable, codable, and posits an idea of standardisation in music production 
which many bands, engineers and producers baulk at. That the machine learning 
process mines historical databases of pre-existing mixes indicates an irony at odds 
with the supposed ‘innovative’ nature of such software solutions: these automated 
mixes can only ever listen to the past.  
 
We can read this, following (but inverting) Pickering and Barad, as a move from 
the performative to the representational (cf. p.19). This incremental incorporation 
of the physical, analogue and human elements of the recording studio into the 
DAW seems, with retrospect, to have followed an inexorable logic of convergence, 
and Sally Jane Norman’s remark of 2006 has lost none of its relevance in the 
intervening 13 years:  
 
Digital information’s propensity for atomisation, limitless duplication and 
recomposition, making it sensible and intelligible in a vast variety of ways, is the 
source of sometimes intoxicating visions of convergence: enthusiasm for the 
unlimited combinatorial potential of digital data distorts our understanding of the 
nature and representational function of digital resources, beguiling us into seeing 
infinite combinations of bits as blessed with a kind of omnipotence, namely the 
ability to relay, convey and ultimately be all. (Norman, 2006, 23) 
 
Once audio is added to the micro-processor based MIDI sequencer and the DAW 
is born, increasing numbers of elements of traditional studio engineering become 
housed within the computer environment: the multi-track tape becomes multi-
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channel digital audio; the analogue mixer becomes the virtual mixer; the studio 
‘rack’, containing processors and effects units becomes available on ‘insert’ slots on 
the virtual mixer; the live performance of the mix, with multiple fingers on faders, 
becomes automation, which allows any element within the DAW to have 
programmed parameter changes in ‘real-time’. Then instruments themselves get 
incorporated: initially this uses onboard sampling technology, but then physical 
modelling brings effective emulations of the Rhodes electric piano, the Hammond 
B3 organ, the Hohner clavinet – all classics of the pop canon. Physical modelling 
also takes in emulation of analogue synthesis, known as ‘virtual analogue’ or 
‘analogue modelling’: hugely expensive and rare classic synths, such as the Arp 
2600 or the Yamaha CS80 are available in multiple instances, all skeuomorphically 
rendered as ‘authentic’ emulations. Even amplifiers get digitised: amp simulators 
being common ways to ‘get that sound’, without the tedious need buy a decent 
amp, have it played at volume, or set up microphones on the amp to capture the 
sound. By this point, nearly the entire studio environment can be seen to have 
been swallowed by the DAW, except for three features of the traditional studio: 
microphones, loudspeakers and the personnel who operate the system: 
The microphone, an analogue transducer, will continue to be valued in the studio 
environment, and no serious commercial studio will be without a selection, but the 
contemporary business of production does not need the microphone: samples, 
sound libraries, virtual instruments and performers played via MIDI, even 
Vocaloid software,101 all mean that everything can be constructed within the DAW 
itself, without the need to ever record anything.  
 
Loudspeakers: it is worth remembering, in the ‘digital age’, that the final stage a 
recording goes through before meeting the medium we listen in, the air, will always 
be analogue. DAWs may happily emulate a guitar amp in software, but the actual 
things we listen to the emulation on stubbornly refuse to be emulated.  
 
Personnel: one of the more intriguing contemporary developments of this move 
from physical/analogue processes to ones instantiated within a computer is the 
                                               
101 See https://www.vocaloid.com/en 
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potential to remove the studio personnel themselves: in addition to engineers being 
replaced by automated AI mixing and mastering we also see the drummer’s old 
adversary, the drum machine, raised to skeuomorphic heights in the latest 
incarnation of Logic, with ‘Drummer’ – a selection of virtual performers, handy 
little homunculi, each with their own ‘personality’ and subtle performance 
differences, always on hand to lend their expertise to your production. In effect, 
these demon drummers all sit in a little locker in the studio, ready and waiting to 
perform for you, all free from the pesky foibles that make real drummers 
potentially difficult to work with: these demons don’t turn up late, they don’t 
drink on the job, they don’t have squeaky pedals, they don’t ask for the drums to 
be turned up in the mix, they don’t speed up towards the end of the song, they 
don’t lock themselves in a cupboard and refuse to come out until their song is put 
on the B side of the single that’s obviously going to be a smash…102 
 
Time and again we see the changes the DAW brings being celebrated as liberating 
the user, of upscaling affordances, saving the engineer time, allowing them to do 
more, more quickly, more cheaply. One of the key changes was sold as ‘vastly 
improved editing functionality’, but even if the icon of the editing tool relies on 
skeuomorphic reference to physical work done with a razor blade (in Logic, for 
example, it is represented by a little pair of scissors), the affordances of digital 
editing are of a fundamentally different order to those of tape splicing. This is a 
difference in kind, not of degree: digital audio editing is a discretisation, a coding, 
a taking out of time, and this removal of sound from its dynamical milieu is neither 
predicted by nor develops out of analogue tape. On multitrack tape it is pretty 
much impossible to move individual track elements in relation to other tracks, and 
the only real editing possibilities are global: horizontal stretches of tape (time) can 
be sliced, removed, moved, reversed, but there is a limit to the smallest (shortest 
time) edit possible on tape, and it is of a vastly greater magnitude than the 
infinitesimal slice that digital audio affords.103 This near infinite manipulability of 
sound, possible even at the level of the individual sample (typically one of 44,100 
                                               
102 Reputedly what Roger Taylor of Queen did to get ‘I’m in love with my car’ on the B 
side of ‘Bohemian Rhapsody’ (Irvin, 2007, 355). B sides take a 50% split of revenue. 
103 With tape editing it is possible to cut very small slices (1mm or so) but, as I can attest 
from experience, it is more or less impossible to put these very fiddly little pieces back 
together again. 
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per second) once it has become data within the DAW, is well known and much 
discussed. What seems to be less readily acknowledged, perhaps because it is 
hidden behind the skeuomorphs and the progress narratives that posit the DAW 
as the natural successor to analogue forebears, is that this ability, literally, to ‘take 
sound out of time’ is a radical, paradigm shifting break with analogue techniques 
and technologies – it is most definitely not a continuation, an upscaling of 
affordance or a necessarily logical successor.  
 
Although this increasing virtualisation of the studio does seem to follow its own 
internal logic, that does not imply that this history is one of progress. Yes, digital 
audio has become better in quality as computers have become faster and storage 
has become cheaper. Yes, the studio can now become truly mobile and production 
can happen anywhere. Yes, the whole process has allowed for more and more 
people to make more and more music more cheaply and quickly: the monopoly of 
the professional studio, paid for by the record company, on making ‘professional 
sounding’ recording has gone. But does that necessarily equate to progress? Are 
there things we have lost as we have rushed headlong into this embrace of the 
computational? As Strachan notes: 
 
Computer-based music production enables and demands that the user work 
directly with captured and generated sounds that are at a remove from the 
processes and competencies of performance traditionally associated with 
musicianship… [T]he computer environment needs to be interrogated for the way 
that it allows, encourages and facilitates the making, processing and manipulation 
of sound. In other words, the computer environment should not be understood as 
a neutral way of recording, capturing and presenting sound but as highly 
influential to the creative process in its design, construction and capability which 
in turn have a central influence on the sounds and eventual recordings that are 
produced. (Strachan, 2017, 7) 
 
How are we to get to grips, in our actual studio practice, with the seemingly 
inexorable departure from the physical? What are we to make of this move away 
from the performative towards the representational? When even performance, 
historically one of the fundamental studio procedures, gets offloaded into the 
computational domain; when personnel, including, increasingly, the person of the 
engineer, seem no longer to be necessary for the production of studio recordings; 
when everything is made so much easier, cheaper and more convenient by staying 
‘in the box’. How do we make decisions about where to draw the line between 
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what we want to play and what we want a handy little homunculus to play for us, 
about how tightly to edit, about what we want to have direct, physical control 
over and what we’re happy to offload onto automated processes? 
 
My own approach has been to remove these questions, by removing the DAW 
and its little demons from the process. The following details that process and 
draws out some of the implications of a primarily analogue tape studio system. It 
will make comment on comparisons with the DAW along the way.  
 
 
Commitment 
 
Where there is no risk and every commitment can be revoked without 
consequences, choice becomes arbitrary and meaningless. (Dreyfus cited in 
Klemmer et al., 2006, 145) 
 
 
It is no accident that traditional studio engineers talk of ‘committing to tape’, and 
we noted in chapter 4 how Klemmer et al. cautioned that “digital artifacts often do 
not exhibit commitment to actions” (2006, 145).104 Compared to the DAW, the 
lack of any kind of ‘undo’ or ‘versioning’ means that every move made on tape 
requires great care and commitment. It is perfectly possible, while recording, to 
press the wrong button, resulting in days’ worth of work being deleted! Such risks 
force one to take great care, and to double-check everything before making critical 
moves. This added pressure does encourage a sharpening of focus which, in many 
ways, is a useful contrast to the somewhat blasé attitude often found in DAW 
recording which may well be sufficient where necessary attention to the task in 
hand is leavened by foreknowledge of versioning and undo.105 No such distracted 
wandering of attention is possible with recording on tape: if you change something 
it is changed permanently, so you’d better make sure it is a change for the better.  
 
                                               
104 Winograd and Flores have also made commitment a cornerstone of their controversial 
attack on many of the assumptions underlying work on artificial intelligence (Winograd 
and Flores, 1987); see also Boden (2008, 846). 
105 See Duigan et al. (2010) on versioning in the DAW. 
 124 
This sense of commitment is also, as discussed below, central to all taped 
performance: the knowledge that what you play is what the listener will hear; the 
knowledge that DAW style micro-editing is not an option; the knowledge that 
previous/better versions of a take may be jettisoned in search of the ‘definitive’ 
take. There is also greater commitment to the post-performance audition of the 
take: the performer records their take and sits with the engineer/producer to listen 
and decide if it’s good enough, if it needs to be redone, or, where possible, if 
certain moments will be fixed through dropping in. The conversation between 
engineer and performer at this point will revolve around practicalities and 
contingencies: ‘if we do another take what are the potential benefits and what are 
the risks?’ The engineer will be encouraged to give as detailed as possible 
suggestions for how the performer is to achieve this: ‘you seem to consistently have 
a problem with that melodic leap in the chorus – try to prepare for it mentally as 
you’re playing that easy run down.’ Or, ‘if you cut that note at the end of the 
bridge short, we’ll have enough of a gap to drop in, so you can relax about the end 
section and just concentrate on the first bit.’ Engineer Carl Beatty, whose 
professional training occurred in the tape studio, and who witnessed at first hand 
the transition to DAWs, notes: 
 
[Of] all the things that I see that have changed drastically because of ProTools, 
the biggest one is communication. For the performers on the ‘other side of the 
glass’… there’s very little feedback from the producers, there’s very little guidance 
in terms of performance, because they know they have acres and acres of ‘real 
estate’ to collect data, and very often the guidance is ‘do another one’. From the 
world I come from, of limited real estate, 24 track analogue recording, that wasn’t 
really part of the process, you had to be listening and making decisions as you go. 
(Beatty, 2007) 
 
Discussing a similar situation, Richard Burgess (2013) cites Steve Savage’s paper 
‘“It Could Have Happened” – The Evolution of Music Construction’, which 
relates the story of guitarist Warren Haynes, an extremely competent professional, 
who was in the studio to lay down a solo. He played three takes, and then left, 
“saying that he thought they had ‘enough stuff’ and that they should assemble the 
finished solo” (ibid., 157). In the end the artist and producer felt they couldn’t 
construct a complete usable solo and had to get someone else to play over the last 
8 bars.  
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What is interesting is not that Haynes played badly – he is an excellent musician – 
but that he was happy to leave the final construction of the solo to the producer 
and the artist. The performer supplied the raw material and walked away without 
hearing the finished solo. Had Hayes still been there when they discovered the 
weakness in the last eight bars, within another take or two, he could have given 
them what they needed. There is now such familiarity with DAWs’ editing power 
that consummate musicians are treating their parts as raw material rather than a 
fully crafted piece. This is interesting conceptually, but not if the end result is 
inferior. (ibid.) 
 
Insights such as this are a useful antidote to the various assumptions of 
isomorphism that we encounter, such as: “In contemporary recording sessions, 
digital technology mimics that of older analog tape-based processes, so that for the 
performing musician the experience is nearly indistinguishable” (Williams, 2012, 
1). Williams’ article is noteworthy for the exploration of how the primacy of visual 
display in the DAW influences and regulates the production process, but fails to 
critically interrogate the deeper implications of the screen, choosing rather to 
celebrate how the shared screen, in a studio control room, affords participation: 
“Observing the ease with which an engineer can delete, repeat, stretch time, or 
literally ‘flip it and reverse it,’ the musician is given access to a staggering number 
of creative possibilities” (ibid. 3). Perhaps, but this also alerts the musician to the 
fact that there is far less riding on their performance than they might have 
thought. This is a liberation, of course, an easing of pressure, but it can also lead to 
an abdication of responsibility, a lessening of commitment in performance. 
 
 
Performance and editing 
 
The actual process of analogue recording is by necessity far more focused on 
performance than digital recording. (Kirby, 2015, 361)  
 
Performance is the ground from which knowledge emerges and to which it 
returns. (Pickering, 2007, 44)  
 
On tape, if you want something to sound like a performance it must be a 
performance. This is not the case in the DAW, where emulation, correction, or 
construction of performance are commonplace. Of course, the nature of 
performance to tape is different to that of live performance in front of an audience; 
the very nature of recording moves sound from the evanescent to the repeatable, 
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and there are all kinds of affordances in the tape studio that facilitate the 
recording of performances that musicians are happy to let out into the world, 
knowing that they may be listened to again and again. Traditional analogue 
recording offers: re-recording, until you’re happy with the take; ‘dropping in’ to 
remove more localised errors; ‘comping’, which allows the compilation of various 
takes to select the best bits from each.106 However, all of the above affordances 
involve further performance to correct unacceptable performance. Even comping 
requires a performance on the part of the engineer to swap between different 
takes on the multitrack, according to a pre-determined script, using mute buttons 
or faders, and also involves the inevitable loss of quality that comes from internal 
track bouncing. Comping in a DAW is free both from quality degradation issues 
and any need to perform: it is all achieved non-destructively on screen.  
 
This is not to say that performance is necessary for every element of recording to 
tape: we have had sequencers, arpeggiators and drum machines since the 60s, all 
of which, apart from some aspect of programming, are automated devices that run 
themselves. A fixed microphone recording 20 minutes of Aeolian harp would 
involve no performance at all. It might be argued that the pressing of the record 
button is a performance, but this seems to deny the word performance of any 
useful specificity: pressing a button becomes a performance only when there is 
pressing need to push it at the right time, e.g. the aforementioned operation of 
mute switches in the analogue comping process, which must happen at exactly the 
right time in the playback/recording of the tape, or the pushing of some parameter 
change button on an effects unit during the mix. As noted in chapter 1, 
performativity is committed real-time activity which brings forth a world. 
 
On tape, editing is intimately related to performance. This occurs on at least two 
levels: (1) The craftsman-like wielding of razor blade, chinagraph pencil, splicing 
tape and ears around the physical medium of magnetic tape is a performative 
combination of tacit knowledge and hand/ear/eye coordination that is mostly 
                                               
106 There is also macro-scale editing, which is possible with solo recordings, and is the 
technique that Glen Gould controversially championed in many solo piano recordings 
(Gould, 2004), but this is not possible with an individual take on multitrack, which is the 
primary form of tape recording explored here. 
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absent from the ‘line the scissors up with the transient on the screen’ type of 
editing common in the DAW. (2) Foreknowledge of the limitations of tape editing 
influences musical performance: if you make a mistake you know you will either 
have to live with it or replay it – there are none of the possibilities of localized 
post-performance editing that exist in the DAW, where timing errors are easily 
corrected by moving the event relative to the time-line, and errors of pitch can be 
corrected by DSP based ‘solutions’.  
 
Furthermore, on tape the decisions about whether to live with a performance, or 
attempt to correct it, directly feed into the sound of the performance. A take 
considered ‘good’ may include errors, but to fix these the previous performance 
(or parts of it through drop-ins) will usually be wiped. You can always re-record, 
but you run the risk of losing aspects that may never be as good. When, and how, 
do you decide the take is ‘good enough’? How much time do you have? Does your 
playing get worse as the part gets ‘stale’? The sound of the final take is often a 
compromise as well as a composite of all of these decisions made throughout the 
process, and may contain things you would rather weren’t there, but seem like a 
better compromise than doing another take. This can lead to some recorded 
elements having ‘rough edges’ or even obvious mistakes, and puts the performer in 
a position of a much greater commitment to the performance than one tends to see 
in DAW recording, where there is almost always the option of ‘fixing’ mistakes 
later, and where you keep every version of a take so you can choose the best bits 
later. The place where I notice this the most on the Euterprise EP is in the singing. 
This is where I really realised how much I’d previously relied on the comping 
facilities of the DAW, where I would sometime comp individual syllables to keep 
all the notes in tune. I chose not to comp on tape, mainly because I didn’t have 
enough tracks free to do it, so had to rely on dropping-in to fix tuning and other 
problems with the singing, and which you can’t use to fix individual syllables. 
There are many rough edges to my vocals on the EP, which I certainly would 
have corrected in a DAW, which I have to live with for the reasons given above. 
This may be part of the charm of the record, but I leave that for others to judge. 
 
However, it is important to note that micro-editing is not a default in DAW 
production, though it is the norm in many areas of music production, such as pop 
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music. Where instruments are recorded simultaneously in the same space (and 
multiple microphones exhibit ‘bleed’) micro-editing becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, and thus many types of music, such as most classical music, and much 
improvised music, are not subject to the same kind of tendency towards 
construction and manipulation discussed here.  
 
 
Decision-making 
 
The making of judgements and decisions happens constantly during tape 
recording, and is a much more heavily weighted part of the process than is evident 
in most DAW recording. The interface and affordances of the DAW positively 
encourage the deferral of all kinds of decisions, from the compiling of takes once a 
performer has left the studio, to the oft heard ‘we’ll fix it in the mix’. Unlimited 
track number means that huge amounts of ‘speculative’ recording can happen, and 
large banks of tentative ‘maybes’ are often amassed before definitive arrangement 
decisions get made. The very tight constraints of multitrack tape recording mean 
that decision-making is an integral and necessary part of the recording process, 
and is thus intimately woven into the fabric of the recording in its becoming. This 
is perhaps the most important concrete result of this foregrounding of decision-
making: the sound of the final recording is in a direct and contingent relationship 
with ongoing performative decision-making. This is different to the comparatively 
minimal impact ongoing decision-making has on the sound of a DAW recording. 
Of course, decisions get made in the DAW environment, but they don’t 
necessarily, and in many cases tend not to, happen concurrently with processes of 
recording.  
 
On tape, many of these decision-making processes are related to the restrictions of 
track count: internal bouncing of multiple elements fixes their internal relationship 
as they will appear in the final mix, both in terms of their relative levels and where 
they appear in the stereo field. Decisions taken about effects and processing of a 
track cannot be removed later. Decisions made about and during performance 
have a similarly pressing vitality, and have a direct bearing on how those 
performances occur. There is a considerable difference between the pressure 
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performers feel when they are wiping everything they previously did to get the 
best take, and the pressure they are put under when they can offload anxieties 
about ‘best’ performances onto a retrospective compiling of ‘all the best bits’ once 
the red light has gone out. 
 
Much of this is related to the DAW’s ability to take sound ‘out of time’, remove it 
from the ongoing temporal flux. This doesn’t just affect things in the micro, 
moment-to-moment level of the temporal flow of the song, but also at the macro 
level of studio environment and recording process: the encouragement of deferral 
of decision-making in the DAW impacts performer, engineer and the ongoing 
evolution of the song in progress. The tight weaving in of decision-making to the 
fabric of the song in progress on tape will tend to result in a very different 
sounding final recording.  
 
 
Contingency 
 
Ordinary life is necessarily one of situated, embodied agents, continually coming 
up with what to do faced with ongoing parallel activities in their various 
perceptuomotor systems. This continual redefinition of what to do is not at all like 
a plan, stored in a repertoire of potential alternatives, but enormously dependent 
on contingency, improvisation, and more flexible than planning. (Varela, 1997, 
83)  
 
The good craftsman places positive value on contingency and constraint. 
(Sennett, 2008, 262)  
 
On tape, however thoroughly we plan how the track is going to sound, however 
detailed and prescriptive the demo is, the song in the making will change. The 
becoming of the recorded song will have a relationship to, and dependence on, 
unpredictable soundings that are an inevitable and not always unwelcome result of 
performance, constraint and circumstance.  
 
Contingency is the dependence on, and reaction to, the environment that one finds 
oneself within at a particular juncture – the knot that emerges unforeseen in the 
carving of a piece of wood. It is an inevitable part of the unplanned (and 
unplannable for) nature of reality in its becoming; the unpredictable, the error or 
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deviation from the plan, the uncontrolled/uncontrollable.107 The hyperfluidity of 
digital audio makes it perfect for exerting total control, eliminating contingency; 
sound, performance, the song, become programmable, codable, and it is ironic to 
hear how often this coding is pressed into service in the production of an emulation 
of performance.  
 
In the tape studio contingency is clearly related to decision-making in the 
construction of the recording, the becoming of the recorded song. Because 
decisions about arrangement, about sound, and about elements of the final mix 
cannot be endlessly deferred, there is a sharper focus on how each of the separate 
elements fit together into the evolving whole. The relationships between different 
elements assume greater significance than in the DAW because there is minimal 
possibility for shifting and altering how these elements fit together after they have 
been committed to tape. Editing/altering possibilities still exist, to be sure, but they 
are of a different order of magnitude than their DAW ‘equivalents’. Thus there is 
a necessary ongoing focus on listening to how elements fit together, with a 
concomitant mental ‘mapping forward’ of how they will fit into the final mix.  
 
Each element in the growth of the recorded song can be seen as being highly 
context specific, much more so than in the ‘equivalent’ building of a song in a 
DAW, where there is a tendency, arguably an encouragement, to accumulate 
elements that will be ‘fit together’ at some point later in the process. Tape has no 
truck with this deferral of decision-making – it insists one deals with contingency 
and context in the moment of making. 
 
 
Listening and gesture 
 
[A]udio engineering practices are not reducible to one sense alone. Every 
widespread form of engineering developed until today has depended on the body 
for the manipulation of interfaces and on audition through headphone or 
loudspeaker audition systems. All computer-based audio engineering technologies 
depend upon the visualization of abstractions of sound and also a visualization of 
the interface for manipulating sound. However, scholarship on audio engineering 
has ignored the sensing body for the most part. (Bates, 2009, 1)  
                                               
107 “The uncontrollable offers us unimagined riches” (Glanville, 2001b, 37).  
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One of the things one notices when one removes oneself from the DAW and into 
the realm of its supposed forebear, is just how hard the DAW tries to ape the 
moves, processes and space of the tape studio through skeuomorphic emulation 
within the “square horizon” (Virilio, 1997, 90) of the computer screen. But 
consider a clutch of related assumptions: the assumption of similarity between the 
physical space of the tape studio and its virtual, logical ‘successor’; the assumption 
that techniques and procedures move smoothly from one domain to the ‘next’ via a 
“digital switchover” (Buckley, 2011); the assumption that all that has changed is 
increased affordance, ease of use, efficiency. All these assumptions are misplaced, 
for they fail to recognise fundamental differences of modality, gesture and the way 
the “sensing body” moves around the space of production.  
 
The tape studio is truly the domain of the ear: listening necessarily has primacy. 
When we consider the DAW arrange window as skeumorphic emulation of the 
tape head with tape passing by it, we downplay the important and fundamental 
change that happens to the engineer/producer/performer when waveforms become 
visualised. If we look at the tape passing by the head, there is absolutely nothing to 
see, just an expanse of black tape. When we start digitising audio and presenting it 
on screen in a manner seemingly analogous to the way tape passes the head 
something fundamental happens: we start looking at sound. This sounds like an 
oxymoron, but such language is common in activity around the DAW: ‘I can see a 
silence here we can cut into’, ‘that master looks a bit over-cooked’, ‘it looks like 
you’re playing consistently behind the beat’. All such pronouncements depend on 
a visualisation of waveforms (and the grid of the timeline in the last example). 
Sight is used in the tape studio: we look at meters to check levels, we visually line 
up pieces of tape we’re editing, we look to check we haven’t record enabled the 
wrong track by mistake. But sight carries significantly less weight than listening 
or gesture. The ocularcentrism of the DAW is manifest in countless ways, such as 
the visual editing that Zagorski-Thomas explores, or the ‘visualiser’ built into 
many EQ plugins, which I have witnessed students use to make the sound ‘look 
more even’: they turn the visualiser on and cut where they see peaks. In some 
circumstances this can help, in others it definitely doesn’t, but one thing is for 
sure, it teaches you nothing about what an EQ does to sound: as the focus moves 
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from ear to eye, attention is diverted away from the actual aural effect, and we tell 
ourselves a tale of how we’ve made the sound ‘look better’. I have witnessed a 
similar preference for the modality of sight in my students as they ‘listen’ to a mix: 
what they appear to be doing is watching ‘blocks of sound’ pass by on the screen, 
and if the screen is not in line with the speakers they will rather orient themselves 
towards the screen than the monitors.108 Autechre, an electronic music duo 
primarily identified as ‘computer musicians’, point up how this focus on the visual 
can be a block to listening: 
 
There’s nothing better than turning the screen off… When we’re putting things 
down and mixing things and are trying to make things sound right, the screen has 
to go off… The worst things are the timeline sequencers where you can see on the 
screen what’s coming up. That really fucks with your head when you’re listening. 
(Tingen, 2004, no pagination)  
 
Above I suggested that the visual modality is of lesser import in the tape studio 
than gesture, or gesturo-haptics, to use Brian Rotman’s term, which folds 
linguistic and choreographic notions of gesture into modalities of touch and 
proprioception (Rotman, 2008). In the tape studio, these performative 
choreographies revolve around both learnt embodied routines, such as fader 
riding and tape splicing, and spontaneously created gestural solutions to 
engineering problems, such as raising a stringed instrument up to the microphone 
after it has been plucked.109 This is a kind of ‘manual automation’ of later fader 
riding, an anticipation of how it will sound in the mix. Left as normally played, 
especially in fairly dense material, the harp in question has a tendency to ‘plink’ 
and then immediately disappear. This manual automation allows the tail of the 
sound to remain audible, and means it doesn’t have to be done in the mix where 
hands are busy with all kinds of other moves. Tape editing is also a good example 
of the kind of gesturo-haptic/listening choreography where the ‘rocking’ back and 
forth of the reels is accompanied by a listening that needs to be expert to hear 
where the transient is (cf. p.86).110 
 
                                               
108 This traditional, studio specific term for loudspeakers indicates how monitoring 
activity in the studio is an aural affair. 
109 See http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/letter-game/#Harp  
110 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VJxasayZSs&t=34s  
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What I’m alluding to here is an embodied engagement with the dynamics of the 
studio; a steering through the complex and resistant materiality of the studio 
environment that will not allow the bending of sound to the imperious will of the 
producer, but has to go with the multiply recursive and co-implicative trajectories 
and channels of that dynamic, through performative engagement and interaction. 
 
[T]he move to digital recording and storage reduced operational physical 
movement within the studio. It did not eliminate it, however. In an analogue 
studio the operation of tape machines and mixing desk faders required physical 
movement over a footprint up to the size of the studio itself. This has increasingly 
been reduced to a footprint the size of a qwerty keyboard and mouse mat, 
possibly retaining fader and other accessory input controls. Hence any residual 
idea of ‘physical’ performance is severely constrained… Less physical but nearly 
as constraining to body movement is having the eyes glued to the screen. 
(Emmerson, 2007, 26)  
 
In the tape studio the various components tend to be (physically) organised 
ergonomically, according both to the needs of a particular situation, and 
established routines of practice. This ‘at-handness’ responds to gestural demands 
and tends to be flexible, modular, shaped by personal experience and in constant 
flux: new elements are bought/brought in, incorporated heuristically, modified by 
ergonomic principle or gestural facility; other elements are taken out as they are 
sold as no longer desirable, or according to economic expedient, or they break 
down and need to be sent off for maintenance, or they lose their lustre and get put 
back on the shelf. Further, elements can change their relationships with each other 
as unforeseen functionality is fortuitously chanced upon, as a synergy is 
uncovered, or as other working techniques from the wider engineering culture are 
incorporated into the setup. All such evolutions and adaptations are part of what 
this thesis refers to as the self-organising studio. The rhythm tracks of the four 
tracks of the Euterprise EP demonstrate these principles well, combining 
populations of different studio devices brought into local synchronisation. In all 
cases their synergetic interactions surprised and delighted me as I put them 
together, following the underspecified goal of ‘interesting rhythm track’. 
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Tape pop recording 
 
The key insights gleaned from this practice-based comparison of tape studio and 
DAW have primarily been to do with the nature of performance in the studio, from 
the perspective of both musician and engineer. The tape studio insists on 
performance, at multiple levels, and throughout all aspects of production. As well 
as musicians’ performances, which require the highest levels of commitment, the 
craft of tape studio engineering is also highly performative: from calibration and 
operation of technology, interpersonal discussion and negotiation, craftsman-like 
razor-blade editing, through to the final mix. The tape studio is the domain of the 
ear, and of gesturo-haptics – the choreographing of embodied performative 
routines negotiating the resistant materiality of tape and its attendant 
technological milieu. By comparison, the DAW tends to devalue performance, by 
making micro-editing such a powerful and attractive alternative, by offering such 
flexible non-linear construction opportunities, by automating traditionally 
performed engineering tasks such as fader riding, by encouraging an accumulation 
of material to be assembled later, by endlessly deferring decisions about how the 
track is eventually going to sound, and through recourse to versioning and undo. 
The DAW studio puts far more emphasis on the eye than the tape studio; even the 
musician can see clearly just how easy it is to ‘correct’ poor performance, and is 
thereby abdicated from much of the responsibility of their own performance.  
 
This performance-centric analysis also points up how the DAW relies on 
skeuomorphic emulation of the tape studio and its physical environment. We’ve 
seen how the succession logic that drives this emulation relies on narratives of 
progress, of increased affordance, of democratisation, and how it tells a tale of 
replacement along lines of continuity, as if analogue technologies’ historical 
function has been to lay the groundwork for their eventual, inevitable 
incorporation into an all-encompassing digital realm. But this narrative occludes 
fundamental differences in kind between the tape studio and its supposed 
descendant. Rather than looking at the DAW as tape studio with added 
affordances, we should see the two environments as different in fundamental 
ways, and the practices that happen in these environments as leading to very 
different sounding music.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Every act of knowing brings forth a world. (Maturana and Varela, 1992, 26) 
 
The world that this thesis brings forth, participates in, and directs its cybernetic 
ears towards is one of constant becoming; a changing world, one that will not sit 
still awaiting explication, penetration or formalisation. Such activities are 
important, but they bring forth, at best, only half a world, one that can be 
identified with Pickering’s “Modern ontology”, and with various strands of 
computationalism, in particular, computational theories of mind that posit highly 
complex digital cognitive structures within our skulls, working primarily though 
symbolic representations of a world ‘out there’. Howard Pattee is fond of quoting 
von Neumann – that celebrated progenitor of formality in its current dominant 
technological form, the digital computer – to much the same effect: “As von 
Neumann warned, if one studies only formal life, ‘…one has thrown half the 
problem out of the window, and it may be the more important half’” (Pattee, 1995, 
2; the quotation is from von Neumann, 1966).111 Pattee believes that the creation of 
formality is itself not adequately formalisable and suggests that such generative 
acts of cognition cannot be separated out from the flux of becoming, cannot be 
reduced to algorithmic or symbolic representation, and are thus beyond the reach 
of processes that exist within wholly digital environments.112  His view suggests 
that an all-encompassing “faith in formalism”, evident in large swathes of common 
sense, as well as much academic research, regarding the position of the digital 
computer within our contemporary culture, is misplaced. Pattee’s plea is that 
within computational systems that deal with such generative processes as learning, 
creativity and intelligence (artificial or otherwise), there is far more frequent 
                                               
111 The reference to ‘formal life’ in this quote reflects the A-life focus of the essay, but 
Pattee has used the same von Neumann reference in relation to evolution (Pattee, 1980) 
and computation (Pattee, 1974). 
112 In light of my assertion that analogue and digital always and only coexist, the ‘wholly 
digital’ of this sentence and below must be taken with a caveat: this is an interpretation at 
a level useful to the conversation, and refers to the fact that the internal, programmable 
environment of a digital computer is wholly discrete and allows no alternation with 
continuous processes. It also marks the contrast with the hybrid computational devices of 
Pask and others, with their frequent alternations between symbolic code and dynamical, 
concurrent processes. 
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alternation and interaction between discrete, symbolic, formal modes and 
continuous, dynamical, time-bound, medium-specific processes. This, he says, is 
the way that life and biological evolution make use of the tremendous power of 
code, of formality, while continuing to exploit dynamical, real-time processes that 
are intimately, inextricably and codependently part of the world in its becoming.  
 
The worlds that Gordon Pask brought forth, throughout his career, answer this 
plea. From his earliest work with Musicolour, through the electrochemical ‘ear’, to 
the many iterations of learning machines, his “deviant” computing systems were 
hybrid, analogue and digital, often involving asynchronous populations of devices 
that only locked into local synchronisation through processes such as the sharing of 
information, or the creation of concepts. They happily and readily shuttle back 
and forth between discrete, formal modes, and continuous, dynamical ones, and 
we are reminded that Pask did not believe that all of reality could be modelled 
within a wholly digital environment: “Process in general is not Turing 
representable” (Pask, 1979c). He invited us to broaden our conception of 
computation itself, and his devices constantly questioned the boundaries of 
individual systems, our place within them, and where control could be said to be 
manifest. Throughout his career Pask was interested in concurrent processes, and 
although he believed such processes could be formalised – Conversation Theory 
and its underlying “proto logic” Lp attempted to do exactly this – he did not 
believe such formality could be adequately instantiated in wholly digital systems. 
His was a formality of many-valued logic, discrete and continuous processes, and 
above all, of concurrent operations. Pask’s formality is anathema to the serial 
operations and the binary logic of the digital computer. The hybrid systems he 
built to explore such issues bring about the becoming of coherence, and in such 
systems it is always impossible to state exactly where control is manifest: circularity 
is the order of the day.  
 
All of this relates very directly to anyone working with music technology today. In 
this domain the dominance of the digital computer, and a wider, associated 
computationalism, is evident wherever we see increasing numbers of processes, 
products and personnel co-opted into an algorithmic setting. This trend is baulked 
by the stubborn refusal of vinyl, analogue tape, modular synthesis, to quietly 
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obsolesce. But academic work stoked on the promise of the digital – a faith in its 
propensity to “ultimately be all” (Norman, 2006, 23, cf. p.119) – tends to dismiss 
such moves through a periodising logic that posits ‘technostalgia’, ‘hipster’ 
appropriation, the ‘post-digital’, and a host of other terms that prop up implicit 
assumptions of historical-technological progression. At the same time this 
normalises the currency113 of digital devices, approaches, techniques, what have 
you. In this thesis – through both theoretical discussion and practical exploration 
– I have tried to show some of the problems with this faith in formality in the 
music technological domain. I have suggested that the continuing presence of 
analogue and physical, real world devices and processes is not simply a blip, soon 
to be subsumed within a digital future. I have tried to show how the narrative of 
progress at the heart of such beliefs is flawed in important ways. To be sure, 
contemporary use of tape is nostalgic for some, or a marker of authenticity for 
others, but I don’t believe this is the only way, or indeed the best way, of viewing 
such actions. I wonder whether the ‘blip’ is rather the ‘detour’ that Pickering 
suggested (cf. p.102): our contemporary culture’s bias towards digital devices and 
computationalism. I wonder also whether the more frequent alternations and 
interactions between continuous and discrete processes found in ‘maverick’ 
computing systems – chemical-, bio-, physical-, reservoir-, evolution-in-materio-, 
analogue – might soon be seen as vital to AI, A-life, generative systems, evolving 
systems. At present this looks unlikely, which is one of the reasons for bringing 
this thesis into being (even though I didn’t know that when I began this project). 
 
 
Research questions revisited 
 
To add further clarity to some of the points above let us revisit the research 
questions presented in the introduction. 
 
 
 
                                               
113 In the sense of the present-day, being “generally accepted or in use” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2018), but also medium of exchange. 
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Analogue-digital 
How might a combination of technical, historical and practice-based research, 
focused through commitment to artistic outputs in the domain of music 
technology, shed new light on the much used terms analogue and digital, and on 
the nature of the analogue-digital relationship? 
 
A key contention of this thesis is the idea that analogue and digital always and only 
coexist. This concept has grown with the thesis, and was not what I expected to 
find when I started this research. This conclusion comes as a result of a detailed 
and extensive theoretical exploration of both the technical and the changing 
historical views of these processes, and a thorough practical investigation within 
realms of music technology deemed obsolete by many, all of which is grounded on 
extensive music technological ‘digital literacy’. These explorations find that there 
is no single way to define the terms analogue and digital such that it will hold in all 
circumstances. Attempts to formalise the distinction fall down when trying to 
move between different domains. What holds for one domain, such as 
computation, fails to port over to another domain, such as recording, signal, 
transduction, or what have you. The terms analogue and digital are “substantive-
hungry” (cf. p.34), and when attached to a particular noun or noun-phrase 
definition becomes tractable, but here we see that each term individually needs the 
other to actually demarcate the distinction: they are complementary, not 
oppositional. The distinction itself is important: it is a difference that makes a 
difference, but the act of making the distinction is an act of interpretation, and can 
never be wholly removed from the interests, schemes and biases of an observer 
who is necessarily participant in the systems thus demarcated. This gives us an 
ethical responsibility towards the act of interpretation itself: we make a cut 
because it allows us to gain traction on a situation, but the nature of the cut 
constrains and conditions further such cuts, and as such we should carry with us a 
responsibility for this demarcation. The making of the distinction itself is a 
performative act that brings forth a world. This thesis, then, questions and 
ultimately refuses commonplace ways of making the cut that privilege either term 
too greatly. Pronouncements on ‘the digital’ and related ‘digital culture’ and 
‘digital age’ vastly overburden the term digital, at the same time as implicitly 
refusing the complementary importance of the term analogue. Digital is here 
 139 
asked to do too much work, at the same time as consigning analogue to the 
position of ‘other’, as outsider, as inexorably obsolescing past, or as ‘everything 
outside of the computer’. All such pronouncement are refused by this thesis. To 
posit anything as analogue or digital is to make an interpretation that is useful to 
the conversation in progress. It is a simplification and an abstraction that allow us 
to gain some purchase on some complex situation or another. Neither analogue 
nor digital can be seen as synonymous with the future, or innovation, or the nature 
of the world, life, or the mind. Let us restore some of the contextual and technical 
specificity to these terms and thereby allow them to continue to do useful work in 
a multitude of different domains and disciplines; let us insist upon the multifaceted 
and complementary nature of their definitions, and be clear about how we are 
using them and the ramifications of our usage. 
 
These are some of the issues that my practice has explored through musique 
concrète, sound installation, modular synthesis performance, and with special focus 
on studio recording. I have found a great difference in my practical investigations 
of what is commonly called ‘analogue recording’ and ‘digital recording’. I have 
consciously chosen to name this separation ‘tape studio’ and ‘DAW studio’, since 
this names the recording medium at the heart of the production of recorded music, 
and avoids ambiguity about which bits of the actual recording process are 
analogue or digital (or both, or neither). I do hold, though, that the most useful 
way to describe magnetic tape is as an analogue medium, just as the DAW is best 
described as a digital medium. The most important differences in working in these 
separate domains that I have noted are due to one recording medium being 
continuous and time-bound, and the other being discrete and time-independent. 
Surrounding these core recording media are the various complexes of 
transductions, alternating continuous and discrete processes. The fact of the 
continuous recording medium of tape is that the music in creation necessarily and 
inevitably goes through extremely frequent alternations of continuous and discrete 
processes – these have been enumerated at length in chapters 3 and 6. The fact of 
the discrete recording medium of the DAW is that the music in creation may go 
through frequent alternations of continuous and discrete, but as we have seen, 
tends to go through far less and may go through none at all (other than in the mind 
of the operator/producer). Pattee has shown how such alternations are 
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fundamental to life and biological evolution, and suggests that they are also 
fundamental to issues of creativity, learning and ‘higher’ cognition. I have 
certainly come to see all forms of musical creation as a frequent shuttling between 
discrete, symbolic, time-independent description and continuous, performative, 
time-bound expression. My work does not and cannot eschew the coded or the 
symbolic. It recognises their profound importance, but asks that hybrid processes 
be given their due, and that the digital computer is not asked to be too much.  
 
 
Progress narratives and succession logic 
There is a prevalent assumption that digital music-technological processes 
represent a progression from preceding analogue processes; how does this 
assumption stand up to a sustained, committed practice-based exploration? 
 
Central to this thesis’s theoretical framework is the idea that digital recorded 
audio takes sound ‘out of time’, removing it from the continuous milieu in which it 
was born (e.g. the transduced analogue signal that outputs the microphone). This 
discretisation is the hallmark of a terminal, digital transduction (in the A/D 
converter), and is the key affordance that distinguishes the production 
environments of the tape studio and the DAW studio. This discretisation affords 
an unprecedented hyper-mutability, yet music technology discourse tends to posit 
digital audio editing as an upscaling of the affordances of editing on tape. I 
suggest, however, that this ‘take out of timeness’ is not a continuation of processes 
initiated in an ‘analogue era’. Instead it is a radical departure from the practices of 
tape editing which fundamentally reshape the domain of technological musicking. 
The term ‘editing’ – apparently innocuous in its functional implications – is co-
opted into the succession logic and the assumption of replacement along lines of 
continuity that I have attempted to identify throughout this thesis. But my 
embodied engagement with tape editing strongly suggests that digital audio 
editing is a radical rupture, rather than a continuation. Other elements of 
recording studio practice, such as musical and technical performance, are also 
often assumed to port over relatively unchanged from tape studio to DAW (or 
from tape music composition to the sampler), but my practice-based explorations 
have highlighted some of the problems with this viewpoint, and how the ‘take out 
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of timeness’ of digital audio conditions and regulates studio practices in ways 
which tend not to have been acknowledged. I have shown how performance is 
devalued, assuming a lesser significance in general, and in some cases 
disappearing completely from the process of production. I have indicated how 
commitment to action, to decision-making, and to performance itself, lessen in the 
DAW, resulting in a very different sounding music, even when the DAW is 
pressed into service in emulation of previous (tape-based) styles of production. I 
have also noted how the embodied, tacit, gestural know-how of the engineer, 
performer and composer, moving and musicking around the physical space of the 
tape studio, alter in profound ways with the move to the DAW, and how 
increasing orders of these embodied processes become rationalised and formalised 
‘in the box’, even if this move is occluded by the multiple skeuomorphic 
emulations, represented through the “square horizon” of the screen. The 
unshackling of sound from its temporal milieu allows audio to become so much 
more code, and affords the encroaching tendency for more and more elements of 
the traditional tape studio, including increasingly personnel themselves, to be 
“lumped together” within wholly digital environments. But we recall from Pattee 
that wholly discrete milieu differ from the processes of life and biological 
evolution, with their frequent alternation of code and physical interpretation of 
that code, their alternation of discrete, symbolic description and continuous, 
dynamical expression. My musical practice has been a kind of ‘de-lumping’: forcing 
alternation by deliberately not lumping all the important parts of the process into 
one closed environment. Pattee asks whether this complementary interaction of 
continuous and discrete processes is not essential for higher forms of intellectual 
behaviour, and I have pursued this question with the commitment that comes 
from making music that will have its own life in the world at large. I have resisted 
the opposition between analogue and digital, seeing them as complementary. I have 
noted the many digital processes still in evidence in the various parts of the 
practice outlined here, even as I stress the importance of the analogue elements. 
There is no attempt here at ‘purity’, analogue or otherwise. The practice is 
resolutely hybrid. All technological musical practices evidence some measure of 
continuous-discrete, analogue-digital complementarity. Hybridity is the norm, and 
I believe we should acknowledge and embrace this. Even in the ‘purest’ digital 
system there is still a continuous electrical base to the constrained discrete 
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network; there is still the need for the digital sound to be transduced to analogue 
sound before transduction to the acoustic sound we can actually listen too; and 
there is the all important source of both continuous and discrete processes in the 
mind of the programmer or user of a digital system. We do these rich and 
important terms, analogue and digital, a very great disservice by writing a 
progress ridden narrative that runs acoustic to analogue to digital. I believe we 
should take seriously Pattee’s deep insights into the nature of life and evolution, 
and that we benefit when our musical systems frequently alternate between 
discrete and continuous modes, especially if we are interested in a music of 
becoming, a music that allows for under-specified goals such as adaptation and 
evolution, and that evidence a liveliness that does any justice to life itself.  
 
Exploring the tape studio has pointed up, in no uncertain terms, the necessity and 
essential underpinning of four related areas: performance, gesture, embodiment 
and commitment. This has encouraged me to re-evaluate the coded, formal, 
representational environment of the DAW and to conclude that, for all its vaunted 
affordances, it tends to devalue, and indeed discourage, all four of these areas. As 
a composer for whom all of these things are crucial, whose compositional process 
relies on performance and relishes contingency, who enjoys a craftsman like 
approach centred on the nexus of mind-hand-ear, who values underspecified 
goals, wayfinding, laying down a path in walking, all within highly technical 
environments, then the embrace of what I have here called the tape studio has 
been something of a revelation: difficult, challenging, frustrating at times, but 
ultimately conducive to the production of compositions I am happy to let out into 
the world. I had a hunch that there was a problem with digital audio. I have 
explored this hunch over the course of several years from a number of different 
angles. The problem itself is a deeply personal one, and I do not recommend the 
path I have taken to everyone, but when so much of contemporary culture comes 
under the rubric of the computational, when the algorithmic becomes dominant, it 
is easy to assume that that is indeed what musicking should be. I have questioned 
and ultimately resisted these assumptions in search of a practice that suits the 
elements of musicking I value – performance, contingency, embodiment, 
commitment, rich possibilities for evolution – and I have not found the progress 
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narratives and their attendant succession logic to stand up to my own explorations 
in these regards. 
 
 
Cybernetics 
How might both practical and theoretical examination of technological musicking 
be buttressed by the now mostly obscured discipline of cybernetics, in particular 
the little known cybernetics of Gordon Pask? 
 
This thesis is part of a current resurgence of interest in the obscured field of 
cybernetics, and I hope I have contributed to this resurgence by showing how 
Pask’s cybernetics can aid us in thinking through and acting around current 
problems in technological musicking. Of particular relevance and import to this 
thesis is how second-order cybernetics affords a powerful practical methodology 
for the examination and creation of dynamical systems in flux, systems that evolve 
as a result of (participant) interaction, systems that can be seen to manifest self-
organisation. Second-order cybernetics puts the emphasis on processes in 
interaction rather than positing pre-existing objects (including concepts) in a 
world ‘out there’. Cybernetics helps us to explore systems whose complexity and 
interdependence precludes the separation out into constituent parts, systems 
where control is shared across multiple mutually interacting dimensions, and 
where the observer is a committed participant whose actions, interests and biases 
cannot be divorced from the interactions therein. It is just such systems that I am 
interested in building within music technological infrastructures, and it is such 
systems that interest me compositionally.  
 
One of the things noted by many commentators on Pask is how prescient, 
perspicacious and generally ahead of his time his thinking and making was (for 
example, Boden (2008), Cariani (1993), Haque (2007), Pickering (2011)). Pask’s 
insistence on buttressing theory through building physical devices – “thought 
experiments carried out in hardware” (Fuller, 2011, 71) – anticipated 
contemporary practice-based research by several decades; Musicolour of the early 
50s seems, to me, to be unsurpassed as an interaction environment; the ‘ear’ of the 
late 50s is still, to this day, the only computational environment that grew its own 
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“emergent sensory capabilities” (Cariani, 1993, 1). His (and Susan Curran’s) 1982 
non-technical introduction to computing is extremely unusual in discussing both 
the history and the yet to be realised promise of alternatives to microprocessor-
based digital computers. He called these “maverick” computers and commented:  
 
Maverick designs are quite well documented, but hidden away in conference 
proceedings or in the archives of funding agencies. One of the purposes of this 
book is to point out that this intellectual and monetary investment exists and that it 
should not be forgotten or squandered. People are, from time to time, apt to 
reinvent the wheel! And reinventions sometimes miss previous clever and crucial 
ideas, or stumble against obstacles which previous innovators succeeded in solving. 
(Pask and Curran, 1982, 136) 
 
This is Pask cautioning against progress narratives that assume that the best way 
to solve a problem is with whatever technology is newest. I have taken such 
directives seriously in my own historical and practical examinations of music 
technologies, where the majority of current research happens at what people refer 
to as ‘the cutting edge’, which for the last 20 years or so has been almost 
exclusively synonymous with digital technology.  
 
In relation to the analogue-digital distinction, above, I have highlighted the 
importance of interpretation, which is central to the drawing of distinctions. The 
centrality of interpretation, and the inseparability of the observer from the act of 
interpretation, is key to the second-order cybernetics of Pask and others, and 
these insights have lost none of their perspicacity, even if cybernetics has become 
obscured. We have seen how cybernetics, in its earliest incarnation at the Macy 
conferences dove deep into questions around analogue-digital, particularly in 
relation to mind, and attempts to mechanise thinking processes. Interpretation, 
and acknowledging the position of the observer in demarcating a system were 
central, even if agreement over the nature of analogical and digital processes in 
body and mind was elusive. Although the tendrils of early AI coiled tightly around 
this formative cybernetic stem, by the 1960s they had obscured much of the 
richness of the early growth, promoting an overweening faith in digital (formal, 
symbolic, representational) processes and eschewing essential notions of 
complementarity and hybridity. At the same time cybernetics began to be written 
out of histories of AI and cognitive science (see Boden, 2008). Cariani believes 
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that this avowed obsolescence was deliberately enforced at multiple points in the 
history of cybernetics, such as the attempt by Minsky and others to “defund” it, 
pushing important funding streams into areas such as symbolic AI, and forcing a 
divergence of disciplines with shared roots in key theoretical work of the 40s and 
50s (Cariani, 2017). Cariani commented in the 1990s on what one might be 
tempted today to call a continuing ‘hegemony of digital computation’: 
 
[D]evices such as the digital computer which evolve into large industries create 
entire worldviews and mold the thinking of the armies of engineers that design, 
build, manage, and maintain them. Once the digital electronic computer had gained 
hegemony in information processing, it became difficult if not impossible for large 
segments of the engineering community to conceive of devices based on radically 
different design principles. Today anyone attempting to develop such alternatives 
must contend with the predominance of the digital worldview. (Cariani, 1993, 8-9) 
 
As Maturana and Varela’s epigraph, at the top of this chapter, indicates, acts of 
knowing bring forth worlds, and there has been, for at least the last 30 years, a 
great deal of ‘digital worldbuilding’. Cariani’s early 90s quote was prescient: he 
was talking about ‘information processing’, but the hegemony of the digital 
computer has proliferated into a bewildering profusion of areas since then. I 
believe this hegemony is problematic in all kinds of ways, and my reaction to it 
certainly informed the bunch of hunches I started this project with, but it is 
cybernetics, more than anything else, that allowed me to make my own intellectual 
inroads into the complexity of the situation. Cybernetics has encouraged me in 
taking a different tack to the historical/technological progress narratives that seem 
so common and that I also, in many ways, subscribed to before commencing this 
research.  
 
Attendance at multiple music technology related academic conferences, as well as 
surveys of the extant literature, not to mention currents in commercial music 
technology, have convinced me that something very similar to the hegemony 
Cariani describes is (still) going on with music technology. My engagement with 
cybernetics has been key to my changed perspective on historical/technological 
progression, on complex systems, on artificial intelligence and a host of other areas 
which the domain of music technology both draws from, and feeds into. I join with 
Pickering, Cariani, Haque and others who hold that cybernetics is not only still 
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relevant, but that it has explored many important issues with such far sighted 
perspicacity that it urgently needs to be reconsidered in light of a culture that 
seems to be becoming more and more computationally oriented. Chapter 3 is my 
attempt to instate the significance of cybernetics in relation to the domain of the 
recording studio; and the relationship between cybernetics and the complex 
performative systems that modular synthesis users build now seems so obvious to 
me that it seems strange that this connection is still under explored.   
 
On a personal level, there is no doubt that my deep engagement with cybernetics 
has changed the way that I think, how I see the world, and how I comport myself 
in that world. Pask’s is a performative vision stressing the ethical responsibility we 
have towards our own engagement with the world in its becoming. Acts of 
knowing, acts of making, acts of musicking – all bring forth a world. I have taken 
this seriously in relation to the bringing forth of both musical creation and the 
environments we value culturally for such creation. Of key import here is the 
concept of self-organisation and the possibilities for evolution – technical, 
infrastructural, musical – therein. The environments that allow participant 
tinkering and creative misuse to aid evolution are the ones I have focused on, and 
found such opportunities for open ended evolution employing underspecified 
goals to be prevalent in environments such as the tape studio that encourage 
frequent alternation and interactions of continuous and discrete processes. Varela 
calls this “laying down a path in walking” and I have found the path I have laid 
down through the supposedly obsolete areas such as the tape studio to be 
conducive to exactly the things that I have always valued in composing and 
musicking: performance, intuition, surprise, craftsmanship, interdependence of 
multiple interlocking elements, emergence, complexity, and liveness itself.  
 
 
Transduction and performativity 
How might notions of transduction and performativity help us in explorations of 
complex technical environments supportive of the embodied production of music?  
 
Although I have spent a quite a large portion of this thesis discussing the 
continuous and the discrete, this is not the only way to cut apart the domain of 
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technological musicking. Transduction and performativity both offer fruitful 
alternatives. But before reviewing this, it is worth remembering that transduction 
allows us to gain some purchase on the analogue-digital distinction itself, since it 
allows us to specify, with some degree of rigour, whether final stages in chains of 
transduction – leading to devices, media, processes, what have you – are 
continuous or discrete. Thus, I confidently ascribe both magnetic tape and vinyl 
recording as analogue media, since the final transduction in each case is a 
continuous one. Likewise, recorded digital audio is the result of a terminal discrete 
transduction. As we have seen in relation to recording, whether this final stage 
leads to a continuous, time-bound signal, or to discrete, time-independent code, 
has important ramifications, not just for what can be done with that signal – its 
affordances – but for how those affordances condition, regulate and influence the 
way embodied musicking agents work with that signal. 
 
Transduction is a process at the heart of many music technological operations, and 
is especially pertinent to the recording studio and recorded music in general, since 
any recording is the result of multiple chains of transductions, and the essential 
listening that brings a recording alive is also the result of multiple transductions: 
the laid down recorded signal (on e.g. magnetic tape, vinyl groove, digital storage) 
is played back; this signal is transduced to an analogue electronic one, which 
drives a speaker, wherein the signal is transduced to an acoustic one, which 
travels through the air to our ears, wherein further transductions occur. Of course 
there are other examples of this passage from source to ear (e.g. bone conducting 
headphones, or the signal traveling through water), just as there may be 
interventions during this passage (the signal might pass through a compressor, or 
an EQ), all of which will evince further transductions. The point is that 
transduction is never neutral: just as something is carried over (e.g. a sound) 
something is changed (e.g. the quality of that sound). Transduction is a process 
that relates at the same time as it distinguishes.  
 
Further to this, technologies of transduction can constrain performativity at 
various points and in varying ways. From the pithy telegram to the singing styles 
of the ‘crooners’, transduction is never a neutral conduit of information: it 
constrains and conditions the ways the particular technology is used by active 
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agents. They may be hoping for clarity in the passage of the message, as in 
composition of a telegram, or in the ‘human microphone’ (cf. p.22); or they may 
consciously exploit unintended side effects, as when the crooners of the 30s 
discovered both how relatively soft singing close to a microphone suggested 
intimacy and ‘presence’ to a listener, and how the proximity effect (itself a side 
effect of directional microphones) boosted the ‘warm’ low frequencies of the voice. 
Frank Sinatra would have been a very different singer had he had to project his 
unamplified voice into an auditorium. Unwanted side effect can become vaunted 
affordance as transduction technologies collide with performativity as part of 
ongoing histories of practice. This co-dependent mutuality between transduction 
and performativity is one of the things this thesis has attempted to highlight in 
relation to the complex technical and cultural assemblages of the recording studio, 
and also in relation to live performance in modular synthesis. 
 
Throughout this thesis I have highlighted the importance of commitment, and 
have explored it in relation to activities such as recording, where I have found that 
despite the assumption of isomorphism between analogue and digital recording, 
levels of commitment vary between the two, recording to tape tending to evince 
far higher levels of commitment than the ‘equivalent’ digital recording. I have used 
this as an argument against the supposed isomorphism, but commitment is also 
important in and of itself, as noted by Klemmer et al. and others (cf. p.91). 
Further to this, I relate commitment directly to one of this thesis’s key concepts 
and propose that performativity is commitment: not commitment to action, but 
commitment in action. Commitment to the bringing about of a world, bringing 
about the becoming of meaning, of identity. Performativity thus also has an 
important ethical dimension, highlighted by Barad and Pickering for whom 
performativity is a useful antidote to representationalism. This performative 
commitment to the becoming of identity also has parallels with Simondon’s notion 
of individuation, and thus also to notions of transduction, which for Simondon is an 
essential, ongoing, continuous process of differentiation through relation: “Every 
transduction is an individuation in process. It is a way something comes to be, an 
ontogenesis” (MacKenzie, 2006, 18). 
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As a composer, I am interested in unpredictable sounding scenarios, in steering 
the becoming of sound, negotiating contingency, being part of complex technical 
environments where interdependency and mutual interaction of multiple elements 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to state exactly where control is manifest, and 
thereby offer rich potential to surprise me in the moment of musicking. Such 
environments, such moments of musicking, heighten performativity for me as a 
musician, and I have especially valued such moments when performativity 
intersects transduction: this can manifest in the simple twisting of a knob in The 
Thing Breathed, where the complex nested feedback networks, with multiple  
interacting transductions, make the ‘wiggling’ knife-edge unpredictable. The 
commingling of transduction and performativity is also evident in the laying down 
of a rhythmic bed in the tape pop pieces where my performance influences 
multiple semi-autonomous interacting clocks; and is especially key to the 
performance of a mix. The crunch point in the tape studio, in all of this, is the 
moment of pressing record; this is a pivotal juncture that not only initiates the 
transduction that lays the signal down on tape, but also transduces between the 
pre-recording rehearsal, setup, calibration, fixing in memory, preparing readiness 
stage, and the performative recording stage itself, which commits to tape. I have 
indicated how much harder it is to find such a pivotal juncture when recording to 
the DAW, where the performer is almost always aware of the affordances of post-
performance editing, and so offloads much of their own commitment to 
performance to a later time, or to other people. I am not setting up this opposition 
in order to claim higher value for one or the other, rather to indicate that for me, 
as a composing musician who values performance, and who makes music in which 
a presentation of performance is important, the tape studio works, in ways which I 
have always found problematic in the DAW.114 
 
 
                                               
114 While acknowledging that language use can itself be problematic: what ‘works’ for me 
might appear as a wilfully contrary refusal to move with the times by others. And much of 
the discussion around the ‘democratisation’ of the studio, said to accompany introduction 
of the DAW, revolves around making technologically complex studio environments 
‘work’ for growing numbers of ‘amateur’ producers. Again, the position outlined here is a 
personal one – I do not claim generality in ‘what works’, rather encourage fitting means of 
production to one’s own predilections.  
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Original contribution to knowledge 
 
Let my pattern of inevitably incomplete competence cover areas neglected by 
others. (Campbell, 1969, 15) 
 
Another lesson we continually relearn is that originality is something of a snare if 
not a positive delusion. (Pask, 1976, 76)  
 
The work discussed here is resolutely interdisciplinary, and the intersections 
herein, the knotting together of diverse realities and domains, is, I maintain, an 
original contribution to the theory and practice of technological musicking. 
 
One contribution highlighted here is that insights wrought from physical 
engagement with material practices are different to those that come either from 
surveying the literature of a domain, or from the attempt to simulate within a 
different domain. The insight itself may not be new, but the confirmation through 
practice discussed here is, I believe, a significant contribution to the buttressing of 
this conclusion.  
 
The practice itself is original, even if the techniques and technologies used are not 
innovative or ‘cutting edge’, as commonly defined. These pieces are my own 
compositions, and I have made technology both substance and subject of these 
compositions. 
 
The cybernetics of the studio of chapter 3 presents a novel way of exploring, 
through a Paskian cybernetic methodology, recording studio dynamics involving 
the intersection of: technological infrastructure; transduction; participant 
interaction; embodiment, gesture and performativity; self-organisation; and 
possibilities for evolution. 
 
The long exploration of analogue and digital in chapter 2 presents much that 
surveys existing work. The conclusions, detailed in that chapter and immediately 
above, are my own, and are, to a certain extent, original in that they present an 
unorthodox perspective. 
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Practice-based research into popular music production is, at present, under 
explored; chapter 6 presents a significant contribution to this area. 
 
 
Directions for future research 
 
Many threads have been left dangling in order to prune growth of the thesis, some 
of which are presented below with incipient anticipation of continuation. 
 
Tensegrity  
Some initial practice-based research was carried out into this area which led to an 
installation at Sussex in 2016. Tensegrity is a structural form invented by sculptor 
Kenneth Snelson, and named and articulated more famously by Buckminster 
Fuller in the 1960s. There has been a concerted exploration of this area in the last 
ten years in architecture, but also interest from the fields of robotics, reservoir 
computing and other areas germane to the concerns expressed here. Fuller used 
tensegrity as exemplar of the complementarity of compression and tension (they 
“always and only coexist”), but it is also of direct relevance to my practice through 
its intimate, complementary weaving together of continuous (the tension wires) 
and discrete (the struts). It is also germane to currents in Pask’s late work yet to 
be built upon by scholars: Pask was experimenting with the form in the early 90s 
as “elements of a potential concurrent computer” (Green, 2004, 1436), indicating 
his continued interest in maverick,  unconventional forms of computation. I will 
continue to explore this structural form in connection with modular synthesis, the 
self-organising studio and other areas. 
 
Further work on the self-organising studio  
With continued attention to the frequent alternation of discrete-continuous. There 
is certainly an article to be written on the self-organising studios of Prince, Kate 
Bush, Laurie Anderson, Lee Perry, Todd Rundgren, and others. 
 
A theory of cybernetic musicking  
This thesis is the first act: it has, in walking, laid down the first few steps, and, in 
growing itself, constrained the eventual theory, as any evolving framework must.  
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Much work still to be done on evolution 
I have indicated, in ‘The life and evolution of a song’ (cf. p.51) how Pattee’s 
theories of cell physiology and biological evolution could be applied to ideas of 
evolution in music. There is much here that could be developed. 
 
Ranulph Glanville  
An experimental electronic musician turned cybernetician via doctoral study with 
Pask. His work is under explored in music scholarship, and I have only been able 
to touch on him in this thesis. His article on his own music (Glanville, 2001c) is 
important both to his status as an unsung 60s electronic music innovator and to 
connections between music and cybernetics. There are a rich set of 
interconnections with Pask, Allan Strange, listening, design and much else. I have 
no doubt he grew cybernetic ears. 
 
 
Growing cybernetic ears 
 
…this work has grown itself, and I have, to the best of my ability, notated it. 
(Glanville, 1975, iii) 
 
I have indicated at various points how my own thinking has changed through the 
course of this PhD. This is why I talk of ‘growing a thesis’, in line with Glanville’s 
comment on his own PhD thesis, above, and why ‘growing cybernetic ears’ is a 
process that is ongoing, a constant becoming. This is pursuit of Pask’s 
underspecified goals. I did not start with preconceived ideas of what I would 
achieve, I followed a path in walking that led me to here, as it led me to hear.  
 
But… 
  
I tire of talk. 
 
When I talk, I cannot guarantee that anyone listens. I can hope they do. But the 
response I may be looking for is not within my gift: it is in the gift of the listener. To 
listen is to connect and to participate. To listen is to sign on. (Glanville, 2001c, 4)  
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Growing cybernetic ears is… 
 
Constantly adapting our listening to a changing world. 
 
Taking seriously the part we play in the coevolution of humans and machines in 
the domain of technological musicking. 
 
Encouraging the machines we coevolve with to be more compelling conversational 
partners, and the technological environments we inhabit to foster better 
interaction through better listening. 
 
An interdisciplinary approach: listening outside one’s own field for cross-currents 
of relevance. 
A historical approach: listening to the past with ears pricked for resonances 
germane to research and practice.  
A technological approach: listening both to the sounds we make with our 
machines, and to the manner in which they encourage and regulate musicking. 
 
A most becoming process. 
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APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 
 
 
 
• A/D converter: transducer that converts an analogue signal into a digital 
signal 
• Arpeggiator: function found on various synthesisers that plays back a held 
chord as a spread arpeggio, clocked in various ways, usually by an onboard 
LFO 
• Bounce: process of recording one or more tape track to another tape track 
on the same machine. An essential process with an 8-track recorder if there 
are more than 8 things to record. The term is also used in DAWs to 
indicate an ‘in the box’ mix, or other process that combines multiple digital 
audio files into a single one 
• Brickwall limiting: extreme form of compression that uses a digital 
algorithm that presents a ‘brickwall’ ceiling, beyond which no signal can 
pass. It has been used to make digital mixes louder and louder (the 
‘loudness war’), though that trend seems now to be on the wane 
• Clock divider: modular synthesis element that takes in a clock signal and 
outputs various ‘divided by’ outputs. E.g. a /2 output would give a half-
time clock signal 
• Comping: compilation of various takes of a performance into one definitive 
take. Standard practice in a DAW. Possible on tape, but depends on how 
many tracks are free, and involves internal bouncing which degrades the 
quality of the sound 
• Compressor: signal processing device that reduces dynamic range 
• CV: Control Voltage – modular synthesis term applied to non-audio signals 
used to control parameters of modules. E.g. an oscillator will have a CV 
input that would allow another module, such as an LFO, to control the 
pitch of the oscillator 
• D/A converter: transducer that converts a digital signal into an analogue 
signal 
• DAW: Digital Audio Workstation – piece of software that allows a 
computer to deal with digital audio, recording, editing, MIDI, etc., all in 
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one production environment. Standard equipment for most audio 
production since the mid-2000s 
• Drop-in: process of recording a new section into an existing recording on 
tape. Used to fix errors of performance, etc. There has to be enough time 
both before and after the drop-in for this to operate successfully 
• EQ: equalisation – signal processing device that alters the frequency 
content of an audio signal 
• Fader: linear potentiometer found on mixing desks. The primary way of 
setting the level of a channel on the mixing desk 
• Fader riding: moving the fader in live performance of a mix or other 
recording, allowing changes of level to certain elements of the mix 
• ‘In the box’: term used in DAW mixing to indicate that all summing of 
audio, signal processing and addition of effects happens within the 
software environment. Contrasted to an ‘out of the box’ mix which would 
include hardware such as a mixer (to sum audio and set levels), 
compressors and EQ for signal processing, and outboard effects such as 
reverb and delay 
• LFO: Low Frequency Oscillator – synthesis term for a device that outputs 
an oscillating signal with a frequency below that of audio (below 20Hz). 
Generally used as a control device to ‘wobble’ parameters such as pitch 
(vibrato) or volume (tremelo) 
• MIDI: Musical Instrument Digital Interface – communications protocol 
established in the early 1980s to allow different musical devices to 
exchange control information 
• Multitrack (tape, etc.): tape or tape machine that has multiple tracks that 
can be recorded onto. All of the multitrack work in this thesis uses an 8-
track multitrack 
• Oscillator: synthesis term for the device which produces the primary audio 
signal 
• Physical modelling: digital synthesis technique which formalises in code 
aspects of the behaviour of physical instruments (acoustic or electronic), 
allowing digital emulation of those instruments 
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• Plug-in: digital device used in a DAW that (usually) emulates the 
behaviour of hardware signal processors and effects such as compressors, 
EQ, reverb, etc. 
• Preamp: analogue electronic device that boosts the very low output of a 
microphone to a level that is usable by other devices (signal processors, 
mixers, tape machines, A/D converters, etc.) 
• Pulse wave: one of the common waveforms of synthesiser oscillators. An 
on/off oscillation that buzzes at audio frequencies and can also be used as a 
clock signal 
• Quantise: digital process used in both A/D conversion and in MIDI 
editing. Places events (e.g. volume of an audio signal or a MIDI event) 
onto a discrete grid 
• Sampling: digital process describing how an A/D converter slices up 
incoming analogue audio into discrete segments (each of which is further 
quantised for level). Also commonly used to refer to the practice of using 
digital audio in a dedicated piece of hardware called a sampler, or using a 
DAW like a sampler (e.g. by sampling the music of another artist) 
• Sound on sound recording: layering of one recording on top of another 
• Tape head: transducer that converts an analogue electronic signal into a 
continuous magnetic flux that can be recorded onto magnetic tape, or 
allows playback of magnetic tape by reversing the process 
• Tape splicing: process of cutting and joining together sections of analogue 
tape 
• Tracking: the term for recording in the studio. Contrasted with ‘mixing’, 
which happens after tracking. The term comes from the practice of 
layering separate recordings onto a multitrack 
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APPENDIX 2: DOCUMENTATION 
 
 
All documentation for the practice is presented on this website: 
http://euterprise.com 
 
The PhD documentation is under ‘music research’: 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/, which is divided up into the 
following four sections: 
 
1. Tape music composition work (chapter 4): 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/musique-concrete/ 
 
2. Tape sound installations (chapter 4): http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-
research/sound-installations/ 
 
3. Modular synthesis (chapter 5): http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-
research/modular-synthesis/ 
 
4. Tape pop production, the Euterprise EP (chapter 6): 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/ 
This section is the most detailed, and gives complete documentation of the entire 
production process of each of the four tracks, giving significant additional 
contextual information: 
Letter Game: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/letter-
game/ 
Perfect Man: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-
ep/perfect-man/ 
Vinyl Coffin: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/vinyl-
coffin/ 
Substantive-Hungry Trouser-Word: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-
research/euterprise-ep/substantive-hungry-trouser-word/ 
 
I have linked to specific pages on the website throughout the thesis. 
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APPENDIX 3: EUTERPRISE EP – THE RECORD 
 
 
The 45rpm 12” EP that comes in the submission package has been cut specifically 
for the PhD submission (3 copies) for examiners to listen to. It was cut by 
Jonathan Harris Cowley at Cutting Grooves, using a modified record deck built 
in Germany (see http://www.cuttinggrooves.co.uk/index.html). What is produced 
is not the same as a commercially released pressing of a record. For that process 
an initial lacquer is cut in the mastering room, which is then sent to a vinyl 
pressing plant which will press the records for mass distribution from the lacquer. 
The system Jonathan uses creates ‘endless dubplates’ (also called ‘one-off vinyl’, 
‘vinyl carving’, etc.): one-off cuts that can be played many times (unlike traditional 
dubplates that wear out after a few plays). The record was cut directly from the 
mix tapes that I made (and that you can hear digitised versions of on the website). 
This process happened only just before I submitted the PhD, and so has not been 
reflected on in the thesis. The process was not straightforward, and I actually had 
to go back to get the three records cut a second time, since the first batch were 
unplayable due to very loud bass masking all of the high frequency detail. As it is, 
the record does sound different to the mix tape – in particular the stereo imaging 
has suffered due to the limitations of the system. I do fully intend to have this 
record pressed in the conventional manner later (in full stereo), in conjunction 
with the record label Bureau B (http://www.bureau-b.com/juniorelectronics.php), 
but details of this are yet to be finalised as I write this. I am still happy with the 
sound of the record included here, and it was important that there was a physical 
product at the end of the process.  
 
The cutting process is documented at: http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-
research/euterprise-ep/euterprise-record-cutting-and-artwork/ 
 
 
The artwork 
 
The artwork was made by me by hand, using a combination of stencil and hand 
printing technology. The image is of Euterpe (muse of music), adapted from this 
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image: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lyon_Mosa%C3%AFque_de_la_muse_
Euterpe_de_la_salle_Rameau.jpg 
 
The creation of the artwork is documented in detail at: 
http://euterprise.com/index.php/music-research/euterprise-ep/euterprise-record-
cutting-and-artwork/ 
 
